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We cannot be completely certain about the ultimate end of the 2008 
world-wide economic and fiscal crises; however, we can be assured that it 
has made permanent changes to the economic and financial systems. In 
this volume, monographs are selected to reflect on the long term impacts 
of these crises within the European Union (EU). Three main topics are 
covered: economic growth, EU fiscal and monetary policy issues, and 
special challenges for the new member and Mediterranean states (in the 
so-called cohesion countries). 
Europe is being battered by multiple, interrelated crises. Economic and 
financial issues triggered the public financial and Euro crises, leading to 
political and social ones not only within some member states but also at 
the EU level. These crises add to a difficult long-term trajectory as Europe 
struggles to maintain its economic, social and environmental models in 
light of resilient challenges such as demographic change, resource scarcity, 
rising inequalities and the need to transform Europe's societies driven by 
climate change and increasing competition from emerging economies. 
Fabian Zuleeg analyses these processes and presents the conditions 
necessary to avoid stagnation in Europe during the next decade.  
Matti Viren applies econometrical analysis to find explanations for the 
slowdown in European economic growth. He presents empirical analyses 
using European cross-country data. Special attention is paid to institutional 
and structural factors that are often assumed to affect aggregate growth: 
the functioning of labour markets, availability of labour and capital and the 
size of government. His results reinforce the notion that accelerating 
growth in Europe is not completely unrealistic. However, it is only 
possible through unpopular reforms.  
The Japanese experience of struggling with decades of recession 
represents a real threat for Europe. Masahiko Yoshii examines what 
happened during the last twenty years in Japan. He studies what policies 
were implemented and why they were ineffective. He draws conclusions 
on lessons learnt and applies them to the current European crisis. 
The common European Union budget is a special field of fiscal policy. 
Gabriele Cipriani provides insights on a particular aspect of national and 
union level budgeting. The economic and financial crisis creates the need 




demonstrating and acknowledging that EU actions add value to national 
policies and address individuals’ concerns more effectively than “national” 
or “local” ones may provide an example of “best practices” for national 
spending. The opportunity is to identify and promote best practices in 
planning, management and reporting to achieve public objectives. 
The euro-area has deep-rooted problems and, despite the various 
attempts to resolve the crisis, no solutions have been offered to the most 
pressing of these problems. Zsolt Darvas summarises ten major roots of 
the euro-crisis and assesses the policy responses to these issues. This is 
followed by a closer examination of the most pressing problem that also 
constitutes the most serious threat to the integrity of the euro-area: the 
dreary economic outlook of southern euro-area member states. He 
concludes that instead of exiting or breaking-up the euro, the common 
interest lies in finding ways to offer improved prospects for these 
countries. A substantial amount of measures need to be accomplished in 
these countries, but other euro-area partners, the so-called ‘northern’ 
members, as well as European institutions, will also have a decisive role in 
supporting the development process in Southern Europe. In the medium 
term, additional intuitional changes will be necessary to complement the 
currently planned overhaul of the euro-area’s institutional framework. 
Miklós Losoncz supplements the previous study and scrutinises the 
latest developments in the sovereign debt crisis and the experience of and 
the issues in crisis management in the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
He focuses on an analysis of the relationship between the institutional 
system and the operation of the EMU and the study of the sovereign debt 
crisis. He discusses the measures introduced thus far that have weakened 
the three pillars of the EMU and provides options for the EU to manage 
the unfolding sovereign debt crisis going forward. 
One of the most important objectives of European integration is to 
reduce the economic gap between the more developed and less developed 
member states. European convergence is based on foreign capital inflows. 
Beáta Farkas demonstrates that this model provided substantial 
opportunities for Mediterranean and post-socialist member states; the 
success of convergence in the European integration process is unique. As a 
consequence of the crisis, the foreign capital inflows in Europe will 
decline and the convergence process will be slowed. Under these 
circumstances, it will be extremely important to promote the positive spill-
over effects of foreign direct investment through economic policy. Both 
national and European policies should focus on the problems of the dual 
economies in the less developed member states and the development of an 
internationally competitive domestic economy to bridge the current 
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productivity gap between foreign and domestic companies. The global 
crisis also necessitates some changes to the concept of integration. 
The crisis that broke out and struck in waves brought to the surface, 
not only the consequences of the shift in the hub of world economic 
development, and the structural problems of the European economy, but 
also the differences in the capabilities, governance and approaches that 
existed between “Eastern Bloc” countries that joined the EU later (the 
“EU-10”), in addition to the differences that had already existed between 
this group and the older members of the European Union. From this 
perspective, Árpád Kovács reviews the common features of, approaches 
to, and differences in public finance among these nations. 
Gábor Dávid Kiss and Andreász Kosztopulosz address the impacts of 
the crisis on monetary policy in three Central-East European countries, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. They analyse the euro-zone’s 
daily bond and currency benchmark’s impacts on their Czech, Hungarian 
and Polish counterparts between 2002 and 2010. They also examine the 
impact of monetary policy changes by the US Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Despite the fact that the Central-East 
European countries follow an ECB-compatible monetary policy; their 
fundamental differences resulted in increased risk premiums on extreme 
days. This risk premium represents increased losses given unfavourable 
events, while the ECB’s and the Fed’s monetary expansion has a limited 
impact on the Central-East European countries. As EU members, these 
countries are required to maintain the free movement of capital and allow 
the application of various financial innovations and will have to introduce 
the euro in the future. The authors conclude that they have to follow an 
inflation-targeting monetary policy but also need to improve their 
institutional capacities to substantially increase their focus on financial 
stability and regional cooperation.  
The crisis in Greece remains the focus of the attention of researchers 
and analysts worldwide. Although several alternative explanations of the 
causes and implications of the crisis in Greece have been produced, the 
literature lacks a focused discussion on the role of fiscal policy in 
addressing the crisis. Against this background, Anna Visvizi’s objective is 
to dwell on the question of how the crisis in Greece was addressed and – 
in this context – how to conceive of the specific role that fiscal policy 
played in the process of addressing Greece’s fiscal imbalance. 
In recent years, Hungarian economic policy has been the focus of 
international interest. Having played a leading role in the 1990s, Hungary 
now lags behind due to public and private sector indebtedness, which is 




important, but less understood cause of the economic slowdown: the 
productivity of domestic enterprises remained low. The country lacks 
large-scale enterprises, which maximise worker output through economies 
of scale and scope. Thus, there is a need for a concentration of ownership 
in fixed capital, as well as in natural resources (e.g., agricultural land and 
forests). Such a strategy would require, first, a rapid consolidation of 
micro- and small enterprises into transparently functioning medium-sized 
and large firms. 
These monographs present a comprehensive picture of the different 
aspects and levels of the crisis. The studies not only confront us with 
serious challenges but also offer potential solutions. 
 
 —The Editor 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
PERSPECTIVES OF GROWTH 
EUROPE IN CRISIS:  







Europe has been battered by the global financial and economic crisis, 
which has turned into a sovereign debt crisis that is not only threatening 
the Economic and Monetary Union and the common currency of the 17 
countries of the euro zone, but the whole European integration process. In 
this immediate climate of crisis, requiring ever-greater political and 
economic sacrifices to keep all countries within the euro zone, too little 
attention is being paid to the long-term challenges Europe faces. 
Europe is facing a daunting set of challenges, which will require 
significant reforms to maintain Europe's economic and social model. 
Dealing with climate change, population ageing, increasing inequality, 
rising unemployment, resource scarcity and global competition will 
require a deeply rooted change in how Europeans live. Furthermore, these 
challenges are being aggravated by the crisis, and the sovereign debt crisis 
will limit what public money can do in future years. Europe will need to 
get used to a very different world, which is characterised by trade-offs and 
sacrifices. 
2. Is the European model special? 
To assess the threat posed by these long-term challenges, including the 
long-term impacts of the current crisis, we first have to determine what 
makes Europe special. What makes the European model uniquely 
European? 
The first and striking issue that can be observed is, of course, that there 
is significant diversity. Even on a very broad macroeconomic level, many 
have classified Europe's economies and social systems into different 
categories, for example, into a Nordic, a Continental, an Anglo-Saxon and 
a Mediterranean model, all with separate characteristics (Sapir 2006). The 
accession of the formerly centrally planned Central and Eastern European 
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countries has, if anything, made the diversity even wider1, also adding 
countries with significantly lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita than in the previous European Union (EU). 
However, even this broad categorisation can easily be called into 
question. For example, where do countries such as France, which arguably 
share some aspects of both the Mediterranean and the Continental model, 
belong? Do all Nordic countries share a similar economic policy 
approach? The euro crisis has also shown that rather than increasing 
convergence, which arguably was the case in the pre-crisis period for 
countries such as Poland, Ireland and Spain, we are facing a period of 
fragmentation, with some countries falling further and further behind. 
Looking at this evidence of continuing diversity and divergence, it 
could be concluded that there is no such thing as a European model. There 
are, however, clear indications that such a European model exists. This is 
more apparent when looking at the situation from the outside and in 
comparison to the rest of the world. 
A case in point is the size and role of government. Typically, the 
European model entails a larger government sector with comparatively 
high public spending. Government expenditure stood at 49.1% in the 
EU-27 in 2011 (Wahrig and Gancedo Vallina 2012), compared to the 
OECD average total outlays of 43.2% (OECD 2012). This level does not 
necessarily mean high public deficits: some countries with the highest 
levels of public spending have sound public finances, while other countries 
with low public spending have significant deficit problems. 
There are typically two reasons for the high level of public spending: a 
relatively generous social net (social security) and the provision of 
universal public services (for example, health and education). This pattern 
of public spending reflects the values of Europeans: while there is a belief 
in the basic principle of a capitalist market economy, there is also a strong 
notion that the “US-style” free market capitalism has to be tempered by 
the state. In essence, the preference of Europeans is for what is termed the 
“social market economy” or the “welfare state.” In recent decades, 
Europeans' concern for social issues has been complemented by a strong 
emphasis on environmental concerns, including combating climate 
change. 
The European model is thus closely aligned with the concept of 
sustainable development, with economic growth complemented by social 
and environmental protection. This concept is reflected in the debate at the 
European level about whether Europeans need and should forego a certain 
                                                          
1 Beáta Farkas (2011) argues that there is a separate model for Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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level of economic growth to maintain high levels of environmental 
protection (by reducing resource consumption) and social cohesion (by 
reducing incentives for profit-making through redistribution). This, in part, 
reflects the high standard of living that has already been reached across the 
EU. However, we should also note that for those countries where incomes 
are lower, more emphasis is generally put on economic growth and 
competition between individuals as an important driver for the economy. 
The general concern for sustainable development is integrated into 
policy at the European level, which in turn reinforces a pan-European 
model. By emphasising the protection of the environment and of workers, 
the EU has created a pan-European standard, which in turn defines 
Europe's unique economic, social and environmental model. Because 
accession to the EU requires acceptance of the existing legal framework 
(the acquis communautaire), the EU also effectively transfers these values 
to new members. 
3. Europe's long-term challenges 
Over recent decades, the Member States of the EU have increasingly 
felt their economic, social and environmental model to be under threat by 
a range of global and European long-term challenges. 
3.1. Globalisation 
One of the key challenges arises from Europe's apparent ambivalence 
to the globalisation process. Europe is clearly one of the key beneficiaries 
of globalisation: European economies are among the world's greatest 
traders and have managed to raise their standards of living significantly 
through integration into the global economy.2 
However, in recent years, for many Europeans the threats from 
globalisation have come more to the forefront, be it culturally, through the 
movement of people, or through intensified competition. Increasingly, 
there is a perception that Europe is not keeping up with its key 
competitors: neither with the more developed economies, such as the US, 
that manage to outpace European productivity developments through 
innovation and entrepreneurship, nor with the developing countries that 
have far lower wages. In both cases, the fear persists that higher European 
                                                          
2 See for example the argument made by José Manuel Durão Barroso (2008), 
President of the European Commission, referring to Daniel Hamilton and Joseph 
Quinlan’s book “Globalization and Europe: Prospering in the New Whirled 
Order”. 
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taxes, as well as higher social and environmental standards, reduce the 
ability of Europeans to compete. 
While this argument has to be taken with a large pinch of salt – after 
all, many European countries have competed very effectively for a long 
time, and the overall European trade position is close to balance – this 
poses a significant challenge to Europe's approach to globalisation.  
First, global competition emphasises the need for quality of public 
spending. If public spending is simply an additional cost, the EU is 
unlikely to retain its competitive edge. If the spending helps to increase 
Europe's productivity and economic capacity, for example by increasing 
human capital and necessary infrastructure, it can add to the overall 
performance of an economy. 
Second, there is a significant challenge for low-skilled jobs that can be 
outsourced to emerging economies. This threat is not for low-skilled jobs 
per se – there are many jobs that are difficult to outsource, for example in 
the area of personal care. However, in sectors where it is easy to transport 
the final product, such as basic manufacturing, labour-intensive industries 
tend to migrate to lower wage cost countries. This can create persistent 
long-term unemployment, especially for low-skilled workers. 
Third, globalisation and especially global competition can put intense 
pressure on companies to consider their cost basis carefully, potentially 
relocating or investing in countries with lower taxes, reduced environmental 
and social standards, or a faster growing market. Companies that do not 
adjust to the reality of global competition will eventually have to close 
down.  
Together, this adds up to a significant challenge to Europe's economic 
and social model. Economies characterised by high public spending without 
the resulting increase in productive capacity, long-term unemployment 
problems, a complex and bureaucratic business environment and low 
investment will struggle to maintain their highly valued lifestyles. While 
some European economies can concurrently maintain their economic and 
social model and retain their competitiveness, others struggle.3 
3.2. Resource competition 
Globalisation is also aggravating the global resource challenge. 
Economic progress still relies on increased consumption of natural 
                                                          
3 In the global competitiveness index, Northern and Western European countries 
dominate the top 10 with Sweden (3rd), Finland (4th), Germany (6th), the 
Netherlands (7th), Denmark (8th) and the United Kingdom (10th). In contrast 
France is only 18th, and Greece is down to 90th (World Economic Forum 2012). 
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resources. The increased demand from the growing middle classes in 
countries such as India and China is creating a strong upward pressure on 
prices for all resources. While the economic crisis is, to some extent, 
reducing demand and thus the upward pressure on prices, this relief is only 
temporary. 
This upward pressure on resources will most obviously affect energy, 
in particular oil, but will also affect energy sources such as coal that were 
less affected in the past. The types of price spikes observed just prior to the 
crisis, which were intensified by conflict, are likely to recur. This then 
affects all of the economy because input prices are higher, leading to 
inflation and lower growth, but also higher food prices. This development 
is mirrored by other resources, such as minerals, commodities or rare 
earths. In particular parts of the world, there will also be an increasing 
pressure on water resources. 
For the EU countries, this resource competition will limit the growth 
potential and increase inflationary pressure. Given that growth rates are 
significantly lower than in emerging economies, the EU provides fewer 
economic opportunities, which will make it increasingly difficult to access 
the resources that are needed. While it is undoubtedly true that emerging 
and developing economies will be even more affected, this provides little 
comfort for the EU. 
In addition to physical resources, there will be intensive competition 
for human resources, especially in relation to scarce, superior and soft 
skills (Collett and Zuleeg 2008). To attract these types of skills in the 
future, European countries can no longer rely on passively attracting 
immigrants and filtering out those that are considered desirable. Rather, 
European countries will have to actively compete for these migrants. 
3.3. Increasing inequality and rising unemployment 
Migration and the increasing diversity of Europe's societies have 
undoubtedly contributed to Europe's economic success in the post-
World War II period. However, increasing diversity has also created 
longer-term issues that are difficult to resolve. In particular, the integration 
of some of the migrant communities has proven difficult, with many 
children from migrant backgrounds underperforming in education and, 
subsequently, being insufficiently integrated into the labour market. This 
deficiency perpetuates social integration problems for these communities.  
However, the problem of inequality does not only affect migrant 
communities. While recent decades have led to an increase in living 
standards for many, there has also been a persistence of disadvantage for 
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some groups. The impact of globalisation noted above can make it difficult 
to reintegrate the long-term unemployed into the labour market, frequently 
resulting in low aspirations being transmitted to future generations. In 
recent years, inequalities in Europe have been rising, a problem likely to 
be aggravated by the economic crisis (European Trade Union Institute 
2012). 
There is an on-going debate in Europe regarding how far inequality 
affects economic performance and imposes costs on all of society.4 
However, having groups in society that are permanently excluded clearly 
adds a burden to social protection systems. And given Europe's 
demographic profile, Europe cannot afford the long-term costs associated 
with under-utilised human resources. 
3.4. Demographic change 
Demographic change, in particular the combination of low fertility and 
increasing life expectancy, will have a profound impact on European 
societies. While the demographic projections differ significantly between 
countries, the common feature for European countries will be population 
ageing: “Population ageing is undoubtedly going to be a key demographic 
challenge in many European countries over the next fifty years” 
(Lanzieri 2011). This development will have a transformative impact on 
European society, which is hard to appreciate in its entirety. 
Of course, migration can have a mitigating impact. However, the scale 
of migration that would be needed to reverse population ageing is very 
high: “In order to prevent a decline in the working-age population, the 
annual number of migrants would need to nearly double compared to 
recent experience” (UN 2001). In any case, it would only be a temporary 
fix because migrant populations also tend to age at similar rates once 
integrated. 
There are clearly challenges from population ageing that affect the 
welfare state. There is increasing pressure on health, care and pension 
systems, while, at the same time, the ratio of those paying into the public 
system to those receiving support is reduced. The obvious way to address 
this issue is by altering public support systems, for example by increasing 
the retirement age. However, this in and of itself is not enough, even if it 
was widely accepted as a step in the right direction. It is crucial to ensure 
that changes to entitlement increase the propensity of individuals to stay in 
the labour market; for example, apart from a potentially small reduction in 
                                                          
4 With significant debate triggered by the publication of Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2009). 
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public support costs, there is no gain if people, instead of retiring, become 
unemployed.  
Keeping all groups engaged in the labour market (i.e., the elderly but 
also other groups with a tendency to drop out, such as those with caring 
responsibilities, a migration background or with health problems) is the 
key to addressing the impact of population ageing.5 
Higher labour market participation also addresses the challenge of 
growth: an ageing population would automatically reduce the growth rate 
unless counteracted by such a development. But achieving higher labour 
market participation is a significant challenge, especially in light of the 
difficult labour market situation across Europe with unsustainably high 
unemployment in many countries. Once again, the current crisis is 
aggravating the long-term challenges Europe faces. 
3.5. Climate change 
One final challenge Europe faces is truly global in nature: how to 
mitigate climate change and how to limit global temperature increases. 
The challenge of dealing with climate change is, however, qualitatively 
different from the other challenges noted above, which makes finding a 
policy solution even more difficult. 
Why is climate change different? The key reason is that whatever 
Europe does with regard to its own emissions will have little impact on the 
overall picture. The growth in the emission of greenhouse gases takes 
place clearly outside of Europe, with the biggest increases in countries 
such as China. While higher emissions in these countries are driven by an 
understandable desire to create economic growth in emerging economies, 
it does aggravate the climate change challenge: even a reduction of 
emissions in Europe is quickly outweighed by developments elsewhere. In 
addition, the other major historical perpetrator of emissions, the US, is 
showing little leadership or motivation on this issue. 
These issues lead some to conclude that Europe should give up on 
attempting to combat climate change and just adapt to its effects while 
ignoring our global responsibilities. However, this is a very negative 
agenda with the obvious drawback that it could result in the destruction of 
the global climate system. A more positive approach is to develop Europe 
as a positive example of how environmental sustainability can be 
combined or even drive economic growth. Such a green growth scenario 
                                                          
5 The European Policy Centre (EPC) has developed the Labour Market Adjusted 
Dependency Ration which clearly shows the combined impact of labour market 
participation rates and ageing populations (Guerzoni and Zuleeg 2011). 
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might well become the standard that other countries aspire to, but it is 
difficult to implement. It is a slow process because of significant political 
and economic transition costs, and it has yet to receive the genuine 
backing of member states. And once again, the crisis is also hindering this 
process, with many arguing that now is not the right time to be too 
ambitious and that we should rather focus on jobs, even if this means that 
the long-term transformation is delayed. 
4. The crisis: from bad to worse 
The economic and financial crisis, which has battered Europe over the 
last three years or so, has aggravated these long-term challenges and has 
added some new and pressing issues that need to be tackled, not least the 
unsustainable public debt situation in many European countries. The crisis 
should thus not be understood as a cyclical downturn from which Europe 
will emerge unscathed. Rather, it is a deep-seated structural crisis that will 
profoundly threaten Europe's economic and social model. While the 
overall impact will crucially depend on how policy reacts to the crisis, it is 
already clear that the on-going transformation will impose significant 
transition costs on all of Europe. 
The first issue the EU will have to address is the aggregated growth 
crisis. The long-term challenges noted above have already tended to 
reduce Europe's growth rate. While policy can do much to reduce this 
impact, overall it remains a challenge to have strongly growing economies 
when faced with low-cost global competition and an ageing workforce. 
The unsustainable public debt situation in many countries further 
aggravates the situation: fiscal consolidation implies lower government 
spending, which will tend to reduce growth rates. 
Dealing with Europe's aggregated growth crisis is tricky at the best of 
times. Even before the economic crisis hit, European attempts to 
reinvigorate the EU economy were less than convincing. At first, European 
worries were raised by competition from the US, driven by impressive 
increases in productivity, and, subsequently, by competition from the 
emerging economies, led by China. The Europeans responded with a 
European growth strategy, the Lisbon strategy, aiming to generate growth 
and jobs in Europe. However, despite some revisions over time, the 
strategy lacked decisive implementation tools. Consequently, while some 
countries in Europe made great advances, others continued to lag behind. 
Even before the crisis hit, it was clear that the Lisbon agenda had not 
significantly shifted the EU's growth performance. 
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The revised version of the Lisbon strategy, Europe 2020, contains 
some provisions that will, in principle, drive implementation more 
strongly, including, for example, provisions to link any European money 
to the strategic objectives in Europe 2020. There are also moves to 
develop the single market further, for example by creating a digital single 
market for Europe's citizens. There are also some attempts to address the 
impact of the crisis, for example by making credit or alternative financial 
instruments more widely available. While these are important initiatives, 
which, if implemented,6 can have an impact on Europe's long-term growth 
rate, they are in themselves insufficient. 
5. Divergence, not convergence 
The solutions for the aggregated growth crisis also have the potential 
to aggravate Europe's other growth crisis: the increasing gap between the 
good performers and those lagging behind. The measures noted above, 
such as a better functioning single market, tend to benefit most those 
countries that have an economy geared towards trade. In a world of scarce 
and expensive capital, investments will go to the countries that are 
performing better. 
In the pre-crisis environment, it looked easier: private capital would 
flow to the peripheral countries, often generated by high savings rates in 
countries such as Germany, and public spending could be financed 
cheaply. Now, however, neither of these routes is open to the countries in 
crisis. Global investors will avoid crisis countries, not least because of the 
political and economic uncertainty such a crisis brings. In the current 
climate, the risks outweigh the possibilities of making returns. The reality 
is that crisis countries will need to receive support from those performing 
better. True, there is already significant funding being provided to prop up 
banking systems and to help governments that struggle to finance their 
public debt at reasonable rates. However, the crisis countries will also need 
support to encourage private investment and enable public investment, for 
example in education (Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis 2011). 
The need of the crisis countries for investment and growth also needs 
to be reflected in the reform programmes the crisis countries have to 
implement. One of the great paradoxes of the crisis is that fiscal 
consolidation tends to reduce growth, but without growth, fiscal 
consolidation becomes near impossible. Europe's approach to dealing with 
                                                          
6 The EPC’s (2012) Digital Single Market project estimates that completing only 
this aspect of the Single market would add at least 4% to EU GDP by 2020. 
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the euro crisis in the absence of positive external growth impulses is thus 
doomed to failure: not only is the fiscal consolidation not working, the 
political constituency for further reform is continually weakened. In the 
medium term, many electorates will question the purpose of reform: is it to 
help the weaker economies to improve, or is it just a means to preserve the 
euro? In either case, the perceived pain of reform is likely to outweigh the 
benefits. 
The recent summit in Brussels made some moves in the right 
direction7, for example by redirecting unused structural funds to the crisis 
countries and by enabling the European Investment Bank (EIB) to expand 
its lending operations. However, overcoming the growth divergence 
between the better performing countries and those in crisis will require 
significantly more action, for example by developing new financing 
mechanisms, providing guarantees for private sector investments and by 
redesigning the European budget (Zuleeg 2012). 
There is, however, little apparent appetite in Brussels for continuing in 
this course of action. Providing the current help for the crisis countries is 
already observed as stretching what citizens can bear. There is also 
concern about the potential moral hazard involved. If the crisis countries 
receive this support, will they not just fall back into bad habits? Many also 
note that the countries most affected by the euro crisis are not the only 
ones that need support. Countries outside the euro zone are also suffering, 
and the Central and Eastern European accession countries are still 
relatively poor when compared to the EU average GDP. 
6. Prospects: stagnation and imbalances? 
Europe's long-term challenges, together with the impact of the crisis, 
are putting European countries in a very difficult situation. It can be 
argued that Europe is facing a “perfect storm” with all the negative 
impacts reinforcing each other, potentially destroying EU citizens' faith in 
their trusted system and, thus, potentially destabilising Europe's economic 
and social model and the European integration process. If no sustainable 
solutions can be found for the challenges arising from globalisation, 
population ageing, resource scarcity, rising inequalities and climate 
change, and if the aggregated growth crisis and the divergence of the crisis 
countries from the better performing ones continue, it is difficult to see 
how Europe could emerge from its current economic doldrums. 
                                                          
7 See European Council (2012) which introduced a “Compact for Growth and 
Jobs.” 
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Europe might then be facing a situation similar to Japan, with a long-
term decline. This does not necessarily imply a dramatic collapse, but the 
European economy would lose dynamism and be left behind. In the longer 
term, this would also mean falling standards of living and a state that can 
no longer play the role of providing public services and social protection 
for all. 
However, the situation in Europe could turn out even worse, given 
Europe's complexity. Europe is not one country, but 27 (soon 28), with 
very different prospects and needs. A sluggish European economy also 
means that the catch-up process for the Central and Eastern Europeans 
would significantly slow down. There would be increasing imbalances 
within the euro zone. Some countries would try to shield their social 
market economy from the turmoil elsewhere, for example by limiting free 
movement of people, while others would struggle to provide even the most 
basic services. All in all, this does not look like a situation that would be to 
the benefit of Europe's citizens: disintegration and perpetual crisis. Indeed, 
the core fabric of the European model would be threatened. 
So what can be done? Policy can still have a decisive role to play if it 
can activate Europe's assets. However, this cannot be accomplished with 
traditional policy approaches. Adapting to the long-term challenges and 
the crisis will require systemic change. To rescue Europe's economic, 
social and environmental model – the very essence of the European 
project – it will not only need to be altered but also reinvented. Only if 
public services are an asset to economic growth, for example by 
effectively activating all those outside the labour market, can the system 
become truly sustainable. Europe's economic and social model must be a 
competitive factor in our relations with the rest of the world, helping us to 
develop new growth and employment patterns and attracting the best talent 
from across the world. If this crisis is to be taken as an opportunity for 
fundamental reform, it might well lead to the eventual re-emergence of 
European strength. 
This vision relies on an ability to carry it out. However, many countries 
in Europe have already lost this freedom of movement, or they never had 
the resources in the first place. So transforming Europe's economic, social 
and environmental model depends on joint EU action. Individual countries 
can do a great deal, but the high degree of interdependence and the need to 
show solidarity with those who do not have the means to carry out this 
process makes a pan-European approach a necessity. The crisis also 
aggravates the following need: solving the euro crisis must be an essential 
part of the way forward and can only be accomplished by moving forward 
together, towards a 'more Europe' solution. 
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Such fundamental change in Europe cannot happen without engaging 
Europe's citizens. We are no longer talking about some institutional change 
at the European level, which citizens hardly care about and are even less 
likely to understand. We are talking about the whole direction of the 
European integration process, and we are talking about the fundamental 
nature of the economic, social and environmental model and how it can be 
revitalised and preserved. 
Europe's leaders must explain these fundamental choices to their 
citizens and sketch out a positive way forward. Without such an open 
debate around Europe’s future, we will face growing imbalances and 
economic stagnation. The technical resolution of the euro crisis and even 
the challenge of current youth unemployment are only elements of this 
wider question. The future of the EU's economic, social and environmental 
model should take central stage in the current debate. 
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Most people would likely agree that Europe suffers from a growth 
slowdown. The GDP growth in Europe has lagged behind the GDP growth 
in the US and has been far worse than the GDP growth in the Newly 
Industrialized Countries, particularly China (cf. Figure 2-1 for the US-
Europe comparison). Quite clearly, there is a declining trend in economic 
growth rates for Europe during the post-WWII period; although there are 
substantial growth differences among European countries, the overall 
trend is similar for all of the EU countries (Figure 2-2). During 1998–
2011, GDP has grown by 1.7% annually in EU-27 and 1.5% annually in 
the euro-area. Moreover, these numbers are misleadingly high, given that 
in most EU/EMU countries, fiscal expansion exaggerates the true 
equilibrium growth rate.1 The growth prospects appear no better for 
Europe; the estimates of annual GDP growth for the near future are in the 
one per cent range, and the long-term prospects are sometimes even worse 
due to poor demographic developments (see Figure 2-8 for several 
extreme examples). 
However, what is the reason for slow or rapid economic growth? 
Growth theory does not provide us with a clear answer to this question. To 
phrase this conclusion in a different manner, the story is far from simple, 
as one may agree after consulting, for example, Acemoglu (2009). The 
classical Solow model states that it is (exogenous) technological progress 
that can keep output growing in the long run (in the short run, capital 
deepening can also produce output growth; however, diminishing returns 
will eventually make increased capital impotent). The new growth theory 
provides a somewhat more optimistic perspective for growth policies. 
However, alternative versions of this new growth theory generate different 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Snower et al. (2011) for an illustration of how to compute the impact of 
unsustainable fiscal policy on output growth and obtain an estimate of the 
corresponding equilibrium growth path. 
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recommendations. In particular, according to the AK model, the way to 
sustain high growth rates is to save a large fraction of GDP, a portion of 
which will find its way into financing a higher rate of technological 
progress and thereby stimulate faster growth. By contrast, the 
Schumpeterian view states that innovation and therefore productivity 
growth and convergence can be fostered by the following measures: better 
protection of (intellectual) property rights, which improves the extent to 
which successful innovators can appropriate the rents from their 
innovations; better financial development, which provides easier financing 
of new and innovative ideas; a higher stock of educated labour, which 
improves the ability of individuals either to imitate more advanced 
technologies or to innovate; and macroeconomic stability, which ensures 
low (risk-adjusted) equilibrium interest rates and encourages individuals to 
engage in long-term growth-enhancing investments (cf., e.g., Aghinon and 
Durlauf 2007). These recommendations are sensible, and to a certain 
extent, they are incorporated into the various programs that have been 
created to stimulate growth in Europe (cf., e.g., EU Commission 2010).2 
However, the recommendations are rather abstract, and it is not easy to 




Fig. 2-1 GDP growth rates in the EU and in the US 
Source: AMECO database 
 
                                                          
2 The Commission program attempts to incorporate all possible issues, and 
therefore it produces results that are not very concrete but are instead a collection 
of aims and intentions. 
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The poor growth numbers have, however, prompted various attempts 
to quantify the importance of possible growth factors (see, e.g., Collingnon 
2011 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1998). The assessment of growth factor 
importance is also the purpose of this paper. What makes this paper 
somewhat different from most previous analyses is its emphasis on “deep” 
background variables. Thus, rather than examining the national accounts 
numbers to evaluate factors such as exports and investment, we attempt to 
discover the relationships between key institutional and structural 
variables and the growth of output. To a certain extent, our variables 
correspond to those of the growth factors of the aforementioned “new 
growth theory”, but one cannot really characterise the empirical analysis 
as a test of this theory. As mentioned, we focus only on the EU countries 
in this study, and therefore the special features of developing countries do 




Fig. 2-2 Range of cross-country growth rates of GDP 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database 
 
Thus, we attempt to quantify the importance of several commonly 
presented explanations for the slowdown of growth in Europe, beginning 
with the (poor) functioning of the labour market, the (adverse) 
development of price competitiveness and the (excessive) growth of 
government. In many respects, the labour market plays the key role in the 
economy because it determines both the use of the labour input and the 
level of overall competitiveness of a nation. Obviously, the functioning of 
the labour market is not independent of the public sector. A large 
government is almost inevitably associated with a large tax wedge, and the 
How to Accelerate Growth in Europe? 
 
22
functioning of the labour market appears to be critically dependent on the 
size of the tax wedge. It may be fair to say that the harmful consequences 
of a high tax wedge are exceptionally well and unambiguously 
documented in the literature (see, e.g., OECD 2006).3 
The empirical model uses certain alternative indicators for these 
institutional and structural factors. The idea is that these factors affect 
growth via productive inputs and (total factor) productivity. Thus, we do 
not attempt to identify any behavioural relationships, and we therefore 
have no (testable) parametric restrictions. Obviously, the estimates can be 
interpreted as the outcomes of a reduced form model; however, the “door 
is left open” for alternative interpretations and conclusions. 
With respect to the structure of the remainder of the paper, the 
estimating equation is introduced in section 2, and the corresponding 
estimation results are reviewed in section 3. Finally, several concluding 
remarks are provided in section 4. 
2. The model 
To predict the GDP growth g  ( )log(yΔ= ), we utilise the following 









where the variables on the right-hand side of the equation are as follows: 
• The wage share, ws  (the inverse of the profit share)  
• The real exchange rate, fx  (an increase in fx  implies an 
appreciation in the exchange rate) 
• The gross tax rate, tax  (or gov. expenditures, govexp )  
• The (needs-weighted) dependency ratio, dep  
• Average working hours (HP trend), hours 4 
• The terms of trade ( tt ) 
• The real interest rate, rr  (in terms of bond yields)  
• The error term ( u ). 
                                                          
3 The OECD study arrives at very high employment (and unemployment) estimates 
resulting from the size of the tax wedge. Thus, for prime-age males, the elasticity 
of this factor was 0.3 and for prime-age females, the elasticity of this factor was 
0.5. 
4 The HP trend is used to diminish the importance of the simultaneous cyclical 
(demand for labour) relationship between output and working hours. 
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With respect to the coefficient values, we expect 
0,0,0,0,0,0 654321 >><<<< aaaaaa  and 07 <a . 
For the wage share, we have two proxies. One of these proxies is a 
simple income-share of (gross) wages, which is denoted by ws , and the 
other proxy is an adjusted wage share, aws , which accounts for the 
difference between the total number of (paid) employees and total 
employment. Similarly, the size of government is measured both by the 
gross tax rate and by total expenditures with respect to GDP, govexp . 
Finally, competitiveness is measured not only by the real exchange rate 
fx  but also by the (real) unit labour costs, ulc . 
As a final check, we introduced a measure of high-tech industries into 
the model. This hightech variable represents the share of high industries of 
the value added of the total manufacturing industry. We would obviously 
expect that a more advanced structure of the economy allows for higher 
growth rates of exports and total output. 
We use annual data from 15 EU countries for this study. The data span 
the 1971–2011 period, and include a total of 375 data points. With the 
hightech variable, only 253 data points were available. The main data 
source is the AMECO data bank, although dep  values were obtained from 
the DICE data bank, values of the US GDP = USG (used as a control) 
were obtained from the NBER, the unadjusted ws  values were obtained 
from OECD data, and the adjusted wage share ( aws ) data were obtained 
from AMECO. The hightech variable was derived from the OECD Stan 
database and it included the following ISIC categories: 3825 (office 
machinery & computers), 383 (electric machinery), 3845 (aerospace), and 
385 (scientific industries); see Viren and Malkamäki (2002) for details. 
The data for dep and hours (which are not frequently used in empirical 
analyses) are illustrated in Figures 2-4 and 2-5. Both of these variables 
evince a great deal of variability over time. The average working hours 
variable demonstrates more trend-like development, whereas the 
dependency ratio undergoes several long swings that correspond to various 
occurrences, such as demographic changes and changes in pension 
systems. 
The estimates of the model are presented in Table 2-A1. The model is 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), or generalised method of 
moments (GMM) in the case of dynamic panel settings (Arellano – Bond 
estimator). Additional variables in the model include the US GDP growth 
rate (USG ) and the lagged dependent variable (g–1). In most cases, we 
have included cross-section fixed effects (in one instance, fixed time 
effects are also included), although these effects are not displayed. 
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However, to indicate the flavour of the result, we report one set of 
estimates for the cross-section fixed effects in Figure 2-7 (which 
correspond to equation (2-4) in Table 2-A1). If the model included either 
period fixed effects or US GDP growth, the terms of trade variable, tt , 
became insignificant; thus, this variable is not included in the equations 
that are reported in Table 2-A1 (see, however, the results in Boxes 2-1 
and 2-2). 
Obviously, the cross-section fixed effects are not completely innocent 
because they capture most of the cross-sectional variance of output 
growth. Given the approach of the current paper, only the cross-sectional 
variation is of primary interest because we wish to know the determinants 
of the equilibrium growth rate, rather than the factors affecting cyclical 
(short-term) variations in output. It would therefore be useful to present at 
least one set of estimates that includes no fixed effects but only has a 
common constant term. Thus, we ask whether our explanatory variables 
can explain all of the changes (differences) in the examined GDP growth 
rates. This set of results is displayed below in Box 1. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is illustrated by computing the growth rate responses to an 
increase of one standard deviation in each right-hand-side variable 
(Figure 2-6). 
Because we have so many alternative proxies available for functional 
income distribution, price competitiveness, and the size of the government, 
we created an additional experiment in which all of these variables are 
introduced into the estimating equation at the same time. The idea is 
simply to determine how robust the model is in terms of the measurements 
of different factors. The results are displayed in Box 2-2 in the Appendix. 
In this study, we almost entirely report results that represent common 
coefficients for all countries (and years). However, we also estimate the 
models for individual countries. In the cases of individual countries, we 
are primarily interested in examining which types of convergence patterns 
can be detected from the data. An idea of the dispersion of data for 
individual countries can be obtained from Figures 2-2 and 2-3, which 
show the range of growth rates for the examined countries and the 
relationship between the standard deviations of growth rates and the mean 
growth rate. On the basis of these figures, it is a bit difficult to perceive 
that the dispersion would change over time (for instance, during the course 
of the EMU period), whereas it is easy to observe that the dispersion of 
growth rates is strongly related to the mean growth rates. This observation,  
 




Fig. 2-3 Mean and standard deviation of growth rates 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database 
Note: The mean and the standard deviations are derived for the cross-section data 




Fig. 2-4 The median dependency ratio in the EU 
Source: Author’s calculation based on DICE database 
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in turn, suggests that individual countries differ greatly in terms of output 
shocks, which is a phenomenon that creates obvious problems for common 








Fig. 2-5 The average working hours in the EU 
Source: OECD/MEI database 
 
Box 2-1 
The estimates of the simplest equation 
Growth rate of GDP =  
069.0−  ( 66.3 ) The wage share (t-ratio) 
053.0−  ( 48.3 ) The real exchange rate 
067.0−  ( 85.2 ) The government size (expenditures/GDP) 
006.0+  ( 61.0 ) The HP trend of average working hours (log) 
201.0−  ( 91.2 ) The needs-weighted dependency ratio  
015.0−  ( 20.0 ) The real interest rate  
033.0+  ( 13.1 ) The terms of trade 
374.0+  ( 35.5 ) constant  
242.02 =R ; 021.0=SSE , 168.1=DW ;  
OLS with no fixed & random effects 
Source: AMECO database 
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3. Interpretations of the results 
 
Overall, our simple model fits the data very well. In general, the 
coefficients have the correct signs and are of reasonable magnitude. 
Moreover, the results that are obtained are quite precise, which allows us 




Fig. 2-6 Growth effects of one standard deviation increase in exogenous variables 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: The values are related to estimates in Box 2-1. 
 
The results also appear to be surprisingly robust in terms of various 
measures of the underlying variables (Box 2-A1). Thus, if we construct an 
extreme version of the model and include all alternative proxies of our 
variables, the only coefficient with an unexpected sign is the coefficient of 
the gross tax rate. This result clearly reflects the fact that the gross tax rate 
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and the expenditures/GDP ratio are sufficiently similar that the coefficients 
of both variables cannot be correctly estimated from a single equation. 
The reported cross-section fixed effects (Figure 2-7) demonstrate that 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are the poor performers among the 15 
countries examined (even after controlling for the background variables). 
By contrast, the Nordic countries manage quite well. This finding may 
provide support for various interpretations of the observed differences, 
including distinctions in the quality of institutions, moral values and/or the 
credibility of economic policies.5 Regarding convergence, there appears to 
be unconditional (but not conditional) convergence in terms of GDP.6 With 
respect to other variables, the evidence is rather inconclusive. In terms of 
unit labour costs, certain striking exceptions can be detected (see Table 2-
A2 in Appendix). 
On the basis of the estimates derived in this study, the following guide 
for growth policies appears to be warranted: Keep the profit rate and the 
price competitiveness at a reasonable level (or improve them). Do not 
over-expand the welfare state. Larger governments are associated with 
slower growth rates.7 Secure a sufficient labour supply. Longer workweeks 
generate better economic growth. Do not allow interest rates to exceed 
equilibrium levels, but instead keep the risk premiums as low as possible. 
Try to achieve a more advanced structure of production and exports. 
Clearly, these recommendations largely match the recommendations 
that are provided by the new growth theory, despite the fact that we do not 
directly control variables that directly affect innovative activities. The only 
exception is the output share of high-tech industries (hightech). Including 
this variable does not, however, invalidate the other results and the 
variable makes a positive contribution to the explanation of differences in 
growth. The systematically positive and rather precise coefficient 
estimates suggest that countries that have managed to modernize their 
                                                          
5 These interpretations obviously enter a topic that is rather thoroughly analysed by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1998). 
















, where ge  refers to Germany, was calculated to 
be 043.−  ( 26.3 ) in the unconditional convergence regression; however, if this 
variable is inserted, e.g., to equation (4) in Table 2-A1 as an additional regressor, 
the resulting coefficient is 019.−  ( 75.0 ). 
7 This conclusion may be motivated by the idea that the there is a type of Laffer 
curve in the productivity of public sector services, as discussed by Koskela and 
Viren (2000). This notion also arises in the analysis of the extensive empirical 
evidence that was produced by Tanzi and Shuhknecht (2000). 
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industries seem to perform better than countries that stick to their old 




Fig. 2-7 Cross-section fixed effects 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: These estimates are derived from equation 4 in Table 2-A1 and they 
represent a level-difference from predictions of the respective model. 
 
From a policy perspective, our explanatory variables provide a plethora 
of possibilities for growth programs. These possibilities may be illustrated 
using the following simple calculation, which will at least provide an idea 
of the relevant magnitudes of various effects. Take the simplest equation 
reported in Box 2-1. Using the mean values of the time series for each 
variable, this equation implies that one may increase the mean growth rate 
from 2.4% to 3.4% by changing the right-hand-side variables in the 
following way: 
 
• Wage share: 66%  61% 
• Government expenditure share: 48%  43% 
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• (Annual) working hours: 1600 h  1700 h 
• Dependency ratio: 24%  23% 
• Real interest rate 3%  2%. 
 
This result implies that a revolution is not required to generate one per 
cent of additional growth each year: the “welfare state” does not need to 
be eliminated, wages do not need to be lowered to subsistence income 
levels, and working hours do not need to be increased to medieval levels. 
In fact, in most instances, significant improvements in economic growth 
could be produced by simply reverting to the conditions of approximately 
one decade ago. The changes that would be entailed in this reversion are 
still sufficiently great that they would not easily be sold to the general 
public within the median voter model. Given the gloomy prospects of 
most EU countries (Figure 2-8), however, the need for certain unpleasant 




Fig. 2-8 Long-run forecasts of the dependency ratios 
Source: Eurostat 2007 projections (European Commission 2007) 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper shows that accelerating growth in Europe is not completely 
unrealistic. However, several unpopular reforms would be required to 
increase the labour supply, alleviate tax burdens and increase 
competitiveness. Obviously, these phenomena are not unrelated. Thus, by 
reducing the growth of the public sector and decreasing tax rates, one may 
increase both the labour supply and the competitiveness of the private 
sector. The future development of the public sector is indeed the key 
aspect of determining the future development of the economy. If the public 
sector can be maintained in a reasonable fashion, one may manage to 
achieve low tax rates and low tax wedges in labour markets, and one can 
also avoid fiscal crises and keep the risk premiums (of interest rates) low. 
Indeed, there are causal relationships in the opposite direction, as well; for 
instance, an increased labour supply (well-functioning labour markets) 
generates more tax revenues, allowing for lower tax rates and diminishes 
the risks of fiscal crises. 
Although the message of this paper is clear and the results of the 
empirical analysis are quite unambiguous, there are several caveats that 
merit mention. Above all, it is worth noting that in this study, we have not 
considered either capital deepening (increasing investment and saving 
activity) or various other factors that may underlie total factor productivity, 
such as innovative activity and the adaptation of innovations, in any detail 
(cf. Kilponen and Viren (2010) for an assessment of the importance of 
these factors). Similarly, financial factors related to economic growth must 
be more deeply analysed (in accordance with the approach of, for 
example, Beck et al. (2005)). We also have not considered the implications 
of global developments, although these developments obviously affect the 
economic position of European countries relative to other countries. Our 
rather crude institutional and structural explanatory variables do not 
capture any of these considerations particularly well, and thus further 
analysis is certainly required. 
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Panel data estimates with all alternative measures in the same 
equation 
Growth rate of GDP =  
054.0−  ( 27.2 ) The wage share (t-ratio)  
035.0−  ( 04.2 ) The adjusted wage share  
006.0+  ( 76.0 ) The terms of trade  
038.0−  ( 63.2 ) The real exchange rate 
063.0−  ( 52.2 ) The unit labour costs  
182.0+  ( 80.3 ) The gross tax rate   
138.0−  ( 88.3 ) The government size 
(expenditures/GDP)  
029.0+  ( 85.1 ) The HP trend of average working 
hours (log) 
297.0−  ( 27.4 ) The needs-weighted dependency ratio  
062.0−  ( 88.0 ) The real interest rate  
571.0+  ( 53.7 ) The US GDP growth rate  
846.2+  ( 04.1 ) constant  
529.02 =R ; 016.0=SSE , 346.1=DW ;  
OLS with no fixed & random effects 
Note: See Box 2-1 for other details. 
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Table 2-A1 Estimation results 
 
1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.27 -0.126
(4.63) (3.17)
-0.309 -0.211 -0.297 -0.137 -0.179 -0.237 -0.191 -0.745 -0.213
(4.23) (3.63) (4.77) (1.47) (3.04) (4.41) (3.75) (2.43) (3.23)
fx -0.038 -0.033 -0.043 -0.038 -0.03 -0.03 -0.035 -0.038 -0.015 -0.019
log (2.35) (2.37) (2.94) (2.30) (2.65) (2.27) (2.42) (2.75) (0.39) (1.23)
-0.137
(4.68)
-0,015 -0.143 -0.112 -0.065 -0.1 -0.152 -0.225 -0.116
(0.38) (2.63) (2.00) (1.12) (1.93) (2.95) (1.15) (2.22)
-0.142 -0.085 -0.082
(4.69) (2.88) (2.29)
hours 0.082 0.071 0.0433 0.027 0.071 0.059 0.038 0.042 0.027 0.089 0.057
log (5.03) (2.83) (1.84) (1.82) (2.64) (0.19) (1.54) (2.44) (1.14) (1.03) (1.91)
-0.081 -0.166 -0.037 -0.18 -0.162 -0.179 -0.094 -0.008 -0.042 -0.032 -0.131
(1.46) (2.87) (0.54) (3.20) (2.89) (2.30) (1.77) (0.13) (0.65) (0.74) (1.76)
-0.245 -0.369 0.019 -0.036 -0.286
(2.15) (3.10) (0.20) (1.15) (2.24)
0.589 0.692 0.643 0.646 0.57 0.665 0.591 0.634 0.441 0.345
(7.97) (8.52) (8.11) (7.82) (7.48) (6.65) (8.35) (8.03) (4.70) (4.46)
0.303
(1.90)
0.347 0.303 0.232 0.251 0.411
(4.51) (5.49) (3.02) (3.89 (3.13)
pane l CS CS CS CS CS CS&T S CS CS CS .. CS
R2 0.529 0.495 0.526 0.505 0.561 0.787 0.579 0.595 0.576 .. 0.41
SEE 0.0171 0.0166 0.0161 0.0165 0.0157 0.0115 0.0152 0.0159 0.0152 0.0177 0.0133












.. .. .. .. .. .. 7.41 (14)
rr
 
Source: AMECO database 
Numbers inside parentheses are corrected t-ratios. CS denotes cross-section fixed 
effects and TS period fixed effects (test statistics for the cross-section fixed effects 
always exceed conventional critical values). Estimates in column (9) are GMM 
estimates. The number of datapoints is 375. However, with equation 10 it is only 
253. 
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Table 2-A2 Convergence of unit labour costs 
 
coefficient t-ratio 















UK -0.018 0.29  
 
Source: AMECO database 
Note: On the first row, we have a common coefficient for all countries and on 




JAPAN’S TWO LOST DECADES:  







Japan experienced an economic boom in the middle of the 1980s. 
Commercial land prices in the Tokyo area increased by 57% in 1987, 
while those in the Osaka area rose by 36%, 36%, and 40% in 1988, 1989, 
and 1990, respectively. The Nikkei index increased from 12,565 yen in 
1985 to 38,915 yen in December 1989. These increases led to capital gains 
from 1987–89 of 1,343 trillion yen, more than three times the Japanese 
GDP in 1989. 
The boom ended in 1990 and 1991, and the Japanese economy has 
stagnated for the last twenty years. GDP increased slightly after the 
collapse but stagnated once again with the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. Today, due to the Lehman Brothers shock in 2008, the GDP 
is almost as low as it was in 1991 (Fig. 3-1). 
Economists have thoroughly studied the lost decades of the 1990s and 
2000s.1 The main issues are the following: 
 
A) Why Japan has experienced such a long recession. 
B) What remedies Japan should utilise to overcome the crisis: 
1) from the demand side: fiscal and/or monetary policies, and 
                                                          
1 A number of books and articles have been published investigating why Japan 
experienced such a long recession. Okita (2010) discusses the Japanese post-war 
economy. Miyazaki (1992) is a memorable book on causes and impacts of the 
bubble. Chapter 19 of Hashimoto (2011) gives a very concise overview of the 
recession. Ogawa (2009), Kataoka (2010) and Otaki (2011) looked back the history 
of lost two decades. Itoh et al. (2005) and Iwata and Miyagawa (2003) collected 
discussions from both supply and demand sides. Todou (2011), Ono (2012) and 
many others discuss how to overcome the long recession from either the supply or 
demand side. 
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2) from the supply side: how to raise productivity through 
structural reform. 
C) The effects of the lost decades: 
1) on the Japanese economy, 
2) on the ageing society, etc. 
 
In this paper, we will summarise these discussions and attempt to draw 




Fig. 3-1 GDP and its growth rate 
Source: Cabinet Office (2011, 343) 
2. After the feast 
In 1991, the Japanese boom ended and the lost decades began. In the 
beginning, there were two serious problems: (1) an unused production 
capacity problem and (2) a balance sheet problem. During the bubble, 
Japanese companies expanded their production capacities on the 
assumption that the economic boom would never end. For example, the 
number of cars produced increased from 8.0 million in 1985 to 13.2 
million in 1991, only to decrease to 10.8 million in 1995 (Statistics Bureau 
2011a). With the bust, these capacities became excessive. 
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When the bubble burst in 1991, the capacity utilising rate of the 
manufacturing industry as a whole dropped from a rate of 100–110 to 90–
100 (Fig. 3-2). The capacity utilisation rate of the automobile industry 
decreased drastically to a rate of 70–80; the steel industry soon fell to a 
similar level. 
As Japanese companies reduced investment, productivity stagnated 
and, in the second half of the 1990s, unemployment began to increase. 
The more serious problem was the balance sheet problem. With 
Japanese companies believing that land prices would remain high, they 
increased borrowing with land as collateral. When land prices began to 
fall, the land standard system – borrowing with land used as collateral  
new production capacities  sales increase  profit increase  price 
increase  land price (collateral) hikes  borrowing – also collapsed, and 
non-performing loans abounded. The non-performing loan problem was 
most serious in the real estate, construction, and wholesale & retail sectors, 
as these three sectors very prominently expanded their capacities on the 




Fig. 3-2 Capacity utilisation rates 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the data of Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (2011)  
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Fig. 3-3 Non-performing loan problems 
Source: Cabinet Office (2002, 34) 
 
Though Japanese banks faced increasing numbers of non-performing 
loans within the above three sectors, they, somewhat surprisingly, 
continued lending to these companies. The banks, companies, and 
government all believed that the economy would soon recover, but this 
was not to be. Some companies within these three sectors went bankrupt, 
and the non-performing loan problem was transferred onto the banking 
sector. 
Figure 3-4 reveals that the non-performing loan problem first impacted 
the banking sector in 1995, four years after the bubble burst, and that it 
took nearly seven years to resolve. There are several reasons why this took 
so long. First, the companies, banks, and government all underestimated 
the seriousness of the recession. Second, in the beginning, the definition of 
non-performing loan was excessively narrowly defined by the 
government. Third, a debate on who was responsible for the costs of the 
non-performing loans took place. In particular, the general public could 
not consent to the idea that the non-financial sectors or the financial 
companies with non-performing loans would be bailed out by tax-payer 
money. Finally, the Ministry of Finance tried to sustain the convoy system 
(Goso Sendan Houshiki) by adjusting the banking regulations so that not 
even the worst-off banks would fall into bankruptcy. For example, each 
bank offered the same interest rate on deposits. 
 





Fig. 3-4 Banking sector’s non-performing loans 
Source: Cabinet Office (2002, 47) 
 
The situation dramatically changed in November 1997 when two large 
financial institutions went bankrupt. First, Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank, one 
of the largest Japanese banks, failed due to a resort development project in 
Hokkaido and closed its doors on 15 November. Then, Yamaichi Security, 
the second largest security company after Nomura, declared bankruptcy on 
24 November due to enormous off-the-book liabilities. 
Insolvencies occurred before these two large financial institutions went 
bankrupt. One example is a bankruptcy of Hyogo Bank several months 
after the Great Awaji Hanshin Earthquake, which hit Kobe, where the 
headquarters of the bank were located, in January 1995. The bankruptcies 
of Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Security signalled that the 
Ministry of Finance could no longer sustain the convoy system, resulting 
in the other large financial institutions substantially increasing the pace of 
their financial consolidations. This led to the establishment of mega-
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financial systems in Japan: four financial groups2 and the independent 
Nomura Security. 
Discussions on whether the government should inject capital into the 
large banks continued. On the one hand, it was difficult to convince the 
general public that financial institutions should be bailed out by tax-payer 
money. On the other hand, the large banks refused to accept the capital 
injections because they were afraid of being nationalised. 
In October 2002, the Koizumi Cabinet settled on the “Program for 
Financial Revival”, which dictated that the Financial Services Agency 
normalise the non-performing loans (NPLs) problem by reducing major 
banks’ NPL ratio to approximately one-half (Financial Service Agency 
2002). 
In June 2003, the government injected two trillion yen into Resona 
Bank, whose financial condition was the worst among the mega-banks. 
Other mega-banks augmented their capital by issuing proffered stocks and 
allocating shares to third parties in order to avoid nationalisation.3 As 
shown in Figure 3-5, the large banks’ non-performing loans began to 
decrease from a peak of 25 trillion yen in the beginning of 2002. While 56 
banks went bankrupt in 2001, only one bank has done so since 2002. 
It took more than ten years after the collapse of the bubble to settle the 
non-performing loan problem. It is not difficult to imagine such an 
enduring experience significantly changing the behaviour of Japanese 
companies and households. 
 
A) Banking sector: 
The first consequence of the non-performing loan problem is that 
Japanese banks gradually became reluctant to extend credit to businesses, 
even those with healthy financial outlooks, to preserve the capital 
adequacy ratios defined by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS). 
The role of Japanese banks as funding centres diminished. The second 
consequence is that their role as main banks also decreased. The symbolic 
event was the merger of Sumitomo Bank, the main bank of the Sumitomo 
group, and Sakura Bank, the main bank of the Mitsui group, in 2001. The 
decrease of roles of main banks was not limited to large banks. As small 
banks’ financial positions became more vulnerable and they became less 
willing to extend credit, their roles as main banks to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) also diminished. 
                                                          
2 Mitsubishi Tokyo UFJ Financial Group, the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, 
Mizuho Financial Group, and the Resona Group. 
3 Nishikawa (2011) described how the author, then governor of Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, overcame the non-performing loan problems. 
Japan’s Two Lost Decades: Lessons for Today’s Euro Crisis? 
 
42
B) Non-banking sectors: 
Most companies within the non-banking sectors also made serious 
efforts to survive the non-performing loan problems. The easiest way was 
to reduce costs by curtailing investments and employment. However, this 
led to the fallacy of composition problem. The fact that investment 
demands and household incomes have not increased is one of the reasons 
why Japanese GDP has stagnated for the last twenty years. However, the 
more serious problem was that curtailing investments led to 
competitiveness losses within Japan’s manufacturing industries. Whether 
the Japanese TFP (total factor productivities) has plateaued is one of the 
biggest discussions on the lost decades (Hayashi and Prescott 2002). 
Discussions on supply-side options ensued. 
 
C) Households: 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Japanese companies tried to 
curtail labour costs, and household incomes have stagnated for the last two 





Fig. 3-5 Resolution of non-performing loans 
Source: Cabinet Office (2004, 85) 
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3. Stimuli to recover 
3.1 Timid attitude of the government in the 1990s 
The Japanese government did not sit idly by as the economy faltered. 
At first, the government tried to support the economy from the demand 
side through active fiscal policies to increase public investments and 
reduce taxes. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) also relaxed monetary policy. The 
government also tried to support the economy from the supply side 
through structural policies. These measures were not successful. 
First, let us look at the fiscal policy of the 1990s (Fig. 3-6). We notice 
the following points. Expenditures increased during the period at 
approximately the same pace. The government had no choice but to 
continue using active fiscal policies since the economy continued to 
stagnate for the next ten years. Second, tax revenue had significantly 
fallen. The government expected that reducing tax rates would save the 
economy and increase tax revenue. However, the expectation was not 
realistic. Third, because of increasing expenditures and decreasing tax 
revenue, the state debt has increased. However, looking at the figure in 
detail, we find that the deficit government bond, which is issued for the 
purpose of covering the budget deficit, was not issued until 1994. This 
might indicate that the government did not strongly intend to stimulate the 




Fig. 3-6 Japanese central government budget 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011a) 
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Regarding the monetary policy of the 1990s, we notice the timid 
attitude of the Bank of Japan. After the official discount rate reached six 
per cent during 1990, it continued to decline. It was not until 1995, four 
years after the bubble burst, that it reached the bottom level (Fig. 3-7). 
From these facts, we may say that the BoJ might think that keeping the 
interest rate level high enough to hold down the land price hikes was still 
the priority task even after the bubble burst, that the BoJ also thought that 
the Japanese economy would recover soon, and that capital losses could be 




Fig. 3-7 Official discount rate 
Source: Bank of Japan (2011)  
3.2 The government policies of the 2000s 
The 2000s were years of deflation. Returning to Figure 3-1, it shows 
that the nominal GDP growth rates have been less than the real GDP 
growth rates. That means that GDP deflators and price indices were 
negative during the 2000s. Because the macroeconomic environment 
changed in the 2000s, the Japanese government also changed their 
policies. 
Referring to the government budget (Fig. 3-6), we find that the 
government (i.e., the Koizumi Cabinet between April 2001 and September 
2006) tried to curtail expenditures and the issuing of state bonds. This 
fiscal approach saw modest success with a weak but extended boom in the 
middle of the 2000s. 
The Lehman Brothers shock frustrated this fiscal strategy. Expenditures 
increased to 101 trillion yen in FY2009 from the previous year’s 85 trillion 
yen, and state bond issuance increased by 20 trillion yen to 52 trillion yen 
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in FY2009. The Japanese fiscal situation had reached a very dangerous 
point in that the value of the newly issued state bonds surpassed that of tax 
revenue. 
Table 3-1 shows the overnight call rate target, which is today’s policy 
interest rate. The BoJ has adopted a zero interest rate policy since 1999 
(except for a short period between August 2000 and February 2001). 
 
Table 3-1 Overnight call rate target 
 
date overnight rate target remarks 
2/1999 0.15% zero interest rate policy 
11/8/2000 0.25% temporary lift 
28/2/2001 0.15% reintroduction 
14/7/2006 0.25% re-lift 
21/2/2007 0.50%  
31/10/2008 0.30%  
19/12/2008 0.10%  
5/10/2010 0.0 – 0.1%  
Source: Authors own construction by The Bank of Japan 
 
When the IT bubble burst in 2001, the BoJ had no room to lower the 
interest rate. Instead, the BoJ turned to an unconventional quantitative 
easing policy to broaden the monetary base by buying financial assets and 
injecting a pre-determined quantity of money into the economy. This 
increased the excess reserves of the banks. However, comparing how the 
monetary bases in the US, Japan, UK, Euro-area and China were 
broadened (Fig. 3-8), we note that the BoJ was very timid in broadening 
the monetary base during the 2000s. As a result of the BoJ failing to 
broaden the monetary base to an extent similar to the US or the ECB, 
some economists demanded that the BoJ introduce the inflation target 
policy4 and more decisively broaden the monetary base.5 
Let us summarise the reasons why the monetary policies were 
ineffective for the last two decades. First, the priority of the monetary 
policy remained controlling high land prices even after the burst of the 
bubble. Second, a de facto zero interest rate policy began at the end of the 
                                                          
4 At the Monetary Policy Meeting on 14 February, 2012, The BoJ for the first time 
officially mentioned the inflation target, saying that The Bank judges “the price 
stability goal in the medium to long term” to be within a positive range of 2% or 
lower in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI and, more specifically, 
sets a goal at 1% for the time being. 
5 Moriyama (2011) is an example. 
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1990s but was only modest in effect. Third, a de jure zero interest policy 
was introduced in 1999 but was lifted while the recovery remained weak 
and the IT bubble had not yet burst. Fourth, quantitative easing was 
introduced, but the monetary base remained insufficiently large. In sum, 
the BoJ failed to introduce the bold policies necessary to overcome the 




Fig. 3-8 Monetary base balance 
Source: Daiwa Institute of Research (2011) 
4. Structural reforms 
In the previous sections, we have discussed how to increase demand 
via fiscal and monetary policy. However, policies from the supply side 
were also considered. These policies always emphasise the importance of 
breaking away from the Japanese economic system, which was admired 
with Japan as Number One in the 1980s (Vogel 1979). 
 
A) Public structural reforms: 
Public structural reforms were mainly driven by the Koizumi Cabinet. 
Prime Minister Koizumi emphasised it with the phrase “No Reform, No 
Growth.” The three pillars of the reform were: 
 
1. from public to private 
• privatisation of the postal and highway systems, 
• marketisation test, 
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• deregulation of the labour market, 
• integration and abolition of public entities,6 
• promotion of special zones. 
2. from centre to region 
• abolition and curtailment of state subsidies, 
• transfer of tax sources, 
• revision of local allocation tax grants. 
3. other reforms 
• promotion of Free Trade Agreements and Economic 
Partnership Agreements, 
• medical system reform, 
• off-budget system reform. 
 
The most debated reform was privatisation of the postal system. When 
the Postal Service Privatization Act was rejected by the Upper House in 
August 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi dissolved the Lower House and 
called a general election. After Koizumi won the election, the law was 
approved. The Japan Post System was divided into the Japan Post Service, 
Japan Post Bank, Japan Post Insurance, and Japan Post Network.7 
Additionally, labour market reform increased the flexibility of the work 
force. The share of permanent workers decreased from approximately 75% 
in 2000 to approximately 65% in 2009.8 
 
B) Private structural reforms: 
Regarding private structural reform, breaking away from the Japanese 
economic system was the key idea. Some examples follow. 
1. dismantling keiretsu (grouping) 
Under the Japanese economic system, the sub-contracting system was 
widely used. Assembly (parent) companies purchased parts of the products 
from sub-contractors (child companies) under the same keiretsu. The 
keiretsu system began to be dismantled in 1999 when Carlos Ghosn 
became president of Nissan. 
2. dismantling main banks 
Mutual/cross holding of stocks among the group companies, with 
banks being at the top of the cross holding system, was very common. For 
example, Mitsubishi/Sumitomo/Mitsui Banks were the main banks of the 
                                                          
6 National universities were transformed to national university corporations in 
April 2004. 
7 See the organization chart: http://www.japanpost.jp/en/group/map/. 
8 Annual Report on Japanese Economy and Public Finance, FY2009. 
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Mitsubishi/Sumitomo/Mitsui Groups. When these banks began to address 
their non-performing loan problems, they could not afford to maintain the 
main bank system. 
3. corporate governance reform 
Based on the life-long employment system in Japan, most presidents of 
large companies designated their successors, and outsider influence was 
very limited. In 2003, the Commercial Law was revised and some 
Japanese corporations introduced the committee system.9 
5. The consequences of the lost decades 
In the previous sections, we showed how the Japanese government and 
companies struggled to overcome the non-performing loan problem and 
the stagnant economy. The main consequences of the lost decades were the 
following. 
 
A) Competitiveness loss 
Has Japan regained its competitiveness? Japan’s IMD World 
Competitiveness ranking is shown in Figure 3-9. Japan fell from its 
highest competitiveness ranking to today’s ranking of just 26th. The fact 
that today’s GDP is approximately the same as that of 1991 symbolises 




Fig. 3-9 Japanese competitiveness 
Source: Kogures.com (2011) 
                                                          
9 http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/Press_Archive/200301/03-004E/ 
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B) State debt 
One of the greatest consequences is the state debt (Fig. 3-10). Because 
of increasing fiscal expenditures and the revenue gap since the end of the 
bubble, state debt has been increasing. Its accumulation accelerated 
particularly after the Lehman Brothers shock of 2008. The state debt at the 
end of Fiscal Year 2011 (March 2012) was 667 trillion yen, 141% of GDP. 
It should be noted that this debt is the responsibility of the central 
government alone. Adding the local government debts, the figure increases 
to 894 trillion yen, 189% of GDP (Ministry of Finance 2011a). The 
general government debt, which includes the social security fund deficit, 
etc., is 1,024 trillion yen, almost 200% of GDP (Ministry of Finance 
2011a). 
These figures are the worst among advanced economies, even 
considering the Greek figures. However, the possibility of fiscal insolvency 
in the short term is limited since almost all of the state debt is held by the 
Japanese people. 
The risk of fiscal insolvency in the long term, however, is high. As the 
Japanese society ages at an increasing rate, expenditures for social security 
will increase. At the same time, the Japanese saving ratio will decrease, 
leading to a current account deficit. These trends may force the Japanese 
credit rating to be lowered, increasing interest rates and making it more 




Fig. 3-10 Central government debts 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011b)  
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C) Public structural reforms 
As mentioned earlier, the postal and highway systems, as well as other 
public corporation systems, were reformed in the 2000s. Before this, there 
were reforms of the national railway, telegraph and telephone, and tobacco 
and salt public corporations during the 1980s (today’s Japan Railway (JR) 
networks, NTT groups (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation), 
and Japan Tobacco). 
Except for some of the JR groups (JRs Hokkaido, Shikoku, Kyushu 
and Freight), which have never turned a profit due to their challenging 
geographical situations, shares of the formerly public corporations were 
sold to the public. They were, genuinely speaking, privatised. 
Shares of the Japan Post and the Japan Highway groups, however, 
remain in the hands of the government. They were corporatized, but their 
privatisation, i.e. concrete tender programs, have not yet been finalised. 
Furthermore, due to the ousting of the Liberal Democratic Party, which 
had ruled Japanese politics for more than fifty years, in 2009, the 
privatisation program of the Japan Post group is now being reconsidered. 
D) Private structural reforms 
Regarding private company reforms, we have seen that corporate 
governance and other reforms were initiated in the 2000s, but they have 
not yet borne fruit. For example, Sony is thought to have lost its 
innovative edge (Tateishi 2011 and Tsujino 2011), has posted losses every 
year since FY2008, and has announced the dissolution of its joint venture 
with Samsung to produce LCD panels. Furthermore, window-dressing 
settlements of Olympus and unjust financing to the former chairperson by 
Daio Paper have revealed that corporate social responsibility has not 
penetrated sufficiently into Japanese corporations. 
6. Conclusions 
We summarise what we have discussed as follows. 
 
In the 1990s: 
• The Japanese government and private sector had optimistic views 
of the recession after the bubble burst in 1991. They thought the 
recession would come to an end soon and that the virtuous cycle 
of the Japanese economic system, including the land standard 
system, would work well again. This belief caused a delay in 
acknowledging the seriousness of the recession. 
• The stimulus fiscal package was too little, too late. 
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• The monetary authority was afraid of the land price hikes and 
their monetary policies were timid. 
• The collapse of the bubble caused the non-performing loan 
problems in the non-manufacturing three sectors and then in the 
banking sector. It was not until 2002 that the non-performing loan 
problem in the banking sector was resolved. 
• GDP increased a little even after the collapse of the bubble, but 
stopped growing in 1997 when the Asian financial crisis took 
place. 
 
In the 2000s: 
• The non-performing loan problems were resolved in 2002 after 
the Koizumi Cabinet settled on the “Program for Financial 
Revival.” 
• In the process of resolving the non-performing loan problems, 
Japanese banks became reluctant to lend to companies, especially 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
• Even during the weak but long boom of the 2000s, Japan’s state 
debt continued to increase. After the IT bubble burst in 2001 and 
the Lehman Brothers shock in 2008, extremely aggressive fiscal 
policies made the state debt situation much worse. Today, the 
state debt is valued at 200% of GDP. 
• The state debt is a serious concern for the ageing society of Japan. 
• The Japanese government tried to implement structural policies to 
raise productivity and increase the effectiveness of the economy. 
However, the government policies were not bold enough to be 
successful. 
• Japanese companies tried to reform themselves. However, the 
reforms were insufficient and the Japanese economy has not 
recovered its competitiveness of the 1980s. 
 
The EU economy has been seriously damaged by the Lehman Brothers 
shock and the euro crisis. Most EU member countries have accumulated 
large sovereign and private debts since 2008 (although the Japanese debt 
remains higher). 
The EU economy is now searching for an exit from their unhealthy 
situation. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will come into 
force in September 2012, is expected to reform the functioning of the euro 
zone. It is also expected to accelerate the fiscal consolidation process and 
to facilitate harmonisation of the fiscal systems among the member 
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countries. The EU also adopted the “Europe 2020” strategy to increase its 
competitiveness. 
However, the Japanese experience shows that these efforts will not 
bear fruit if the governments, the ECB, and the companies do not take 
prompt and decisive measures. If they do not, they may also experience at 
least two lost decades. 
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The legend of the Trojan Horse, told in Virgil's Aeneid, exemplifies a 
masterstroke of cunning. At the end of the 12th century BC, after ten years 
of war, the Greeks could not breach Troy’s walls. Yet, the Trojans could 
not drive the Greeks away. 
Then, the Greeks devised a plot. Pretending to admit defeat and to sail 
home, they left behind them a huge wooden horse as an offering to the 
goddess Athena. Thirty Greek warriors hid themselves inside the horse. In 
fact, the Greek fleet actually hid just nearby. 
Smelling a trap, the priest Laocoon wanted to burn the horse and 
warned the Trojans: 
 
“O wretched countrymen! What fury reigns? What more than madness has 
possess’d your brains? Think you the Grecians from your coasts are gone? 
(…) Somewhat is sure design’d, by fraud or force: Trust not their presents, 
nor admit the horse” (Vergilius). 
 
The Trojans ignored the warning and rolled the horse into the city as a 
reminder of their victory. During the night the Greek warriors came out of 
the horse and opened Troy’s gates to the other Greek warriors. There was a 
big battle and the Greeks won.  
The idea of a “Trojan Horse”, meant as a way to put in place the 
conditions for achieving specific objectives, is somewhat implicit in the 
EU’s actions, whose aim is to reach a better result than the member states 
                                                          
1 The opinions expressed by the author in this publication in no way commit the 
European Court of Auditors to which he belongs. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the insightful comments as well as the editorial assistance received. 
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could achieve by themselves. This aim is the basis of the EU added value 
concept. 
2. The EU fundamentals 
The European Union originates from the member states’ decision to 
pool selected aspects of their respective sovereign powers to attain 
objectives they have in common (Articles 1, 5(1)(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU)). The Union’s competences, most of which are 
shared with the member states, are therefore based upon the achievement 
of these objectives.2 The Union’s competences imply the identification of 
“what” the EU should be doing and “how” it should be done. Here the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality come into play. Before 
launching an initiative, it is essential to systematically check (a) whether 
public action is really necessary, (b) whether action at the European level 
is the most appropriate, and (c) whether the measures chosen are 
proportionate to achieving those objectives (European Commission 
2001, 11). 
The subsidiarity principle, applicable in the areas of shared 
competence with the member states, requires one to demonstrate that the 
member states cannot sufficiently achieve the objectives of the proposed 
EU action, which can instead, by reason of its scale or effects, be better 
achieved by the Union (Art. 5(3) TEU). Subsidiarity implies weighing up 
all types of advantages and disadvantages and, finally, the exercise of 
political discretion. Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept that allows EU 
action to be expanded where the circumstances so require and, conversely, 
                                                          
2 Art. 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes three 
categories of EU competences depending on the intervention field (exclusive, 
shared with the member states, and competence to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the members states’ actions). The European Union has 
exclusive competence in few areas (see Art. 3 TFEU). It is worth mentioning that 
Art. 4(1) TEU (and Declaration No. 18 in relation to the delimitation of 
competences attached to the Treaty of Lisbon) underlines that “competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”. Protocol 
No. 25 on the exercise of shared competence clarifies that “when the Union has 
taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers 
those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover 
the whole area”. An increase or a reduction of EU competences can be decided in 
accordance with the Treaty’s ordinary revision procedure provided for in Art. 48 
TEU. The procedure can be initiated by the member states, the European 
Parliament or the Commission. A Treaty revision would require ratification by the 
member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
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to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified. One of the 
characteristics of EU action is therefore to be “inevitable” in terms of 
reaching a better result and making a real difference.3 The underlying logic 
is that for every EU action, one should be able to convincingly answer the 
question: Why Europe? 
Moreover, the content and form of any Union action should be limited 
to “what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties” (principle 
of proportionality) (Art. 5(4) TEU). All EU measures should leave as 
much scope for national decision as possible. This concept explains, for 
example, why the Union has no administration at the individual country 
level so that it must rely on each member state to implement its decisions. 
The EU’s implementing power is consequently residual and not 
monopolistic. The EU administration is, in fact, a chain of national 
administrations (Sigma 1998, 13). 
EU actions are pursued above all through EU legislation. The latter is 
at the root of a significant (and growing) part of national legislation and is 
therefore instrumental in bringing different national laws in line with each 
other and effecting changes in the member countries’ basic economic, 
social and political structures. For governments, EU law might even 
represent a welcome externally imposed discipline for overcoming internal 
resistance to far-reaching domestic reforms (i.e., the “vincolo esterno” 
metaphor conceptualised by the Italians). 
3. The EU budget 
As observed by the President of the European Commission, the EU 
budget is one of the tools available to achieve the Union’s objectives and, 
in particular, to foster change (Barroso 2008). 
As a consequence of the European Union’s unique framework, the EU 
budget represents a type of “rare bird” in all aspects, from its approval and 
                                                          
3 For example, the European Parliament has underlined that the main purpose of 
EU budgetary spending is to create European added value (EAV) by pooling 
resources, acting as a catalyst and offering economies of scale, positive 
transboundary and spill-over effects thus contributing to the achievement of agreed 
common policy targets more effectively or faster and reducing national 
expenditure. EU spending must always aim at creating greater value than the 
aggregated individual spending of member states (see European Parliament 2011, 
para. 15). 
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financing, through the management of its revenue and expenditure, to 
holding to account for its implementation.4 
The EU budget does not, in general, finance goods and services aimed 
directly at EU citizens.5 A significant part of its expenditure 
(approximately one-third) is devoted to agricultural markets and direct 
payments to farmers. The rest is divided up into more than 70 spending 
programmes, covering a wide range of sectors and contributing to similar 
actions financed from national budgets (for example, providing funds for 
infrastructure and favouring productive investments, training, research and 
studies).6 In quantitative terms, the EU funds represent a relatively 
marginal financial contribution to the far higher-funded national 
programmes.7 In some cases (notably, Cohesion, Rural Development and 
Fisheries), the EU actions are co-financed by national budgets. As a result, 
the EU and the national budgets are closely interconnected. 
The EU budget has evolved over the years from a primarily political 
instrument of compensation to an instrument for economic development 
and pan-European objectives. Currently, the budget is a hybrid between a 
political and an economic instrument. One example is its pivotal role in 
the development of the internal market by making it acceptable for the 
member states (Núñez Ferrer 2012, 8). The cohesion policy is another 
example where the policy’s rationale goes well beyond its financial 
dimension because it focuses on a long term change in investment patterns 
and on overcoming structural barriers to development; in order words, a 
                                                          
4 For a complete review of the EU budget process, see European Commission 
(2008a). For a critical analysis, see the numerous contributions presented in the 
context of the EU budget review (European Commission 2008c). My own 
considerations are developed in Cipriani (2007). 
5 BusinessDictionary.com defines a public good as an “item whose consumption is 
not decided by the individual consumer but by the society as a whole, and which is 
financed by taxation. A public good (or service) may be consumed without 
reducing the amount available for others, and cannot be withheld from those who 
do not pay for it. Public goods (and services) include economic statistics and other 
information, law-and-order enforcement, national defence, national parks, etc. No 
market exists for such goods, and they must be provided to everyone by the 
government.” 
6 For an overview of the different programmes funded by the EU budget, see 
European Commission (2012c). 
7 For example, although taking approximately 1/3 of the EU budget resources, the 
cohesion policy is still a relatively small policy when compared to similar spending 
in member states. Another example is provided by the research domain, the bulk of 
whose public funding is provided by the national budgets (approximately 95%). 
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“Trojan Horse” to improve and modernise public administrations, to 
enhance transparency and to foster good governance (Hübner 2007, 3). 
The concept of EU added value mentioned earlier implies the ability to 
do things that nobody else can (or will) do, with better results. For the EU 
budget, this added value means that one euro spent at the EU level can 
offer more than one euro spent at the national level (European Commission 
2004, 5,8). The EU budget raison d’être is, therefore, to produce a better 
added value compared to national spending, not to replace it. 
Yet, what can the EU budget do that the member states cannot do for 
themselves? Does the European Union’s role in a given policy area 
necessarily require EU spending? Is an EU budget of over €130 billion 
needed? 
There is no straightforward answer to these questions because there are 
no “objective” criteria for deciding whether a policy fulfils the conditions 
for EU financing.8 For example, if funding for cohesion, agriculture and 
research can be traced back to the Treaty, the latter does not clarify what 
actions should be undertaken and how much money should be invested in 
those policies. This lack of clarity is why the European Court of Auditors 
has suggested that “[t]he concept of European added value should be 
articulated in a suitable political declaration or in EU legislation in order to 
provide guidance to the EU's political authorities to be used when 
choosing expenditure priorities” (European Court of Auditors 2010a, 
point 18). 
In fact, because of the integration between the European states, “nearly 
all policies have a European dimension and a national dimension” 
(European Commission 2002, 20).9 In practice, the decision to complement 
EU actions with spending measures is made on “political” grounds. In 
                                                          
8 It is worth mentioning that, already in 1978, the Commission had tried to define 
the intervention of the EU budget on the basis of criteria such as “economies of 
scale”, the “need for a global approach with the other policies funded” or the 
“reduction of the burden of national budgets” (see European Commission 1978, 6–
8). However, these criteria turned out to be too vague to be applied. With the 
Lisbon Treaty, it would still be possible for the EU budget to intervene in all 
sectors. Indeed, while the Treaty establishes three types of categories and areas of 
EU competence (see note (i)), it does not provide operational criteria to define the 
EU area of intervention. 
9 For example, immigration, justice, taxation, the labour market, energy and 
telecommunications are all sectors in which responsibilities are still largely 
national but which doubtlessly have effects across frontiers. 
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given situations, on the basis of different arguments, the member states can 
decide that the “European” level is preferable to the national level.10 
Without denying the difficulties and differences surrounding the 
concept of EU added value,11 it appears reasonable to identify three main 
characteristics for EU expenditure: catalytic (making something happen 
that otherwise would not happen or would happen more slowly); targeted 
(concentrated on the best added value and the most effective results on the 
basis of evaluation and impact assessment); and realistic (objectives 
should be achievable). 
The use of the EU budget to make something happen that otherwise 
would not happen is based on three elements.  
There is first “money”, earmarked for specific objectives and meant to 
increase the overall funds available nationally for a given policy. This can 
be relatively significant in some cases.12 
Second, these funds are made available for spending according to 
specified rules that are instrumental to achieving the EU added value 
through a number of specific requirements concerning for example public 
procurement, competition, environment, financial management, audit and 
control. More recent tendencies aim to introduce other forms of 
conditionality, such as funding disbursements that are linked to the 
                                                          
10 Gros (2008, 2) argues that the current composition of spending is the result of 
historical accidents and that the main legacy of the ‘founding’ compromises on 
Agriculture and Structural Funds is that the budget is basically seen as a vehicle for 
the redistribution of money between member states, rather than as a tool for 
fostering common goals. 
11 For example, Tarschys (2005) observes that the notion of European added value 
can often appear to be capable of justifying almost anything as a worthy target for 
European funding. To make the concept operational in policy-making practice, one 
should design procedures and methods for assessing how the specific programmes 
and projects rank. This assessment would speak in favour of a two-pronged 
strategy. First, there is a need to take a hard look at the economic elements 
involved. Returns could differ a great deal between various policy areas. The 
second part of the appraisal would aim at estimating the strength of the various 
proposals with regard to their contribution to European cohesion, in the widest 
sense of that word. As a result, the concept of European added value should be 
reserved for (i) investments where the limited scope of the member states and the 
existence of economic externalities reduce their propensity to take appropriate 
action and for (ii) programmes and projects likely to make substantial 
contributions to promoting the sense of community and effective interaction within 
the European Union. 
12 For example, for the 2007–13 period, some €348 billion are set aside for 
Cohesion (all Funds), €96 billion for Rural Development, and €50 billion for 
Research programmes. 
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achievement of results or the countries’ compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (European Commission 2011b, articles 11 and 21). 
Third, the budget is implemented by the Commission on its own 
responsibility and with regard for the principles of sound financial 
management.13 However, to reflect the EU model of governance without 
government, the EU spending programmes can be implemented through 
several management modes, which are very different in nature and which 
imply a variable intensity for the EU intervention.14 This intensity concerns, 
in particular, the degree of decision by the Commission in granting the funds 
and its direct control at the level of the funds’ beneficiaries. 
For most of the expenditures (approximately 80%), there is “co-
administration” with the member states based on a partnership (or “shared 
management”). This partnership means that in reality the financial 
implementation (Commission) is dissociated from the main decision-taking 
aspect (member states). In particular, the member states must satisfy 
themselves that the actions financed from the EU budget are actually carried 
out and implemented correctly, while the Commission has a supervisory role 
and is not expected to micro-manage the implementation of the spending 
programmes. This segregation of functions shows that the EU might well 
have a “shared competence” in terms of policy, without necessarily having a 
corresponding full competence in terms of implementation. 
4. Beware of myths 
When discussing EU expenditure, very often three “myths” come to 
light. The first myth is that significant spending is essential to achieve 
some public objectives. The second is that spending is a sufficient 
                                                          
13 See Art. 17(1) TEU and 317 TFEU. In particular, Art. 17(1) TEU provides that 
the Commission shall execute the budget and “manage programmes”. This 
addition from the Lisbon Treaty appears to indicate an enhancement of the 
Commission’s role. One should also note that the “cooperation” with the member 
states in the budget implementation is related to specific tasks only and, therefore, 
it should not undermine the Commission’s full responsibility (Art. 317 TFEU). 
14 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities as amended last by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1525/2007 of 17 
December 2007 provides for four different management modes: centralised 
management by the Commission (used mainly for administrative expenditure and 
internal policies), shared management with member states (namely agriculture and 
rural development, cohesion), decentralised management (external actions/pre-
accession aid) with third countries and joint management (cooperation with 
international organisations). 
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condition for durable results. The third is that when EU payments are 
found to be irregular, recovery procedures can fully repair the damage to 
the EU budget. 
4.1 No spending, no results 
To what extent a given policy requires EU spending (or non-budgetary 
measures only) depends on an assessment of EU spending’s added value 
compared to national spending. As has been observed, the strongest 
generators of economic expansion are most likely found in the regulatory 
sphere. The important engines for this development are the internal 
market, the monetary union and the growing mobility of skills and 
knowledge. In stimulating lasting growth, the EU’s rules matter more than 
the EU’s expenditures (Núñez Ferrer 2012, 43). 
For example, crossing borders between some national rail systems 
remains complicated because many trans-European rail services are 
interrupted by required stops at border locations. Making progress on 
alleviating these constraints has the potential to facilitate improvements in 
trans-European transport that are of comparable scale to the performance 
gains that result from significant investments in infrastructure. As shown 
below, this progress would entail more co-operation between the member 





25 minutes saved and 25 minutes delay on Priority Project 1 
25 minutes 
The journey time saved by 
constructing a new high speed 
line between Nürnberg and 
Ingolstadt in Germany at an 
overall cost of 2,336 million 
euro (with EU co-financing of 
134 million euro from TEN-T). 
 
The additional time needed for a 
technical control for trains entering 
Italy at the Brennersee station at the 
Austrian-Italian border, because the 
Italian railway undertaking does not 
accept the technical control already 
carried out at the point of departure in 
München by its German counterpart. 
 
(European Court of Auditors 2010c) 
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4.2 Just a question of money 
The success of the EU budget cannot be measured by a high rate of 
expenditure implementation. This rate could represent a good indicator of 
“political efficiency” for the various levels of government concerned, 
showing how far their (often short-term) expectations have been fulfilled. 
However, a more adequate approach would require an examination of 
“policy efficiency” and, in particular, of the achievement of the declared 
objectives. 
Things do not happen automatically just because there are funds and 
processes in place. The European added value of a policy is not only 
dependent on its stated objectives but also on its management system, 
funding tools and implementation. Policies that, at face value, appear to 
have a high added value can fail to deliver it in practice (Núñez Ferrer 
2012, 10). Box 4-2 shows a key EU objective that might not be achieved 
due to an inadequate framework. 
 
 
4.3 Recovery procedures: a full damage waiver 
EU rules allow the Commission to apply financial corrections in the 
case of irregularities in EU spending. In the Commission’s view, these 
procedures permit the restoration of a situation where 100% of the EU 
expenditure complies with the applicable rules.15 Yet, the effectiveness of 
ex-post clearance in both “cleaning” national expenditure and in representing 
                                                          
15 Financial corrections are the main tool for the correction of errors and 
irregularities in the context of shared management. The final objective is to ensure 
that all expenditure declared by the member state (i.e., on the basis of which the 




Measures taken to date to reduce fishing overcapacity by adapting the 
fishing fleet to fishing resources have been unsuccessful. This is due in 
particular to important weaknesses in the framework, such as the existing 
definitions of fishing capacity did not adequately reflect the ability of 
vessels to catch fish; fleet capacity ceilings do not impose real restrictions 
on fishing fleet capacity; despite the key objective of aligning fishing 
capacity to fishing opportunities, fishing overcapacity has not been defined 
or quantified (European Court of Auditors 2011d).
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a deterrent against irregularities does not meet with unanimous agreement 
(Box 4-3).16 
Three main factors weaken the actual impact of the financial correction 
mechanisms. First, financial corrections do not constitute genuine financial 
sanctions. Corrections are limited to a recovery of EU irregular 
expenditure from member states and the final recipient may feel no effect 
whatsoever. The same expenditure can still continue to be financed 
through national budgets and represent, in the end, a further contribution 
by taxpayers. Additionally, the practical possibility of imposing financial 
corrections is very much dependent on the necessarily reduced number of 
the Commission’s controls. Second, as these corrections generally occur at 
the end of a programme, it is no longer possible to correct any 
fundamental system weaknesses and to re-direct the objectives to be 
achieved by the co-financed policies. Third, due to the “input” nature of 
EU expenditure, based on items of eligible spending, the extent to which 
the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts are achieved by the EU 
programmes is not the basis on which a financial correction is triggered. 
The regular (and increasing) occurrence of financial corrections has 
made them an inevitable routine procedure, thus demonstrating the limited 
deterrence of this instrument and its reduced ability to effect structural 
repairs. The corrections can counteract the financial consequences of an 
“error”, but not necessarily solve the problem at source.17 
 
                                                          
16 Parliament has recently confirmed serious doubts on the effectiveness of 
financial corrections mechanisms (see European Parliament resolution of 10 May 
2012 with observations forming an integral part of its Decisions on discharge in 
respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget for the 
financial year 2010, Section III – Commission and executive agencies, paras. 120–
122). 
17 This situation, for example, occurs in the case for the non respect of procurement 
procedures, a key precondition for the implementation of the internal market but 
also a major source of infringements in the cohesion area. If public administrations 
and beneficiaries in the member states are unable to improve the implementation of 
the procurement rules, the cohesion policy would continue to be systematically 
affected. 




Financial corrections are, above all, an indicator of whether a policy 
has been implemented according to the established rules. If EU money is 
invested to achieve some sensible results, it can then be said that the 
objectives have not been met. As a result, the higher the number of 
financial corrections, the higher the evidence of failure and missed 
opportunities. 
5. Light and shadow 
The EU budget’s reputation is sometimes tainted by cases of waste and 
fraud, which can represent a temptation to question the budget’s very 
Box 4-3 
 
The likelihood of recovery of an undue payment made under the 
Common Agricultural Policy is affected by delays in the member states 
initiation of recovery procedures, shortcomings in their recovery 
actions, and their limited enforcement possibilities. During the period 
2006–2008 around 90% of the amounts reported in the EU annual 
accounts as “recoveries of undue payments” were those made by the 
Commission through deductions from the member states and not actual 
recoveries of the unduly paid aid from beneficiaries. This undoubtedly 
protects the financial interests of the EU but without the full deterrent 
effect of a recovery made from an unduly paid beneficiary (European 
Court of Auditors 2011c). 
 
For the cohesion policy, although the financial correction process 
is lengthy (30 months on average), the Commission took the 
appropriate actions and measures were properly applied in about two-
thirds of the cases examined. However, there is a limited assurance that 
financial corrections mechanisms translate into lasting systems’ 
improvements as to avoid errors uncovered to occur again. Only in 
28% of the programmes the assurance was found to be high. This 
means that the Commission will have to take further corrective actions, 
entailing increasing resource and administrative costs. For half of the 
programmes examined member states were able to replace ineligible 
expenditure disallowed by new projects, thus off-setting the financial 
impact of the corrections. This is not without risks, since some of the 
deficiencies identified are systemic (e.g. incorrect application of 
procurement rules) and are therefore likely to apply also to new 
projects (European Court of Auditors 2012a).
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existence. Yet, there is no evidence that, overall, the EU budget is 
performing worse than national expenditures. Actually, for the policies 
where the actions are co-financed (for example, cohesion), if infringements 





As for the national budgets, the main issue is how to make the best use 
of the available funds. The following examples show that useful 
achievements are reached through EU spending, although this does not 
necessarily mean that these funds were used in the most effective way and 
that, compared to national spending, EU funding has resulted in a better 




The waste water and sewage sludge from urban agglomerations 
can affect the quality of Europe’s lakes, rivers, coastal waters, soils and 
ground waters. As a result the EU has adopted a series of directives and 
has also co-financed the building of urban waste water treatment plants 
through the Cohesion Fund and the ERDF. 
The EU funded infrastructures have contributed to a significant 
increase in the coverage rate of the urban population served. This is 
particularly marked in the four member states who received more than 
50% of EU expenditure for implementing urban waste water treatment 
for the 2000–06 programme period. Of the treatment plants visited, 18 
out of 26 were deemed to be operating satisfactorily with regard to 
capacity, having a utilization rate above 50%. In these cases, there was 
an adequate connection of households and industrial users to the 
treatment plant. A large majority of the treatment plants produced 
effluent meeting EU requirements. 
However, six of the seven cases of underutilization resulted from 
problems in completing the network, with many households and 
industrial users remaining unconnected to the treatment plants despite 
the plants being five years or more in operation. As a result, not all of 
the waste water produced in the area was treated. Where the quality of 
the effluent did not meet EU requirements (nine cases) one of the 
problems noted was that some treatment plants were being operated by 
local authorities lacking adequate resources and expertise and with no 
mechanisms in place to be informed of best practice (European Court 
of Auditors 2009b). 





The question is, therefore, how to make the EU budget more effective. 
In this respect, there are some lessons learned, pointing to three issues in 
particular. 
5.1 Institutional capacity 
As noted by the European Court of Auditors (2011a, para. 22), 
adequate institutional capacity is necessary to ensure that the EU funds are 
correctly spent to support durable economic development. The 
effectiveness of national management and control systems should 
therefore be ensured from the start. Regulation alone is, however, not 
enough. In this respect, the day-to-day actions of the managers in the 
member states are key because the assurance at the EU level heavily relies 
on their systems.18 Additionally, these bodies very often also manage 
                                                          
18 For example, the Commission’s analysis of errors in cohesion policy for the 
years 2006–09 points to weaknesses in the administrative capacity and the national 
management and control systems as the main factors explaining those errors (see 
European Commission, 2011c). 
Box 4-5 
 
Investments in water supply address different needs, such as: 
increasing availability of water in response to increased demand; 
expanding geographical coverage; improving the quality of the water 
distributed; improving the efficiency of water supply systems and the 
quality of the service.  
Structural measures spending has contributed to improving the 
supply of water for domestic use, either by increasing the available 
volume of water, extending the public network to areas which were 
previously not connected or improving water quality, network efficiency 
or service continuity.  
However, better results could have been achieved at a lower cost. In 
particular, the focus is on building infrastructures to exploit new water 
sources and attention is rarely paid to other solutions, such as reducing 
water losses and using other nearby resources. This could have made it 
possible to build smaller capacity infrastructure. Also, some projects 
were not operational because of missing complementary infrastructure. 
When measured by the two main efficiency parameters (capacity 
utilisation rate and non-invoiced water), several projects were found to 
operate with limited efficiency (European Court of Auditors 2010e).
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national funds. Here, the interest in getting things right is therefore 
common because there is a real win-win opportunity for both the EU and 
the member states and, ultimately, for the taxpayer. 
It is unrealistic to believe that in the current governance framework, 
the Commission can alone ensure an adequate budget implementation. As 
long as the member states do not put in place more effective management 
structures and increase the possibility that the Commission can rely upon 
these structures, it will not be possible to reduce the frequent checks, 
remedial action plans, and financial corrections, which will not 






Limited value was added by the Commission and the member 
states’ Managing Authorities’ appraisal (European Court of Auditors 
2010e). 
 
The Commission does not make full use of the instrument’s potential 
due to insufficient expertise in the priority areas related to the General 
Budget Support programmes’ objectives and weaknesses in its 
management of the dialogue process (European Court of Auditors 2010g). 
 
Education expertise is not optimally assigned and developed in 
Delegations. This deprives the Commission of a vital monitoring 
mechanism as well as of the best opportunities for effective influence 
on implementation (European Court of Auditors 2010h). 
 
The Commission assessments and decisions for Major Projects and 
Cohesion Fund projects did not lead to action to remedy project 
weaknesses observed during the audit. The results and impact of the 
projects were not monitored and empty ports and unused seaport 
infrastructures were found. Monitoring Committees and the Managing 
Authorities focused on the rate of spending. Some regions 
retrospectively financed replacement projects to absorb the available 
allocated resources. However, two of the three replacement projects 
included in the sample did not attain their objectives (European Court 
of Auditors 2012b). 
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The European Court of Auditors has, for example, observed that for a 
significant number of the transactions affected by error, sufficient 
information was available for the member state authorities to have 
detected and corrected at least some of the errors prior to certifying the 
expenditure to the Commission (European Court of Auditors 2009a, 
para. 4.23; 2010d, para. 4.25). This fact shows the difficulty of applying 
the principle of partnership and common interest that underlies the “shared 
management” arrangements. 
There is no “geography” of the good and bad administration; 
improvements are needed in all member states. Improvements are also 
needed within the Commission. As a consequence of the emphasis put on 
compliance and funds absorption, the institutional capacity has focused on 
processes rather than on the achievement of sensible objectives. The 
Commission should therefore improve its appraisal procedures, 
supervision, and the monitoring of achievements to make the best use of 
the funds. There is also a need to put the right skills in the right places. 
Some examples are provided below (Box 4-6). 
5.2 Needs and objectives 
The EU budget is not meant to replace the national budgets; it is meant 
to perform better than them. The “needs” are basically quantified by 1% of 
the member states’ GDP, which reflects what the member states’ 
governments consider to be an acceptable contribution, rather than the 
outcome of an EU added value driven analysis. Whether the 1% is too 
little or too much depends on what it is intended to achieve. 
As observed by the European Court of Auditors, the EU objectives are 
too wide-ranging, unclear or somewhat conflicting; policy instruments and 
resources are insufficient to meet the set objectives; causal links between 
the funded activities and the desired outcomes are unclear; and there are 
deficiencies in the monitoring and evaluation arrangements (European 
Court of Auditors 2010a, para. 14). Some examples are indicated below 
(Box 4-7). 
The EU’s expenditure is ‘input’ oriented, based on items of eligible 
spending, as opposed to disbursements based on a set of concrete 
objectives and linked to the achievement of results. Additionally, “fair 
return” considerations invite member states to seek “acceptable” net 
balances rather than specific policy objectives, leading to an inevitable 
trade-off between the desired outcomes and the spending levels. The 
absorption of funds potentially becomes an objective in itself, encouraging 
the dispersion of resources in a multitude of small initiatives whose main 
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characteristic is that they are easily implemented rather than that they have 
intrinsic added value. This situation introduces a tension with the aim of 
making efficient, effective and economic use of funding by pursuing 
specific policy objectives. In this way, the EU budget is adding 
“something” to a number of existing policies already financed by national 
budgets, with a result that the EU de facto makes no choices regarding 
purpose. Where “political efficiency” can be satisfied, “policy efficiency” 




In some cases, as shown below, the objectives of the programmes were 
eventually not achieved, also because they were found to be contradictory, 
such as in the sugar sector (Box 4-8). 
Box 4-7 
The usefulness of the programming work was reduced by 
insufficient clarity and prioritisation. Clarity was further reduced as the 
same priorities were reformulated and restructured from one document 
to the next. The lengthy programming and design process did not suit 
the fast changing and conflict-affected environment of the Southern 
Caucasus, endangering the relevance of the assistance. Programming 
and design of assistance were not sufficiently guided by a structured 
dialogue with the beneficiary countries (European Court of Auditors 
2010i). 
 
There was a lack of clarity as to what was to be achieved and how 
the success of the projects’ activities could be assessed. This had 
negative consequences for the implementation of projects (European 
Court of Auditors 2011b). 
 
Concerning the EU financial assistance for the decommissioning of 
eight non-upgradeable nuclear reactors, the Court found that 10 years 
after there is still no comprehensive needs-assessment, prioritization 
and setting of specific objectives (European Court of Auditors 2011e). 
 
None of the regions visited had a long term port development plan 
for seaports’ transport infrastructures. Needs assessments to support 
the selection of seaport infrastructure projects had not been carried out 
(European Court of Auditors 2012b). 





One of the consequences of the often grand EU objectives, with no 
clear or specific expected achievements, is that very little is known about 
the achievements, especially their outcomes and impacts (Box 4-9). This 
opacity makes it extremely difficult to identify (and report on) the added-
value that citizens get in return for their money. As the Court has observed, 
“[i]nsufficient information on results and outcomes also undermines 
accountability and transparency as well as decisions on the allocation of 
resources” (European Court of Auditors 2010a, para. 16). 
The lack of selective and focused objectives is directly reflected in the 
difficulty in setting measurable indicators for the policies financed. This 
difficulty, in turn, undermines the role of the ex-post evaluation and the 
Box 4-8 
 
There is no rationale in initially making available additional quotas 
and later striving to reduce them. Moreover, in the case of additional 
isoglucose quota, undertakings were paid even when they renounced 
quotas which had just been granted for free. The costs involved 
amounting to around 97 million euro cannot be justified. If additional 
costs are taken into account, the overall cost to the EU budget after the 
reform for the period 2007-2013 is likely to be 1.2 billion euro higher 
than before the reform. EU dependence on imports has been increased 
and the reduction of the prices of sugar is unlikely to benefit to final 
consumers (European Court of Auditors 2010b). 
 
Owing in particular to the low subsidy rate, the school milk 
scheme continues to be relatively unattractive and, as a result, 
generally has no more than a deadweight effect. In most cases, the 
products subsidised either would have been included in canteen meals 
anyway or would probably have been bought by the beneficiaries even 
without the subsidy. While the decision by certain member states to 
organise milk distribution free of charge has resulted in a more 
satisfactory impact, this form of distribution is at present covered by 
costly national schemes to which the Community budget makes only a 
marginal contribution. Both the School Milk and School Fruit Schemes 
allow only of a limited impact, especially as neither scheme has a 
mechanism for targeting priority needs (European Court of Auditors 
2010f). 
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potential ‘pedagogical’ effects for future policies. For example, the ex-post 
Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-06 shows that, although 
quantitative targets were often set and an indicator system established, in 
many cases they were not linked in a meaningful way to any ultimate 
policy objectives and determined in relation to the funding made available 
and what it could plausibly achieve. Accordingly, targets were either 
attained far too easily or were unattainable given the funds deployed 




Due to the ‘input’ based design of the spending programmes, the focus 
of a significant number of the reporting documents provided by the 
national bodies and by the Commission rests on financial and physical 
implementation only. The Treaty of Lisbon has recently introduced an 
obligation for the Commission to establish “an evaluation report on the 
Union’s finances based on the results achieved”, in particular in relation to 
the indications given by the budgetary authorities (Art. 318 TFEU). The 
idea was that this evaluation would represent an assessment that goes 
further than the traditional record of budgetary implementation and rules 
compliance “so that the relation between the key performance indicators, 
their legal/political basis, the amount of expenditure and the results 
achieved is clear and transparent”.19 Yet, the first report falls short of this 
                                                          
19 See European Parliament resolution of 10 May 2011 with observations forming 
an integral part of the Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of 
the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III, 
para. 200. 
Box 4-9 
The objectives of the programmes tend to be formulated in too general 
terms which hinders the design of the various components of the 
programmes and makes it more difficult to hold the Commission 
accountable for their effectiveness. The Commission should be able to 
demonstrate that the amount of funds allocated is appropriate in view of 
the objectives as well as the framework for dealing with risks and benefits. 
It is often difficult to assess whether conditions have been met or not, 
particularly due to a lack of clarity over what constitutes satisfactory 
progress as well as weaknesses in the statistical systems used for assessing 
results (European Court of Auditors 2010g). 
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expectation.20 This shortfall is primarily due to a lack of sufficient and 
reliable information on the results and impacts of the specific programmes 
(European Commission 2012). 
This means that if the EU rules oblige spending to comply with “sound 
financial management”,21 there is not yet a framework for ‘performance’ 
accountability. It is therefore not possible to provide a conclusive answer 
concerning the use of funds and their impact, thus making the 
Commission’s ultimate responsibility all the more fragile. 
6. If not now, when? 
The financial and economic crisis has put the spotlight on the member 
states’ severe public deficits, requiring the adoption of rigorous measures 
to significantly curb public spending. Tougher budgetary discipline and 
rigour will also be an issue for the next EU multi-annual financial 
framework, currently under discussion. In particular, future spending is 
bound to meet the expectations raised by the EU budget review for a more 
targeted and results-driven expenditure. Faced with these significant 
issues, the EU’s credibility in providing clear and visible benefits for the 
EU and its citizens that could not be achieved by spending only at the 
                                                          
20 For example, the European Parliament considered that the coverage and the 
content of this first report is not in line with the Treaty requirements (see resolution 
of 10 May 2012 with observations forming an integral part of its Decisions on 
discharge in respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget 
for the financial year 2010, para. 99). The European Court of Auditors observed 
that the report is vague, short on substance and, consequently, adds limited value. 
However, it presents the Parliament, the Council and Commission with an 
opportunity to discuss and agree how the evaluation report can be made useful to 
the discharge authority (see European Court of Auditors 2012c). 
21 See Articles 310 (5) and 317 TFEU. The concept of ‘sound financial 
management’ is built around three principles. The principle of “economy” requires 
that the resources used shall be made available in due time, in appropriate 
quantities, of appropriate quality and at the best price. “Efficiency” is 
characteristically a managerial value consisting, in essence, of maintaining a good 
ratio between the resources employed and the results attained. A related value is 
“effectiveness”, which basically consists of ensuring that the performance of public 
administration is successful in achieving the goals and solving the public problems 
set for it by law and government (see Sigma 1999, 13). These principles (known as 
the “three E’s”) are codified in the EU Financial Regulation under the concept of 
sound financial management (see Art. 27 of the Financial Regulation, Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002, op. cit.). 
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national, regional or local level, is ultimately at stake.22 The current 
difficulties and the longstanding weaknesses require that a number of 
issues be addressed and that the necessary changes be put into place 
without delay. 
Indeed, identifying the areas where the EU dimension can offer more 
than national spending is not, in itself, sufficient. Spending on the right 
policies is only worthwhile if it secures the desired results (European 
Commission 2010d, 5–6). It is inevitable that hard choices are needed. A 
catalytical effect from EU expenditure would require a sufficient critical 
mass to produce visible results, which is also a factor in any potential 
increase of the EU citizens’ confidence. Given the present financial 
constraints and compared to the present framework, this requirement 
should mean more money for a “few” spending programmes, rather than 
less money for a plurality of programmes. Less funds from the EU budget 
does not necessarily mean less funds for a given policy, but rather the 
choice to have funding supplied by a different level of government.23 This 
concept would also mean fewer and more precise objectives than currently 
exist, to be put in relation to the available funding. The EU budget should 
provide the “cake” rather than the “icing”. 
Almost any expenditure creates somewhere some type of growth 
because it boosts consumption and therefore economic activity. It is, 
however, important to distinguish between short-term and lasting growth. 
                                                          
22 The conclusions of the Westendorp report are illuminating in this respect, stating 
already in 1995 that “the Union's principal internal challenge is to reconcile itself 
with its citizens. Therefore, enhancing its legitimacy in their eyes has to be the 
prime task of the coming reform. The achievement of this aim will depend on a 
clear definition of the Union's objectives, i.e., the joint goals sought, the credibility 
of common policies and the cooperation machinery designed to attain those 
objectives (or, to put it another way, the suitability of the instruments for the 
purpose of achieving the objectives set) and the preservation of the Union's 
internal cohesion” (Report by the Reflection Group: A Strategy for Europe, 
Brussels, 5 December 1995, part two, para. 10). The Reflection Group was 
established by the Corfu European Council of 24 and 25 June 1994 to examine the 
challenges to be addressed to bring the European Union up to date and to prepare it 
for the next enlargement. 
23 For example, as noted by Parliament, “a large proportion of the Union’s 
objectives have been taken into account by the Member States in their national 
budgets” (see European Parliament 2009, para 18). Parliament also noted that 
because the EU budget is very limited compared to the national budgets, there is a 
need to create synergies between the EU budget and the national budgets to 
implement common EU strategies. It stressed that coherence gives European 
policies greater impact, achieving true European added value while supporting 
long-term policy objectives (see European Parliament 2010, para. 15). 
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Consistent with the definition of EU added value and taking account of the 
limited resources available, one would expect EU expenditure to aim at 
long-term “sustainable” results. One should note in this respect that one of 
the three priorities of the Europe 2020 growth strategy is precisely to 
achieve sustainable growth (European Commission 2010a, 10; 14–17). 
However, the fact that less than half of the EU annual budget is currently 
directed at financing initiatives that support the Europe 2020 strategy 
shows the long road still ahead of us (European Commission 2011a, 10). 
The Commission’s claim of a results-driven EU expenditure (European 
Commission 2010c, point 4; 2011b, points 1 and 5.2.2.) should materialise 
with a shift from the ‘eligible’ inputs for spending towards outputs and 
outcomes. Yet, for example, for the future cohesion scheme, the Commission 
has essentially proposed retaining the old input-based framework, though 
with a few performance-based exceptions. The same applies to the future 
agricultural policy scheme, which remains fundamentally input-based and 
therefore oriented more towards compliance than performance. 
For EU expenditures to be measured in terms of real impact, rather 
than in terms of the inputs involved, there is a need to set meaningful 
indicators that are linked to realistic policy objectives and to evaluate at 
key intermediate points whether the defined objectives and intended 
impacts are likely to be achieved. 
Processes and rules are not enough to deliver the expected results. 
There is a need for adequate governance. Because it is about placing 
public resources in common to achieve EU objectives, it is legitimate to 
expect that the management of the EU funds takes place through an 
effective EU-driven process, resulting in a full accountability at the EU 
level. This management should be the role of the Commission that is 
charged by the Treaty to promote in various ways the general interest of 
the Union: giving policy direction and coherence, initiating proposals for 
EU law, and acting as the guarantor of EU law and of a level playing field 
in Europe (European Commission 2008b, 2).24 One of these roles is to 
“execute the budget and manage programmes” (Art. 17(1) TEU). As a 
result of an enhanced concept of EU added-value, the full responsibility 
for the Budget implementation should lay in the Commission’s hands. 
One precondition is the alignment of the Commission’s tasks, powers 
and responsibilities. There should no longer be a segregation of functions 
between the EU and the national level, but a true “sharing” of roles under 
one single responsibility: national bodies handling EU funds should act on 
                                                          
24 As pointed out by Ponzano (2009, 218), the general interest of the Union does 
not necessarily correspond to the addition of national interests, nor does it equate 
to the lowest common denominator of the different national stances. 
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behalf of the Commission. This responsibility would require some form of 
accreditation and “contract” based upon pre-specified output and 
performance targets and budgetary allocations consistent with the EU 
objectives selected.25 The Commission should be prepared to directly 
endorse that, what is intended to be achieved, responds to the criteria of 
EU added-value. It is only if there is “one” implementation line (and not as 
many as there are national bodies), that the Commission’s ultimate 
responsibility can be sustained. 
The administrative structures at the national level should be assessed 
(at an operational level) by the Commission as being adequate to deliver 
the expected outcomes. The aim is to ascertain the structures’ capacity to 
“absorb” funds effectively, by putting forward, managing and maintaining 
meaningful and sustainable projects consistent with the pre-agreed policy 
objectives. A “selective” process for the identification of national bodies 
for EU spending (a type of “Champions league”) would introduce an 
element of “reward” and sound external pressure, which in the end should 
also benefit public spending at the national level.26 
In a future perspective, where one might look more to results than to 
the inputs of spending, the Commission will have to demonstrate that it 
has done everything possible to achieve the intended results, ‘making the 
difference’ when compared to purely national actions and that it has 
learned from past experience what does and does not work. Indeed, the 
primary purpose of accountability is not to cast blame and to punish. 
Accountability should rather help to identify lessons for the future that 
make future approaches more relevant and effective. 
The demonstration and acknowledgment that the EU’s actions add 
value to national policies and address people’s concerns more effectively 
than the “national” or “local” levels, potentially provides the grounds for a 
positive “Trojan Horse” impact on public spending in general. This effect 
occurs through identifying and promoting best practices in planning and 
                                                          
25 In its conclusions on the EU budget review, the Commission proposes the idea 
of a ‘Development and Investment Partnership Contract’ between the Commission 
and the member states, setting out the objectives to be achieved, how the progress 
towards the achievement of these objectives will be quantified and measured and 
the allocation of national and EU resources among the priority areas and 
programmes. Also, the Commission identifies the institutional capacity at a 
national, regional and local level as the key for successful development, 
implementation and monitoring of the policies. The allocation of EU financial 
resources should therefore take account of the capacity to effectively utilise these 
resources (see European Commission 2010d, p. 14). 
26 This process should be effective, in particular, because of the national co-
financing and/or because these bodies often manage other national funds. 
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managing by objectives, with managers held to account for the agreed 
expectations and the means used. 
7. Conclusions 
EU’s actions represent a kind of ‘Trojan Horse’ to achieve specific 
objectives with better results than the member states could do by 
themselves. This is the basis of the EU added value concept which can be 
articulated around three main characteristics: catalytic (making something 
happen that would otherwise not happen or would happen more slowly); 
targeted (concentrating on the best added-value and the most effective 
results on the basis of evaluation and impact assessment); and realistic 
(objectives should be achievable). 
To achieve EU objectives, EU spending is not necessarily required. For 
example, the strongest generators of economic expansion are most likely 
found in the regulatory sphere. In addition, spending is not by itself a 
sufficient condition for durable results. Finally, ineffective spending 
constitutes a missed opportunity that cannot be repaired ex-post. 
Making the best use of the available funds requires paying due 
attention to three issues in particular: adequate institutional capacity to 
realise sensible projects, the identification of the needs and the 
establishment of realistic objectives consistent with the available funds, 
and the demonstration of the results achieved through meaningful 
indicators. This is equally important for both the EU and the national 
budgets also because very often the same bodies manage funds from both 
sources. 
Consistent with the Europe 2020 growth strategy, the aim of EU 
spending should be to achieve sustainable growth. A distinction must be 
made between short-term and lasting growth. The requirement for a 
catalytic effect for EU expenditure would need to secure a sufficient 
critical mass to produce visible results. This concept should mean more 
money for a “few” spending programmes rather than less money for the 
approximately 70 current spending programmes. The EU budget should 
provide the “cake” rather than the “icing”. 
The natural outcome of a virtuous process where objectives are clear, 
agreed and realistic is an unequivocal ownership as a precondition for both 
achieving policy objectives and ensuring ‘value for money’. Because the 
EU budget is about placing public resources in common to achieve 
common EU objectives, it is legitimate to expect the Commission, as the 
promoter of the general interest of the Union, to be fully accountable for 
the money spent. For this to happen, a precondition is the alignment of the 
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Commission’s tasks, powers and responsibilities. An adequate accountability 
process for EU funds is not only instrumental in good management; it is 
also a critical condition of legitimacy for public authorities and therefore a 
factor in the potential increase of the EU citizens’ confidence. 
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THE EURO CRISIS:  







The euro faces an existential crisis. While shortly after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, which led to an unprecedented disruption in the 
functioning of the modern global financial system, the euro seemed to be a 
shelter for its members (Wyplosz 2009), attitudes regarding the euro 
changed completely following a series of events that began with the Greek 
fiscal crisis in early 2010. Despite a number of attempts by various 
European institutions, the crisis continues and the outlook is bleak. Why is 
it so difficult to resolve the euro-crisis? 
The typical answers to this question are that the euro-area does not 
constitute an optimum currency area or that monetary unions were 
traditionally combined with fiscal and political unions. These generalisations 
of course have some validity, but given the status quo and the complexity 
of the euro-area’s legal and institutional arrangements, they are not very 
helpful in providing solutions or determining the fate of the euro. 
In this article we summarise ten major roots of the euro-crisis and 
assess the policy responses (if any) to these issues. This is followed by a 
more in-depth examination of the most pressing problem that also 
constitutes the most serious threat to the integrity of the euro-area: the 
dreary economic outlook of southern euro-area member states. We 
conclude that instead of exiting or breaking-up the euro, the common 
interest lies in discovering ways in which these countries can be offered 
improved prospects for the future. A great deal of homework needs to be 
accomplished in these countries, but other euro-area partners, as well as 
European institutions, will also have a decisive role to play in supporting 
the process. In the medium term, additional intuitional changes will be 
necessary to complement the currently planned overhaul of the euro-area’s 
institutional framework. 
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2. Ten major reasons behind the euro-area crisis  
and the EU’s policy responses to date 
The euro-area has deep-rooted problems. We follow Darvas (2011c) in 
categorising ten important issues – the first four relate to pre-crisis 
developments, while the other six relate to issues highlighted by the crisis. 
2.1 The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact 
First, the rules-based Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was the 
cornerstone of fiscal prudence in the European Union, failed. In Darvas 
(2010b), we calculated the number of violations of the euro-entry criteria, 
which also include the two fiscal criteria of the SGP: the 3% of GDP 
budget deficit criterion and the 60% of GDP government debt criterion.1 
We found that between 2001 and 2006, i.e., after the euro was introduced 
but before the global financial crisis erupted in 2007, approximately one-
third of euro-area member states had violated the SGP. Such violations 
have greatly diminished the trust in the effectiveness of European rules-
based surveillance systems and resulted in high public debt, especially in 
Greece and Italy, at the start of the crisis. 
 
A number of new agreements have been reached to strengthen the SGP. 
The new agreements include the so-called “Six-Pack” (five regulations 
and one directive approved by all 27 Member States and the European 
                                                          
1 To be more precise, the exact definitions are as follows: (a) the budget deficit 
should not be larger than three per cent of GDP, unless “either the ratio has 
declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the 
reference value, or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only 
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value”; (b) 
government debt should not be greater than 60% of GDP, unless “the ratio is 
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace”. To calculate the number of violations of these criteria in Darvas (2010b) we 
used the three per cent benchmark for the deficit and the following definition of 
meeting the general government debt criterion: a country is considered to meet the 
criterion if either the debt/GDP ratio is below 60% or, if it is above this figure, then 
projecting the average change in the debt/GDP ratio over the latest three years 20 
years ahead will lead to a ratio below 60%. Note that the “Six-Pack” reforms 
adopted in 2011 operationalised this criterion exactly the same way (just the 
wording differs): the gap between the debt level and the 60% reference should be 
reduced by at least 1/20th annually (on average over three years); see European 
Commission (2011). 
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Parliament in October 2010), 2 the “Euro Plus Pact” (signed by 23 
countries in March 2011), 3 the so-called “Fiscal Compact” (Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, signed by 25 
countries in March 2012). 4 Furthermore, a new proposal called the “Two-
Pack” drafted by the European Commission in November 2011 is 
currently under negotiation.5 These new agreements fundamentally reform 
fiscal coordination, surveillance and enforcement in the EU, and in 
particular, in the euro-area. Fiscal rules will be stronger, they will be 
enshrined in national constitutions and non-compliance will be sanctioned 
in a quasi-automatic way. These agreements, if implemented and properly 
employed in practice, could help to sustain healthy fiscal positions once 
the current crisis is solved. However, they are less helpful in resolving the 
current fiscal crisis in the euro-area. Although the so-called structural 
budget balance (i.e., a budget that is balanced once the impact of the 
economic cycle and one-time expenditures and revenue measures are 
removed) will receive greater emphasis, the new agreements lead to a 
strong contractionary bias, i.e., pro-cyclical fiscal policy during the current 
downturn. Moreover, the current situation could only be made worse by 
forcing Spain to pay an immediate fine. 
An alternative solution, a form of Eurobonds (i.e., pooled national debt 
issuances), is unfortunately not yet on the table. The proposal by Delpla 
and von Weizsäcker (2010) of splitting debt issuances into a senior 
component of up to 60% of a member state’s GDP (called “Blue bonds”, 
guaranteed by all participating countries) and a junior component above 
the 60% threshold (“Red bonds”, guaranteed by the issuing country alone), 
would stabilise government financing (via the Blue bonds) but at the same 
time would expose governments to market discipline (via the Red bonds). 
At the current juncture, Blue bonds should be phased in through complete 
pooling of new issuances, in which a member state can participate until its 
share of the stock of Eurobonds reaches 60% of its GDP (Darvas 2011b). 
Such a phasing in would provide struggling countries with a long period of 
time to put their fiscal houses in order, while benefiting from a low interest 
rate. Unfortunately, talks for any sort of Eurobonds are not on the table, 
partly due to the mistrust between euro-area nations, and partly due to the 
very complex institutional framework that would be required to make the 
                                                          
2 See European Commission (2011). 
3 See European Council (2011). 
4 See European Council (2012b). 
5 See European Commission (2012a) for a concise comparison of the “Six-Pack”, 
the “Fiscal Compact” and the “Two-Pack”. 
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common bond issuance function properly, in the absence of an adequate 
level of political and fiscal integration. 
2.2 Neglect of private-sector vulnerabilities 
Second, there was a sole focus on fiscal issues – and a consequent 
neglect of private-sector behaviour. This resulted in unsustainable credit 
and housing booms in countries such as Ireland and Spain (Ahearne et al. 
2008) and the emergence of structural imbalances such as high current-
account deficits and eroded competitiveness. Divergence within a 
monetary union, such as divergence in current account balances, is not 
necessarily a bad thing. Capital flows across regions and the ensuing 
current account deficits and surpluses may reflect the improved utilisation 
of resources when capital moves to fast-growing regions to the benefit of 
the entire monetary union. However, the booms and busts in the Irish and 
Spanish housing sectors (Ahearne et al. 2008) exemplify capital 
misallocation. Additionally the accumulation of “excessive” regional debt 
is undesirable, and there are good reasons to conclude that the external 
debt of Greece, Portugal and Spain became excessive (Darvas 2012b). 
Figure 5-1 depicts changes in current account balances in five main 
geographical regions of the EU since 1995 and the projections of the IMF 
until 2017. In southern European countries, the median current account 
balance exceeded ten per cent of GDP before the crisis and the pace of 
adjustment is slow, especially in comparison to the rapid adjustment in 
eastern European countries. While private capital inflows halted and even 
reversed both in southern and eastern Europe, in southern Europe banks 
received massive liquidity support from the European Central Bank 
(ECB), which has offset the sudden stop in private capital flows. Such 
support has contributed to financial stability, but at the same time, has 
made it possible for these countries to delay the adjustment, as noted by 
Sinn (2011). 
The crisis was a bitter proof that not only fiscal issues matter. The 
“Six-Pack” and “Euro Plus Pact” also include regulations to prevent and 
correct of private sector imbalances, such as weak competitiveness 
positions and high private debt. A new procedure, the so-called 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), was introduced with the aim 
of assessing these private sector vulnerabilities and assisting countries in 
designing remedies (European Commission 2012b). Undoubtedly, this 
procedure is a major innovation in the EU’s economic governance 
framework. However, their effectiveness needs to be tested, and in any 
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case adjustment within the euro-area could take a long time and hence 
quick improvements are not expected. 
 
 
Fig. 5-1 Current account balances in main geographical groups of the EU (% of 
GDP), 1995–2017 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from IMF (2012) data 
Note: median values are indicated for the groups, which have the following 
composition: 
West: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; 
South: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; 
North: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and the UK; 
Central: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; 
East: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
2.3 Lack of structural adjustment 
Third, there were no proper mechanisms to foster structural 
adjustment. Some countries, such as Germany, were able to adjust within 
the euro-area on their own (i.e., Germany’s competitiveness improved 
considerably from the mid-1990s until the onset of the current crisis; see, 
e.g., Darvas 2012a), but others, such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
were not. While Germany, Italy and Portugal had the worst growth 
performance among euro-area member states before the crisis, Germany 
boosted its competitiveness during this period, but not Italy and Portugal. 
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Booming domestic demand contributed to rapid economic growth in Spain 
and Greece before the crisis, which obscured the more serious structural 
problems. Following IMF (2010) and Allard and Evaraert (2010), in 
Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2011) we studied certain aspects of growth that 
could be improved with structural reforms. We found that southern 
European countries are severely lagging behind in all criteria. 
Fostering structural adjustment is one of the aims of the MIP. The so-
called “European Semester,” a yearly cycle of mutual assessment of fiscal 
and structural issues was introduced in 2010, which encompasses all new 
instruments, including the MIP. This is also undoubtedly useful, yet the 
jury is still out on its effectiveness. By studying the first European 
Semester, Marzinotto et al. (2011) conclude that member states are only 
slowly internalising the new procedure and the Semester has thus far 
lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the European 
Parliament, the marginal involvement of national parliaments and the lack 
of transparency at some stages of the process. 
2.4 Lack of a crisis-resolution mechanism 
Fourth, there was no crisis-resolution mechanism for euro-area 
countries. The series of sovereign debt crises in the euro-area came as a 
surprise and euro-area policymakers had to improvise. It is important to 
highlight that in other federations, such as the US, there are no crisis-
resolution mechanisms for sub-central governments either (Darvas 2010a). 
When studying the conditions required for a fiscal union to function 
smoothly and successfully, Bordo et al. (2011) conclude “The first and 
probably the most important condition is a credible commitment to a no-
bailout rule.” In the euro-area at present, the reluctance on the part of the 
citizens of economically stronger countries such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland, to extend loans to economically weaker 
countries, such as Greece, highlight the validity of this conclusion. 
However, it also must be recognised that public debt levels in certain euro-
area member states are much higher than sub-central government debt in 
other federations, and due to the reasons discussed in the next two 
sections, an uncontrolled default could be more harmful for the rest of the 
euro-area than a similar default of a sub-central government in other 
federations.6 
                                                          
6 This conclusion remains valid even though a properly designed debt restructuring 
inside the euro-area should not cause a major contagion, as we argued in Darvas 
(2011a), and as the subsequent Greek experience has shown. 
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The lack of a sovereign debt crisis resolution mechanism was initially 
addressed through some temporary arrangements: bilateral lending from 
euro-area partners (in partnership with the IMF) to Greece in May 2010, 
and the establishment of two financing mechanisms, the EFSF (European 
Financial Stability Facility)7 and the EFSM (European Financial Stability 
Mechanism)8. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)9, a permanent 
rescue fund with €500 billion in resources, will likely be introduced later 
in 2012. The resources, even if augmented with IMF lending, would not be 
sufficient if Italy were to require assistance. Moreover, it would be much 
more preferable to design an institutional framework in which member 
states did not have to lend money to each other. 
2.5 Interdependence of banks and sovereigns 
Fifth, the national bank resolution regimes and the large home country 
bias in banks’ government bond holdings imply that there is a lethal 
correlation between banking and sovereign debt crises. When a 
government gets into trouble, so does the country's banking system (e.g., 
Greece), and vice versa (e.g., Ireland). Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012a) 
demonstrated that most continental euro-area countries were characterised 
by the large size of their banks’ portfolios of domestic government bonds, 
which were markedly larger than in the UK or the US. Moreover, during 
the crisis this vulnerability has increased, as all countries for which 
concerns about state solvency arose have observed a reversal in the 
previously steady increase of the share of government debt held by non-
residents. Germany, by contrast, has seen an increase in the share held by 
non-residents. 
The lethal correlation between banking and sovereign debt crises could 
be best addressed with a so-called “banking federation” or “banking 
union”, whereby bank resolution and deposit guarantees would be 
centralised at the euro-area (or preferably the EU) level, which would also 
require the centralisation of regulation and supervision. This is because 
when bank resolution in a given country is not the responsibility of that 
country’s government, but bank recapitalisation, when needed, would be 
financed using a common fund, then banking fragility would not lead 
directly to sovereign debt problems for that government. The opposite 
case, where the fragility of the government is transmitted to the banks of a 
given country, could also be better managed when regulation and 
                                                          
7 See EFSF (2012). 
8 See EFSM (2012). 
9 See European Council (2012a). 
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supervision are centralised at the euro-area level. The notion of a banking 
union was not on the agenda until late spring 2012, despite numerous calls 
by economists (see, e.g., Véron 2011). However, the intensification of the 
euro crisis brought euro-area policymakers back to reality, and perhaps the 
call for a banking union seemed a politically more acceptable alternative 
compared to a more rapid move towards a full-fledged fiscal union. 
Consequently, the European Council on 28–29 June 2012 called for a 
banking union and the European Commission proposed its first element, a 
single supervisory mechanism for banks on 12 September 2012. It was 
agreed that once banks come under the control of the joint supervisor, the 
ESM would be able to recapitalise banks directly. The willingness of 
member states to relinquish national sovereignty over major banking 
issues is clearly an important development in crisis management. 
However, the formation of the banking union will be an extremely 
complex process, and many open issues need to be negotiated and agreed 
upon, as discussed by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012), including the means of 
providing financing for the banking union, which is studied by Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff (2012). 
2.6 Interdependence between countries 
Sixth, there is a strong interdependence between countries – much 
stronger than was generally perceived during the good years before the 
crisis. The collapse of a small country can create a contagion and the 
collapse of a large country would lead to a meltdown. Italy, for example, 
cannot be allowed to go bankrupt, as it would bankrupt the Italian banking 
system, which in turn would cause a meltdown throughout the rest of the 
euro-area banking system through high-level linkages and would also have 
disruptive effects outside the euro-area. This channel remains important 
even if financial integration were reversed to a significant extent, as 
argued by the ECB (2012a). 
The strong interdependence between countries should primarily be 
addressed via limiting the scope of the fiscal and private sector 
vulnerabilities of member states. Once the crisis is over, the European 
Semester and all the instruments included in it could help in this regard – 
to the extent of course that the Semester will prove to be effective. A 
properly designed banking union as discussed above is the best means of 
addressing banking interdependence. Furthermore, a type of Eurobonds, 
such as the Blue bond discussed before, would help to limit the spread of a 
sovereign debt crisis from one country to another. 
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2.7 Lack of a lender of last resort for sovereigns 
Seventh, the strict prohibition on the European Central Bank/Eurosystem 
providing monetary financing means that euro-area governments borrow 
as if they were borrowing in a “foreign” currency, as highlighted by De 
Grauwe (2011). This is because a central bank can in principle act as a 
lender of last resort for the sovereign, i.e., print money and buy 
government bonds (as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the 
Bank of Japan did during the crisis). The lack of a lender of last resort for 
sovereigns of individual states of a monetary union is not a substantial 
problem when the level of debt is low. For example, in the US, the Federal 
Reserve does not buy the debt of states such as California or New York but 
only buys federal bonds. Although California has been in deep financial 
trouble since 2007, its eventual default would not cause a major disruption 
to the US banking system. The reasons are that the debt of the State of 
California is small, approximately 7% of California’s GDP (the debt of 
local governments in California represents an additional 13% of the state’s 
GDP); moreover, this debt is not held by banks, but mainly by individuals. 
However the default of Italy would be a game changer in Europe.  
The lack of a lender of last resort for sovereigns could be remedied by 
establishing a stronger political and fiscal union that could provide the 
basis for changing the statutes of the ECB. Absent such a change, the ECB 
can act within its current mandate. The ECB has already purchased the 
sovereign bonds of member states under the so-called Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) beginning in May 2010, which was terminated on 
6 September 2012, and a new programme called Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) was introduced (ECB 2010, 2012b). 
The SMP only had temporary effects on government bond yields for a 
number of reasons. First, the ECB itself communicated that these 
operations will remain limited, and even introduced a weekly cap. Second, 
the ECB claimed senior creditor status with respect to other bondholders, 
and therefore ECB purchases increased the eventual losses of other 
bondholders in the case of a default. Third, the modalities of the SMP were 
unclear: the ECB started and ended bond purchases without known 
guidelines. Fourth, in the case of Greece the SMP attempted to temper the 
government bond market in a country with a fundamentally unsustainable 
fiscal situation (Darvas et al. 2011). Finally, the SMP was subject to moral 
hazard, exemplified by the Italian government’s backtracking on promised 
reforms in the summer of 2011, after the ECB began purchasing Italian 
bonds.  
The new OMT differs from the SMP in major respects. First, it will be 
based on strong conditionality (i.e., compliance with a full or a precautionary 
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macroeconomic adjustment programme by the EFSF or the ESM). ECB 
intervention will not be automatic, but the Governing Council will decide 
on a case-by-case basis when and to what extent it will intervene. Second, 
it will be unlimited in principle. Third, the ECB will be treated pari passu 
with other creditors, i.e. the ECB will not have any preferential treatment 
in the case of a credit event. Furthermore, transparency of OMT holdings 
will also be higher (the breakdown by country and the average duration of 
holdings will be published). Moreover, there is clarity on the maturity of 
eligible bonds, i.e. between one and three years, which is the relevant 
horizon for monetary transmission. These characteristics likely constitute 
the outer limit of what is feasible within the ECB’s mandate. 
The initial reactions in the markets (until the completion of the 
manuscript for this article in mid-September 2012) were positive. For 
example, the 2-year Spanish government bond yield fell from a 15-year 
record high of 6.9% in late July 2012 to below 3% in early September 
2012. Longer maturity yields have also fallen somewhat.  
It was wise for the ECB to introduce the OMT, as otherwise the euro 
crisis may have escalated in mid-2012. By preventing a self-fulfilling 
crisis, the OMT may help to reduce government bond yields, and thereby 
also lower private sector yields, which will help the economy. However, 
the OMT operations can only buy precious time, but cannot solve the euro 
crisis and cannot fully eliminate the risk of an eventual euro-area exit, as 
these are dependent on the answers given to the other more fundamental 
problems of the euro-area we discuss.10 
2.8 Downward spiral and negative feedback 
between the crisis and growth 
Eighth, there is a downward spiral in adjusting countries: i.e., fiscal 
adjustment leading to a weaker economy, thereby reducing public 
revenues and creating additional fiscal adjustment needs. It is extremely 
difficult to break this vicious circle in the absence of a stand-alone 
currency. In the US, automatic stabilisers, such as unemployment 
insurance, are operated by the federal government, which also invests 
more in distressed states – but in Europe such instruments do not exist. An 
economic stabilisation tool is badly needed for the euro-area, which should 
work as automatically as possible and be financed from a euro-area wide 
tax. It should be confined to economic stabilisation only, but not making a 
platform for permanent transfers between euro-area member states. 
                                                          
10 See Darvas (2012c) for an assessment of the various criticisms of the OMT. 
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The negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth does not 
only exist in southern European adjusting countries, but in all euro-area 
countries. Uncertainty over the future of the euro, and the risk of economic 
hardship that an eventual break-up would bring, makes corporations and 
households more hesitant to invest and consume. Corporations in the 
economically stronger countries are also directly affected by the 
deteriorating situation in economically weaker countries through trade and 
financial links.  
Furthermore, the funding constraints in the banking sector, the increasing 
credit risks for banks due to the weakening economic outlook, and the 
efforts to raise banks’ capital ratios lead to a reduction in credit supply. 
Reduced credit availability further dampens economic growth. Without 
effective solutions to address the crisis, growth is unlikely to resume. 
The EU did not have a powerful response to the growth crisis. The 
main goals of the "Compact for Growth and Jobs" agreed to at the 29 June 
2012 summit (European Council 2012c), such as structural reforms, 
completing the restructuring of the banking sector, growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidations, addressing the social consequences of the crisis, and 
deepening the single market, are all correct. However, few new tools were 
mobilised to achieve these goals. Providing fresh capital to the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) in the amount of €10 billion (which would 
increase lending capacity by €60 billion) and launching a pilot phase for 
Project Bonds up to €4.5 billion are welcome, but these would have a 
limited impact on growth in the EU. Moreover, while mobilising idle 
structural funds, which was also agreed on at the summit, is also crucial, 
this does not constitute new funding. 
2.9 Lack of a euro-area fiscal policy 
Ninth, no institution is responsible for managing the overall fiscal 
stance of the euro-area. Member states implement the policy deemed 
appropriate for their own economies, subject to the constraints of the 
European fiscal governance framework. However, on aggregate, such 
decentralised fiscal policy is unlikely to produce optimal fiscal policy for 
the euro-area as a whole. For example, while the aggregate fiscal position 
of the euro-area is much better than that of the US (Figure 5-2), and while 
the economic outlook is arguably more fragile in the euro-area, there is a 
much stronger consolidation bias in the euro-area as a whole than in the 
US. Certainly, states in the US are also independent in setting state-level 
fiscal policies (all but one has a balanced-budget constitutional rule), and 
the second major conclusion of Bordo et al. (2011) concerning the conditions 
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necessary for a fiscal union to function smoothly and successfully is “a 
degree of revenue and expenditure independence of the members of the 
fiscal union reflecting their preferences.” However in the US the federal 
government dispenses approximately half of the total tax revenues and 
considers the US economy as a whole when setting fiscal policy targets 
(Darvas 2010a). In other federations, such as Canada or Switzerland, the 
circumstances are similar. 
Unfortunately, the euro-area has not yet reached a point where a 
discussion can be begun on the overall fiscal stance of the euro-area and 





Fig. 5-2 The aggregate fiscal positions of the euro-area and the USA (% of GDP), 
1990–2017 
Sources: Euro-area balance and debt – IMF (2012); US balance – AMECO 
database up to 2000 and IMF (2012) for 2001–2017;  
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US debt: USGovernmentSpending.com (2012) up to 2012, for 2013–2017 we 
assumed that state and local government debt will remain at the 2012 value as a 
per cent of GDP and federal debt increases as projected by IMF (2012). 
Note: US general government debt also includes the debt of states and local 
governments (IMF and European Commission data only report federal debt, even 
though they call it, erroneously, “general government gross debt”). 
2.10  Executive and democratic deficit 
Tenth, the current crisis is not just a sovereign debt, banking and 
growth crisis, but is also a governance crisis. In most cases the response of 
European policymakers has been partial, inadequate and belated, and they 
have thereby lost trust in their ability to resolve the crisis. Some observers 
have concluded that agreeing on a comprehensive solution is technically 
and politically beyond reach. Compounded with the lack of democratic 
accountability of various European decision making bodies, Véron (2012) 
places the “executive and democratic deficit” at the centre of the lingering 
euro crisis and argues that some of the most important problems, such as 
Europe’s banking crisis, the Greek sovereign debt saga, or the weak 
growth outlook of southern European member states, could have been 
addressed earlier and in a decisive way, had proper European decision 
making processes existed. 
Regarding the political constraints, overcoming executive and democratic 
deficiencies is a truly fundamental issue. Nigel Lawson is most likely right 
when he claimed: “There is no wish among the people of Europe … for a 
full blooded United States of Europe political union”.11 Therefore, any 
progress towards a more effective and legitimate decision making and 
executive system will be, at best, piecemeal. 
3. Southern Europe and the euro’s future 
The combined impact of all the factors discussed thus far drives down 
the economic outlook in the euro-area, and in particular, in Southern 
Europe. Figure 5-3 takes a historical perspective on changes in GDP per 
capita in the main geographical areas of the EU. After World War II, 
European countries embarked on a rapid convergence with the US in terms 
                                                          
11 Nigel Lawson was the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the government of 
Margaret Thatcher during 1983–1989. He also claimed that “The whole thing [i.e. 
the euro] is a nonsense, and the sooner the whole thing can be dismantled in an 
orderly way, the better”, with which I disagree. Source of the quotes: Mullholland 
(2011). 
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of GDP per capita, which was in part based on the rebuilding of the capital 
stock lost during the war, in part on technological catching-up and in part 
on economic integration efforts (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry 2011). By the 
late 1970s, however, convergence with the US had stopped in most 
countries of the “older” Europe – although with significant exceptions, 
such as Ireland. However, in the years ahead, according to the world 
economic outlook of the IMF, European countries are expected to fall 
behind, especially in southern Europe. Moreover, the IMF outlook must be 




Fig. 5-3 GDP per capita in major geographical regions of the EU (USA = 100), 
1950–2017 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from IMF (2012), PENN World Tables 
and EBRD 
Note: GDP is based on purchasing power parity dollars; median values are shown 
for the country groups defined in the note to Figure 5-2. 
 
The single most important threat to the integrity, and perhaps also the 
existence, of the euro is the bleak economic outlook for southern European 
member states. Without the problems of economically weaker countries in 
Southern Europe (for which western and northern members also bear 
responsibility), western and northern members would be able to overcome 
their baking woes, and the other issues we identified as the roots of the 
euro crisis would be much less relevant. 
Economic growth in Southern Europe would gradually help to improve 
the unemployment situation and ease social tensions. It would help to 
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improve public finances, thereby lessening the need for fiscal consolidation. 
It would help to stabilise asset prices, and in particular, housing prices, 
which in turn would improve the balance sheets of banks, thereby also 
reducing recapitalisation needs. Increased trust in banks and the hope of an 
economic recovery would slow or even reverse capital outflows from these 
counties. As a consequence, economic growth in Southern Europe would 
greatly diminish the exit risk facing some southern euro members. 
But growth is not coming, and in fact the recession deepens. Several 
commentators concluded that southern euro members have no hope for 
growth inside the euro-area and an exit from the euro is the only viable 
option. While undoubtedly it would be much easier for southern euro 
members to solve their problems outside the euro-area, I disagree on both 
counts: there is some hope, at least in some southern members on the one 
hand, and on the other hand an exit would likely be so disastrous that it 
would take a very long time to recoup the output that would be lost during 
the exit process. An exit would cause devastating consequences for 
economically stronger countries as well, thereby creating existential risk 
for the euro, with severe implications for the EU as well. 
 
• Hope: Since 2008, Spanish exports are performing the best among 
the EU-15 countries, i.e., the pre-2004 members of the EU (Darvas 
2012a). Spain is followed by Germany, Ireland and Portugal. Spain 
and Portugal even outperform the UK and Sweden, two countries 
that benefitted from significant currency depreciation during the 
crisis.12 While their tradable sectors remain small, solid export 
performance is an indication the tradable sector is able to expand. 
Additionally, the World Bank (2012) found that large and 
internationalised firms in Southern Europe are as productive as 
large firms in Western and Northern Europe, and the main issue is 
that there are far fewer large firms in Southern Europe, due to 
various barriers. Altomonte et al. (2012) arrived at a similar 
conclusion. This suggests that while the business conditions are 
unfavourable and there are barriers to firm growth, properly 
managed firms are able to achieve a high level of efficiency even in 
Southern Europe. 
• Disastrous exit: It is impossible to provide an accurate estimate of 
the cost of an exit from the euro, but it would most likely be huge. 
UBS (2011) have concluded that an economically weak country 
leaving the euro-area would lose approximately one half of its GDP 
                                                          
12 However, the export performance of Greece is very weak. 
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in the first year. If they are correct, it is unclear how many years it 
would take to compensate for the lost output, even if growth were 
to increase from this halved level of output. The huge decline in 
output would necessitate even harsher fiscal austerity, as it is not 
very likely that in the event of a messy exit from the euro other 
euro-area partners would be happy to lend to the country that left 
the euro – without such support, the government could spend only 
tax revenues, which would be dramatically reduced by the collapse 
of GDP. Moreover, there would also be longer term consequences, 
as the low credibility of the newly stand-alone central bank of the 
exiting country would likely lead to much higher real interest rates 
and a period of high inflation, which are bad for growth. 
Additionally, a euro exit may be accompanied by an EU exit and 
thereby the country would lose huge transfers form the EU. It is 
also in the best interest of euro-area partners to keep these countries 
in the union, and not just because of the direct losses that would 
arise from financial and trade relations with the exiting country. 
Even more importantly, the exit of a country would open Pandora's 
box: it would be very difficult to safeguard other economically 
weaker countries and a wave of exits would be even more 
disastrous for the economically stronger euro-area countries.13 
 
However, the good news we highlighted and the fears of disaster do 
not guarantee that the deep economic slump in these countries will end 
anytime soon. If the recession continues to deepen, social tensions could 
escalate, which may lead to domestic political paralysis. Under such 
circumstances, cooperation between euro-area partners and the country in 
question, including financial assistance that has already been granted to 
some southern euro members, would halt, leading to an accelerated and 
possibly uncontrolled exit from the euro-area, with all the consequences 
we described above. 
Therefore, ending the recession and offering improved economic 
prospects for southern euro members is pivotal, and actions will be 
required at both the national and European levels – well beyond the 
Compact for growth and jobs: 
 
• The southern euro-countries should engage in a number of efforts: 
we have highlighted that they suffer from huge structural 
weaknesses, which are impediments to growth. Moreover, while 
                                                          
13 And the euro is not just about economics but has major historical and political 
roots as well. 
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productivity has improved and unit labour costs have fallen, e.g., in 
Spain since 2008, this was mainly the consequence of reduced 
employment, which has adverse social consequences. Wages 
proved to be downwardly rigid (Darvas 2012a). Structural reforms 
to improve the functioning of labour markets are also inevitable, 
yet it will take a long time for these reforms to take effect. 
• There is a strong case for calling for unit labour cost (ULC) 
increases in “western” and “northern” euro-area trading partners 
(see for example Wolff (2012) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry 
(2012b)). To some extent wages have begun to increase in 
Germany, but in any case this process will take a long time. 
Moreover, higher average inflation in the euro-area may also help 
to correct pre-crisis intra-euro divergences in prices and wages, but 
such a policy would be clearly unacceptable to the economically 
stronger countries of the euro-area. 
• Fiscal expansion in northern members of the euro-area, or at least a 
significant slowdown in the pace of fiscal consolidation, would 
facilitate the economic adjustment of the southern members (Merler 
and Pisani-Ferry 2012b), but unfortunately, the relaxation of fiscal 
targets in Northern Europe does not seem to be on the agenda. 
• A weaker euro would also greatly facilitate the adjustment of 
southern euro-area members (Darvas 2012b), which would be 
fostered by further interest rate cuts and quantitative easing by the 
European Central Bank. A weaker euro would help southern 
economies to improve their trade balances with non-euro countries 
and would also boost German exports. This in turn would help to 
address intra-euro imbalances, since increased exports would likely 
translate into greater wage increases in Germany, due to the 
country’s tight labour market, but not in Spain, due to its high 
unemployment. Thus, Spain’s competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany 
would also improve. Without a weaker euro, Spain would need to 
enter a deflationary period, which on the one hand is difficult to 
achieve and on the other would make debt sustainability even more 
difficult. 
• Euro-area partners should also recognise that public debt at least in 
Greece is still too high. Even if the austerity programme is 
implemented as planned, it is very unlikely that Greece will be able 
to repay all of its public debt. Prolonging the recognition of this 
issue simply prolongs the uncertainty about Greece’s future, 
thereby also negatively impacting the economy. However, as 
European partners have lent money to Greece to repay private 
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lenders and therefore ‘socialised’ Greek public debt, further 
significant public debt reduction cannot be accomplished without 
some involvement by the official sector. This is the price that euro-
area partners have to pay for their mistakes in managing the Greek 
crisis in 2010 and 2011. 
• Finally, to help break the downward economic spiral that southern 
euro-area member states face, a very significant European 
investments programme is needed for southern members. Note that 
investments are different from aid and lending. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The euro suffers from a large number of flaws, which were cast in stark 
relief during the crisis. For some of these flaws, solutions were provided, 
even if belatedly, and member states exhibited a willingness to improve 
the functioning of the euro by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty 
in some important dimensions. However, the single most pressing issue, 
which threatens the integrity and perhaps the existence of the euro, is not 
yet well addressed: the deepening economic recession in southern member 
states. Most of the major policy measures that would help to stop the 
economic misery of these countries and offer the prospect for improved 
economic conditions are not yet on the agenda. Only time will tell the 
economic and political denouement of southern euro member and what 
progress will be made in addressing the ten main roots of the euro crisis 
that we have identified. 
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THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS  
AND THE WEAKENING OF THE PILLARS  







The sovereign or government debt crisis that entails solvency risk on 
the part of sovereign debtors or governments began in November 2009 in 
the wake of the global financial and economic crisis. It brought the 
institutional weaknesses of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
established between 1999 and 2002, to the surface. Given the dysfunctional 
operation of its institutional and regulatory systems, perspectives emerged 
that questioned the long-term viability of the EMU and anticipating the 
exit of individual member states (particularly Greece) or its complete 
break-up. 
This paper analyses the latest developments of the sovereign debt crisis 
by focusing on the relationship between the institutional system and the 
operation of the EMU on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the 
other. The objective of the paper is to discuss the ways in which the 
sovereign debt crisis affected the pillars (no exits, no defaults and no bail-
outs) of the EMU. It argues that they were softened to certain degrees, but 
because they form essential parts of the monetary integration they cannot 
be dismissed completely.  
Before discussing the issue it should be underlined that the crisis has 
not primarily affected the euro’s role as a common currency. Considering 
its internal and external purchasing power (its exchange rate to major 
currencies), the euro is relatively strong in spite of eventual short-term 
depreciations against major currencies. Its roles in international 
settlements and central bank reserves were not weakened significantly. 
In terms of purchasing power parity, the euro is still overvalued vis-à-vis a 
number of major currencies. The sovereign debt crisis did not have a 
negative impact on the stability and international position of the common 
currency. The crisis impacted the member states of the EMU both directly 
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and through the regulatory mechanisms of the EMU. Thus, in this respect, 
the EMU also contributed to the sovereign debt crisis, as will be analysed 
below.  
The first section of this report discusses the three prohibitions 
stipulated in the relevant EU treaty (no exits, no defaults and no bail-outs) 
that form the three pillars of the EMU, their consequences in the 
management of the crisis, and optimum currency area theory. The 
subsequent three sections focus on the softening of the pillars of the EMU. 
The fifth section provides an overview of the latest measures. The final 
section contains the summary and conclusions. The sovereign debt crisis 
in the EMU has yet to come to an end. This report relies on data and 
information that were available before 15 July 2012. 
2. The three prohibitions and their consequences  
on managing the crisis 
The legal regulation of the Economic and Monetary Union was 
originally based on three prohibitions or negations that are strongly 
interrelated and should be interpreted together.1 Regarding the irrevocability 
of the EMU, the first prohibition is that there be no exits. The possibility 
of exit would weaken the credibility of the EMU and nurture speculation 
against weak member states. If exit were a real possibility, investors would 
purchase the high quality government securities of economically stable 
member states rather than those of weak ones predicted to leave the EMU. 
The absence of an exit clause indicates that the EMU is something more 
than a loose fixed exchange rate area or a group of countries using a 
common currency.  
According to the second prohibition, government default is not possible 
in the EMU. Government default should be avoided and there are no 
institutions, legal rules or procedures to handle the default of member 
states. 
The third prohibition contains rules on the financing of general 
government deficits and government debts. The major principle is that 
general government deficits and government debts have to be financed 
exclusively using the money and capital markets. Consequently, funding 
general government expenditures with central bank credits is prohibited, 
and EU institutions and member states are forbidden from providing the 
public sectors of troubled members with financial aid. The latter is the so-
                                                          
1 In the Hungarian economic literature, this topic was discussed by Benczes 
(2011). 
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called no bail-out clause that covers all EU member states rather than only 
those of the EMU. The set of rules included in the Treaty of Lisbon and 
reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact and other documents are 
designed to avoid excessive general government deficits. The 
independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), which is considered 
an important value, is closely related to the no bail-out clause. The 
objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is price stability; it does not have 
any other tasks, including fiscal ones.  
Because of the no bail-out clause, EU member states facing financial 
difficulties may only turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
assistance. In fact, the possibility of applying for loans to the IMF may 
have been a means of escape from the no bail-out clause. Member states 
are willing to avoid this mechanism because of reputational considerations. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the IMF had to be 
involved in the management of the sovereign debt crisis in the EMU. 
However, the IMF has agreed that it will only begin negotiations regarding 
loans to EU member states with the consent of EU institutions. Thus, this 
theoretical legal escape clause was also restricted.  
According to the founders, the three prohibitions were necessary to 
guarantee the credibility of the EMU. They also assumed that if the legal 
rules ensuring fiscal discipline were observed systematically, financial 
crises could be avoided. 
The three prohibitions have further implications. A consequence of the 
exit prohibition is that an EMU member state using the common currency 
may not mitigate short-term disequilibria and competitiveness issues by 
devaluating their national currencies. Devaluations based on the 
discretionary decision of central banks would only be possible if member 
states were to exit the EMU, but this is not permitted.  
With respect to adjustment mechanisms, the EMU is similar to the gold 
standard of the 19th century but without the use of gold. Historically, 
those countries that insisted on retaining the gold standard faced more 
substantial fiscal and political consequences during the Great Depression 
of 1929–1933 than those that eventually abandoned it. Analogously, under 
a fixed exchange rate regime in the EMU, competitiveness can be 
improved only by internal devaluation, i.e., by reducing wages (more 
precisely unit labour costs) and prices, which is a rather painful process; 
one that is more painful than external devaluation. Unlike the US, the 
EMU does not have a federal budget that makes it possible to bail out 
indebted member states facing financial tensions. 
The prohibition on government default for individual member states is 
explained by the desire to inhibit the spill-over of its negative effects to the 
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rest of the EMU. First, a government default would have a negative impact 
on banks with large proportions of the government securities of financially 
troubled member states in their portfolios. Thus, due to the strong ties 
between governments and banks, government defaults may also lead to 
bank defaults. Bank failures may have an adverse impact on financial 
stability. 
Second, the spill-over effects may be quite significant. The default of a 
sovereign debtor in the EMU (at present that of Greece is the most 
probable) may well have repercussions on other countries (such as Spain, 
Portugal and Italy) that should also be taken into account. In this context, 
the first question is whether it is possible for governments to avoid default 
by exclusively relying on their own resources or if the financial support of 
other member states and international organisations is indispensable. The 
involvement of external sources calls the validity of the no bail-out clause 
into question. The second question is, if it proves unavoidable, whether 
government default should be disorderly or managed. The latter seems to 
be preferable because it entails lower expected costs.  
The no bail-out clause is more than a limiting legal formula; it can be 
logically derived from the structure of the economic and monetary union. 
In a decentralised monetary union where no common fiscal policy exists 
and there are no cross-border transfers due to political reasons, the 
no bail-out clause is the essential guarantee of the functioning of the EMU.  
The first consequence of the no bail-out clause was the rise in the 
default risks of sovereign debtors in the EMU. While this has long been a 
theoretical possibility, it was regarded as a very low probability event. 
However, with the expansion and deepening of the sovereign debt crisis, 
the probability of government defaults has increased. The second 
consequence of the no bail-out clause is that according to the provisions of 
EU law, the ECB may not assume the role of the lender of last resort for 
the banking system, a role that otherwise may be very useful in crisis 
situations. This is different from the status of central banks in non-EMU 
countries. The balance between solidarity and autonomy is not 
proportional in the EMU. In the case of complete solidarity, when 
government debts are fully guaranteed, free riders and moral hazard 
appear. In the absence of any guarantee, speculation may loom. Mutual 
guarantees are missing in the EMU. The EMU was established without 
any insurance mechanism, and it was assumed that a monetary union could 
be successful without a budgetary or fiscal union (De Grauwe 2010). 
In spite of the structural problems, the lack of institutions, financial 
funds and crisis management mechanisms, the set of rules based on the 
three prohibitions did not inhibit the smooth functioning of the EMU in a 
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period when the global economy developed without major issues and 
global liquidity was abundant, although prior to its establishment several 
experts voiced their doubts over the long-term viability of the EMU (see in 
retrospect e.g., Feldstein 2012). In the late 1990s, the extent to which the 
EMU would meet the criteria for an optimum currency area was not clear 
to experts who were critical of the then current form of monetary 
integration.  
Optimum currency area theory focuses on the criteria that are essential 
for a country or group of countries to form an economic and monetary 
union. In an optimum currency area (a group of countries suitable for a 
monetary union), the following criteria are met:2 
First, the markets for production factors (labour and capital) are 
flexible and function well, the production factors are mobile, and therefore 
their prices are able to adjust to external price changes. 
Second, the area is internally homogeneous, implying that its member 
countries have similar economic structures and their business cycles are 
synchronised. The internal homogeneity of the area must have reached 
such a level that it is not threatened by asymmetric external shocks. The 
term asymmetric external shock means that countries forming the 
monetary union suffer shocks of different sizes from the same external 
event. The reason for this is that the commodity and geographical 
structures of their exports and imports, their reliance on imported energy 
and external finances, etc., are significantly different.  
Third, budgetary transfers are also available to fend off various 
economic disturbances including asymmetric shocks.  
The analysis of the applicability of these criteria to the EMU would go 
beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that, 
first, the no bail-out clause excluded budgetary transfers in the EMU. The 
reason for this was that monetary integration was not accompanied with 
the creation of a fiscal union. Budgetary transfers would have implied a 
transfer union with permanent transfers from richer to poorer countries as 
is the case within individual countries. Second, the internal homogeneity 
of the EMU must have not yet reached a level at which it is exempt from 
asymmetric shocks. Third, doubts over the mobility of the labour force and 
the flexibility of the labour market may also be justified. All of these 
deficiencies are demonstrated by relevant research. These deficiencies 
                                                          
2 The original concept of the optimal currency area was elaborated by Mundell 
(1961). The theory was amended and further developed by many scholars. The 
issue and other relevant problems are discussed in detail by, e.g., De Grauwe 
(2003). 
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mean that the criteria for an optimum currency area were not met from the 
outset. 
Nevertheless, of the three criteria for an optimum currency area, only 
one can be directly associated with the three prohibitions, namely the no 
bail-out clause. The structural weaknesses of inflexible labour markets and 
differences in macroeconomic structures were aggravated by deficiencies 
in the institutional and policy frameworks of the EMU. One such weakness 
was the primacy of real interest rate effect over the real exchange rate 
effect (Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa Group 2012). The one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy of the ECB led to excessive cyclical divergences and 
imbalances. Real interest rates were negative in the dynamically growing 
peripheral countries of the EMU (Ireland and Southern Europe, including 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) that led to sharp price and wage 
increases and the subsequent deterioration of their relative international 
competitiveness resulting in a competitiveness crisis on one hand and 
credit and real estate bubbles and the accumulation of private and/or 
government debts on the other.  
Furthermore, in the absence of flexible labour markets and official 
transfers in the EMU, huge imbalances accumulated in conjunction with 
substantial current account surpluses in the core economies (such as 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands) and enormous current account 
deficits in the peripheral member states. They generated a balance of 
payments crisis (EEAG 2012). The EMU regulatory system did not 
include guarantees for financing international imbalances (current account 
surpluses and deficits), managing financial shocks or implementing 
adjustments to restore international competitiveness (for details see e.g., 
EuroMemorandum Group 2010). The sovereign debt crisis called into 
question prior assumptions that international disequilibria are not relevant.  
In managing the sovereign debt crisis, rules based on the three 
prohibitions substantially impeded the ability to shift economic policy for 
both nation states and EU institutions. The constraints were particularly 
pronounced relative to the possible actions and economic policy tools of 
the EU’s competitors. The relaxation of some of the prohibitions played an 
important role in managing the sovereign debt crisis. 
3. Easing the exit from the EU 
According to Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU, 
the first part of the Treaty of Lisbon) that became effective as of 
1 December 2009, any member state may quit the EU. If an EU member 
state is simultaneously an EMU member, it has to exit the latter as well. 
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The TEU makes no explicit mention of exiting the EMU. However, 
according to the relevant EU laws governing monetary integration 
(regulations concerning the introduction of the euro, the irrevocable fixing 
of the conversion rates of the national currencies against the euro, the 
irreversibility of the EMU, etc.) that are based on the basic treaties, 
member states are not allowed to leave the EMU. This implies that an 
EMU member state is barred from leaving the EMU while remaining in 
the EU. Because an exit from the EMU is unprecedented, there are no 
formal procedures or mechanisms for departing the EU in general and the 
EMU in particular. 
EU law does not allow for the exclusion of any member state from the 
EU and the EMU. Although from the standpoint of the ECB, it may be 
feasible to exclude a member state from the EMU through indirect means, 
it is not possible through current legal provisions. An example of such 
indirect means would be the ECB refusing liquidity to member state banks 
that suffered runs on their deposits. This was a perceived danger in Greece 
in May 2012. The legal possibility of exclusion would undermine the 
Economic and Monetary Union by sending markets the message that the 
union is no more than an exchange rate mechanism, which individual 
countries may join or leave, depending on their actual economic situation 
(The Economist 2008). 
The provisions concerning exit from the EU have nothing to do with 
the sovereign debt crisis and attempts to ameliorate it with economic 
policies. The elaboration of the Treaty of Lisbon began well before the 
outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis. However, the possibility of exiting 
the EU and the EMU has received a different interpretation in light of the 
crisis. The major reason for a member state to leave the EMU is to regain 
its independence in exchange rate policy. This would make it possible to 
remedy or at least mitigate the negative effects of the crisis by devaluing 
the national currency that would replace the euro at least in the short run.  
From the legal point of view, an exit from the EMU could be feasible 
in two ways, at least in principle. First, the TEU and other relevant legal 
rules regarding the EMU and the euro could be explicitly modified to 
allow member states to leave the EMU and remain in the EU. Such a 
change in the basic treaty seems nearly out of the question under normal 
conditions. It is not realistic to assume that 27 EU member states could 
agree on a new treaty or the necessary modifications to the existing one at 
an intergovernmental conference within a reasonable timeframe. In 
addition, lengthy negotiations would also have an adverse impact on 
financial stability. The legal codification of exit criteria would also weaken 
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the credibility of the EMU. This possibility could only become reality in a 
very severe crisis.  
Second, apart from the rationality of such a decision, exiting the EMU 
is the autonomous, independent decision of a member state. To avoid or 
moderate capital flight, exit measures must to be taken on a single day or 
within a few days. In this sense, a managed exit based on negotiations with 
other member states and EU institutions would hardly be possible. Of 
course the detailed conditions for the exit would have to be clarified 
subsequently in long and complicated negotiations.  
Assuming that a member state leaves the EMU and remains in the EU, 
it would face serious legal problems. In this case, EU law would remain 
effective in the departing member country. “If it abandoned the euro in all 
domestic contracts, but maintained it in all foreign contracts, the 
consequence would be a flood of well-founded lawsuits. Every citizen of 
the departing country would have a legal case against its own government 
– and possibly against the other member states as well. A euro zone exit 
would constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality – the biggest 
“no, no” under EU law” (Münchau 2012d).  
If a member state exits both the EMU and the EU, it will be isolated in 
Europe. The EU would impose tariffs on its goods. The Schengen 
Agreement would be suspended with the direct consequence of the 
introduction of visas. To halt capital flight, the departing country would 
have to introduce restrictions on capital flows. The departing country 
would lose access to transfers from the structural funds and the Cohesion 
Fund. 
In addition to legal factors, there are also economic arguments against 
the partial or complete break-up of the EMU. First, it would trigger chaos 
or uncontrollable developments. Second, it would entail unbearable costs 
on those concerned. According to model calculations, the direct losses 
from a break-up or the exit of strong and weak member states would 
amount to 20–50% of the GDPs of the countries concerned. Germany 
would suffer losses amounting to 20% of GDP and those of Greece would 
be 50%.3 These are approximate figures. Modelling the consequences is 
difficult because the effects are unprecedented. 
With respect to the most troubled countries, the most probable case 
may be that Greece would exit the EMU. Then it will have to balance its 
primary budget (deficit excluding interest payments) immediately, 
otherwise it would not be able to finance its deficit. As in the ensuing 
chaos, mass corporate and household defaults, increasing unemployment, 
recession, etc., general government revenues will decrease, a primary 
                                                          
3 The figures come from an analysis by UBS. Source: The Economist (2011). 
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surplus should be achieved rather than a balanced budget. The Greek 
primary general government deficit amounted to 2.5% of GDP in 2011; it 
is expected to total 1% in 2012. This would necessitate a 20–30% wage 
reduction in the public sector. Under these circumstances, the collapse of 
the public sector would be unavoidable, and the government would not be 
able to rely on underpaid civil servants to maintain law and order. If the 
government were to default, Greek banks would be cut off from the 
liquidity facilities of the ECB. If the Bank of Greece did not comply with 
relevant EU rules, Greece could be excluded from the EMU’s payment 
system and the government would be forced to reintroduce the drachma.  
The new drachma4 replacing euro would depreciate quickly (likely by 
30–40%, but more pessimistic estimates place the decline at 80–90%), the 
subsequent inflation increase would improve the external competitiveness 
of Greece through the contraction of real wages. Nevertheless, this 
possibility could only be modestly exploited because manufacturing 
accounts for merely 7% of Greek GDP. The role of tourism could be more 
significant, as its share of GDP is 18% and that of maritime transport is 
another 12%. Given the relatively low importance of manufacturing, 
Greece is not integrated in the EU supplier network and German 
corporations within it. Consequently, the acceleration of GDP growth in 
the EU in general and Germany in particular would not provide a great 
deal of a boost to Greek manufacturing. In addition, the depreciation of the 
new drachma would trigger a strong inflationary spiral. 
Devaluation and the subsequent increased inflation would lead to the 
loss of wealth due to plummeting real estate prices and the devaluation of 
financial assets. With the expected rapid devaluation of the new drachma, 
the costs of financing government debt denominated in euros would soar. 
The paradoxical feature of this strategy is that to avoid hyperinflation and 
restore international competitiveness, Greece has to pursue prudent fiscal 
policy and accomplish structural reforms without external funding that are 
similar to those requested by EU institutions and the IMF in exchange for 
the financial rescue packages (Münchau 2012a). However, the 
depreciation of the national currency may weaken the pressure for 
structural reforms faced by the government. In summary, an exit from the 
EMU would not solve the Greek economy’s fundamental issues such as 
the limited export sector, the lack of competitiveness and substantial 
external imbalances.  
                                                          
4 According to various sources, the Greek government would likely declare a bank 
holiday after announcing the country’s exit from the EMU, and the euro banknotes 
held by the country’s banks would be stamped to demonstrate the reintroduction of 
the drachma. 
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In the case of a Greek exit from the EMU, bank runs in other 
endangered countries (Portugal, Spain and perhaps Italy) are certain to 
occur, as economic actors would transfer their monetary holdings to safer 
EMU member states. To neutralise this threat, the ECB would have to 
provide additional liquidity to the banking systems of the countries 
endangered by the negative spill-over effects. It should be noted, however, 
that at present the major Greek political parties do not desire to quit the 
EMU. According to public opinion polls, the majority of the Greek 
population does not support an exit either.  
Despite the severe negative effects, many experts argue that considering 
the existing set of rules governing the EMU, the most indebted member 
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) should quit the EMU (see, e.g., 
Arnab and Roubini 2012). They believe that the long term advantages 
created by such an exit will exceed short-term disadvantages. Apart from 
the fact that the author of this paper does not find these arguments 
convincing, a discussion of these views would go beyond the scope of this 
report. If Spain and Italy leave the EMU, they would likely default on their 
external debt. Such an act would probably lead to the collapse of the 
European financial system (Münchau 2012e). A Greek, Spanish or Italian 
exit would cause investors to perceive that EMU membership is reversible, 
implying the implicit reintroduction of currency risks (Kramer 2012). 
In spite of the great uncertainty and enormous costs, the partial or 
complete dissolution of the EMU cannot be excluded, but the probability 
of such events seems to be rather low. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
counterbalancing forces, this probability may increase, particularly if the 
political, financial and economic tensions surrounding Greece or other 
troubled EU member countries intensify. Even a low probability of exit 
may create uncertainty among economic actors and bolster demand for the 
safest US and German government securities, increase capital outflows 
from the EMU, and weaken the euro’s relative position against other major 
currencies. The Deutsche Bundesbank may have considered the exit of 
individual member states from the EMU when President Jens Weidemann 
proposed the securitisation of German surpluses valued at €500 billion that 
had been accumulated in the TARGET2 central payment system and 
which has managed settlements between the central banks of countries 
where euro is legal tender since 2007. By seeking insurance against the 
collapse of the euro, the Deutsche Bundesbank does not regard the 
dissolution of the EMU as a zero probability event (Münchau 2012b).  
The insolvency of governments may also endanger the solvency of the 
debtor countries’ central banks. This may impose substantial losses on the 
central banks of creditor member states that are likely to be covered by the 
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taxpayers of the respective countries. This is a disguised fiscal transfer 
that cannot be sustained.  
The major guarantee against the complete break-up of the EMU is of 
an economic nature, namely, the high cost of such an event. None of the 
member states would benefit from the partial or the complete break-up of 
the EMU. In spite of the sovereign debt crisis, the costs of maintaining the 
EMU are much lower than those of its break-up. There is broad 
recognition by the major political forces in the EU that member states have 
little future outside the EMU.5 As the probability of a partial or complete 
break-up increases, exit costs may decrease. Discussions on managing the 
crisis focus on, first, the distribution of burdens across the remaining 
member states and economic actors rather than the question of whether the 
system is worth saving. The answer to the latter question is clear 
(The Economist 2012b). Second, the unwillingness of the governments of 
individual member states to abandon their sovereignty or at least parts of it 
inhibit a move towards stronger monetary and fiscal integration. 
At first glance, the demise of the EMU would involve the cancellation 
of a number of obligations enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. Furthermore, 
the complete and disorderly break-up of the EMU would also lead to the 
collapse of the EU, including the single markets for goods, services, 
capital and labour. The benefits of European integration achieved over the 
past 55 years would disappear.  
The other argument against the break-up is one of a political nature. 
Member states invested substantial political capital in the EMU over the 
past 10–15 years; they do not want to write it off. The political 
commitment to the euro is strong in a defensive sense but is not sufficient 
to support stronger financial integration. 
Apart from the possibility of a partial or complete break-up, economic 
actors regard the elaboration of contingency scenarios for the EMU at both 
the macro- and microeconomic levels as necessary. Contingency scenarios 
were prepared, i.a., by British and US investment banks for their clients 
rather than by EU institutions for the general public. With the escalation of 
the crisis in Greece in May and June 2012, increasing numbers of such 
                                                          
5 Of the $11 trillion worth of euro-area debt outstanding, $4 trillion must be 
regarded as at risk in the near term in a restructuring process. The capital markets 
of the EU, including that of $185 trillion in outstanding euro-denominated 
derivative contracts would be in turmoil, causing large-scale capital flight to the 
US and Asia (Vallée 2012). The general view among experts is that the disorderly 
break-up of the EMU would be a much greater shock than the default of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. 
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contingency scenarios appeared that were elaborated by banks and large 
corporations.  
It is difficult to judge whether discussions of contingency scenarios on 
the macro level would trigger market panic or help to reduce uncertainty.6 
Fearing panicked reactions, until recently EU institutions refrained from 
compiling contingency scenarios under the otherwise justifiable assumption 
that they cannot be kept secret. Such a worst case contingency scenario 
should discuss the ways in which financial assets and liabilities would be 
redenominated after the managed break-up of the EMU. This is 
particularly important if the EMU collapses with the demise of the euro. It 
should be noted, however, that the majority of assets and liabilities are 
subject to UK law rather than EU law. It is unclear how they can be 
redenominated. An interesting suggestion is that in the case of a break-up, 
the euro should be replaced by ECU-2 (European Currency Unit – ECU), 
similar to the original ECU (Nordvig 2012). The EMU and the euro have 
developed to a point where the return to individual member state 
currencies is unlikely, and the only future recourse would be the use of the 
ECU as a basket currency. Nevertheless, the tensions accumulated within 
the EMU can only be eased in the absence of its partial or complete break-
up. 
4. The softening of the prohibition on government 
default 
It is worth considering the possibility of government default because it 
is doubtful whether indebted countries in general, and Greece in particular, 
can repay their government debts. In addition, large government debts 
could stifle economic growth for an extended period independent from the 
issue of repayment. It is assumed that the costs of avoiding a government 
default, in terms of external rescue packages, are smaller than those of the 
default itself, including its spill-over effects on the rest of the EMU.  
Government default may take two forms. First, it could be accompanied 
by an exit from the EMU or, second, it could be accomplished within the 
EMU. The consequences of an exit have already been discussed. This 
implies at first glance that government default does not automatically 
imply that the defaulting countries would exit the EMU. Nevertheless, in 
                                                          
6 In this context, the Wolfson prize should be mentioned. The British Tory offered 
GBP251 thousand to the authors of the best plan for the dismantling of the EMU 
(see, e.g., Rachman 2012). For some details of the proposal, see The Economist 
(2012c). 
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the case of Greece a government default would also result in the country 
exiting the EMU, as it would likely only be able to obtain financing by 
reintroducing a national currency. This also holds for Spain and other 
indebted member states.  
Government defaults in the EMU can be either disorderly or managed. 
In a disorderly default, the government stops servicing its debt without 
consulting and cooperating with concerned parties including EU institutions, 
member states, banks and the private sector. The revenues of the Greek 
government are not sufficient to finance the public sector. Not only would 
public services collapse, but banks would as well, because they would be 
forced to write off the government securities they own. Following a 
disorderly government default, it would be difficult to find investors 
willing to finance the Greek government. A disorderly government default 
may easily lead to the country exiting the EMU, which would have 
negative implications for the rest of the EMU through contagion effects. 
An orderly or managed default is based on negotiations between the 
parties concerned. This raises the issue of the creation of a European Crisis 
Resolution Mechanism, as proposed by Bruegel, based on two pillars 
(Gianviti et al. 2010). The first pillar is a procedure to initiate and conduct 
negotiations between a sovereign debtor with unsustainable levels of debt 
and its creditors resulting in an agreement. The second includes the 
provision of financial assistance to EMU member states in an effort to 
resolve the crisis.  
A government default within the EMU would not improve the 
competitiveness of the Greek economy or any other defaulting member 
state. As devaluation is not allowed, the forces driving economic growth 
would likely be external, in the form of European investment programs. 
The precondition for this is the restoration of credibility and co-operation 
between the interested parties (Münchau 2012a). The probability of this 
scenario is very low.  
The weaker form of government default, which can be considered an 
orderly or managed one, is the write-off of a certain portion of government 
debt. The dilemmas here are the following. 1) Do the advantages deriving 
from the decrease in government debt and related debt service burdens 
exceed the financial and economic losses that are associated with the 
decline in credibility (that may spill-over to the rest of the EMU)? 2) Are 
the costs of government default lower than those of a potential bail-out?  
In Greece, 74% of government debt held by private investors was 
written off as losses in March 2012. The haircut of more than €100 billion 
was one of the largest in economic history. Representatives of EU 
institutions frequently underline the fact that the partial write-off of Greek 
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government debt having only involved the private sector was an 
exceptional case; it cannot be regarded as a precedent and is not applicable 
to other EMU member states. This implies that these other states must 
employ all available measures to avoid government default. Nevertheless, 
after the Greek precedent, investors buying the government securities of 
indebted member states are likely to be more cautious, and this may make 
it more difficult to finance other troubled EMU member states. A 
sovereign debt default mechanism may have other negative effects; it may 
nurture moral hazard and speculation (De Grauwe 2010).  
A Greek exit from the EMU or a government default would involve 
Greek debts worth €121 billion owed to official creditors, €27 billion 
owed to the IMF and €155 billion directly owed to the euro system 
(comprising the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the EMU). The 
last figure includes €110 billion provided directly to Greece through the 
TARGET2 payment system (Vallée 2012). These figures demonstrate that 
a Greek government default could have far-reaching consequences on the 
euro zone. If we consider the potential candidates for government default, 
according to estimates based on official data the claims of the euro system 
on troubled periphery countries amount to approximately €1.1 trillion, 
corresponding to 200% of the broadly defined capital of the euro zone 
(Vallée 2012). These figures indicate quite considerable risks for bank 
capital and taxpayers and represent a strong argument for avoiding 
government default in the EMU. The risk of the fear of contagion, 
including capital flight, cannot be quantified.  
Because bank portfolios contain significant shares of government 
securities, the recapitalisation of banks in the EU and the EMU envisaged 
in mid-2012 by the European Council can be considered, inter alia, a 
precautionary move to dampen the effects of potential government 
defaults. The new idea of a banking union will be discussed below.  
Despite the softening of the prohibition on government default, the 
roll-over of government debt is still more difficult in the EMU than outside 
it. Countries outside the EMU are less likely to be subject to liquidity 
crises than EMU member states because, first, the devaluation of the 
exchange rate will generate buyers for government securities, albeit 
presumably at a weak exchange rate and high yields. Second, the national 
central bank can assume the role of lender of last resort and inflate the debt 
by excessive money creation. In this way, a government default can be 
avoided. In the case of fixed exchange rates or a common currency and the 
absence of a national central bank, there may be no demand for 
government securities at high yields and the government may default. This 
may explain why Spain’s rating is worse despite the lower level of 
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government debt relative to GDP than that of the UK despite its higher 
level of indebtedness.7 As a consequence, the indebtedness levels should 
be much lower in economic and monetary unions than outside them. 
5. The modification of the no bail-out clause:  
financial rescue packages and bail-out funds 
In the wake of the Greek sovereign debt crisis that began in autumn 
2009, as well as the subsequent crises in Ireland and Portugal, the 
softening of the no bail-out clause in the Treaty on the European Union 
became necessary. According to an evaluation of EU institutions and the 
leaders of major EU member states, defaults on the part of the countries 
mentioned – including spill-over effects – would have entailed higher 
costs than bail-outs financed by credit.  
With respect to the legal basis: “Member states referred to Article 122 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, according to 
which assistance by EU countries is allowed if member states are faced 
with difficulties that are beyond their control. Before the actual rescue 
packages this article was interpreted in such a way that it cannot be 
applied to the bailing out of debtor countries. Since the resolution of the 
European Council as of 8/9 May 2010, governments of EMU member 
states have based their bail-out actions on it by arguing that the sovereign 
debt crisis endangered the solvency of individual member states and 
posted a threat to the financial stability of the Economic and Monetary 
Union” (Sinn 2010, 5). Nevertheless, the Economic and Monetary Union 
has faced crises in specific indebted EMU member states rather than a 
systemic crisis since that time (Sinn 2010, 7). “The use of this provision to 
the legal justification of bail-outs may give ground to different 
interpretations by the constitutional courts of EMU member states. 
However, this seems to be a smaller risk for the time being than the rather 
complicated modification of the Treaty of Lisbon to provide a clear legal 
basis for bailing out troubled EMU member states. The legal basis of bail-
outs is still rather shaky” (Sinn 2010, 7). 
A European Council decision (European Council 2011) added the 
following paragraph to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union: “3. Member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro-area as a whole. The granting of any 
required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to 
                                                          
7 See details based on the explanation of Paul De Grauwe in Wolf (2011). 
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strict conditionality.” As this mechanism is designed to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro-area as a whole, Article 122(2) of the TFEU 
will no longer be needed for such purposes. 
In light of the circumstances, three funds were established, which did 
not conform to the spirit of the original provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
to bail out member states coping with funding difficulties. The first fund is 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism with €60 billion that 
expired on 30 June 2012 and is designed to aid EU member states outside 
the EMU. The second is the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) 
with €440 billion in effective lending capacity that expires as of 30 June 
2013. Its successor will be the third fund, called the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), with €500 billion in effective lending capacity that will 
be operative as of June 30th 2013. The EFSF and the ESM are likely to 
work simultaneously until mid-2013. The combined lending capacity of 
the two funds will amount to €700 billion, out of which fresh money will 
total €500 billion, the remainder being parts of the on-going Greek, 
Portuguese and Irish programs. These efforts will be supported by a 
contingency reserve valued at €240 billion. The overall size of the funds 
will reach €940 billion. They are operated jointly by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. The difference between the EFSF and the ESM is that the loans of 
the ESM are senior to those of private investors, in other words, 
government defaults will be possible at rather limited risk to the budgets of 
lender countries. In the case of the EFSF, the lending member states are 
burdened with the costs of government default. The creation of bail-out 
funds can be considered an initial shift towards an optimum currency area 
where budgetary transfers are available to fend off various economic 
disturbances. The disputed issues include, first, the size of the funds 
required to match the potential risks and, second, the ways in which they 
are used, including conditionality.  
Until recently, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have received financial 
packages. In June 2012, Spain was awarded €100 billion and Cyprus 
applied for assistance. The sizes of the funds fall short of the total needs of 
EMU member states endangered by potential government default. In 
principle, the optimal sources of the bail-out funds have to be sufficient to 
guarantee that new government securities can be issued to roll over the 
government debt of troubled sovereign debtors, such as Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain, Italy, France and Belgium, until the EU issues common 
euro bonds. According to the calculations of Bloomberg and the IMF, €2.5 
trillion – €3 trillion would be necessary until 2015 (Bloomberg Business 
Week 2011). In addition, if temporary and transfer items are excluded, the 
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actual amount of funds that can be used for bail-outs amounts to only €500 
billion in the long run. This is significantly less than the amount necessary 
to guarantee the government debt of all of the member states potentially 
facing financial difficulties. However, the available money is sufficient to 
prevent government default in smaller countries (such as Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland), but it is insufficient to bail-out Spain.  
On one hand, increased financing for the funds may have psychological 
implications. The larger the size of the funds, the more convincing the 
deterrence, and the lower the probability of their deployment. Therefore, 
the risk of political debates challenging solidarity within the EU 
diminishes (Editorial 2012). Another interesting psychological question is 
whether the interventions of the European Stability Mechanism avoid 
crises or, on the contrary, trigger them. 
On the other hand, increasing the sizes of the funds is a signal to the 
US, China and other non-EU member states in general and those 
belonging to the G20 in particular that they, too, may wish to increase their 
contributions to the IMF’s global crisis management funds that were 
promised in April 2012 in the amount of $430 million.  
The further extension of the EFSF and ESM funds runs the risk that 
international rating agencies will downgrade the best debtors because both 
the EFSF and ESM raise funds in international money and capital markets. 
Another political obstacle to further increases in the funds is that an 
addition to German’s existing €211 billion contribution is subject to 
parliamentary approval. Domestic political issues may make the approval 
of new sums uncertain. In addition, the simple fact that the German 
contribution temporarily exceeds the approved ceiling may provoke 
political disputes.  
Furthermore, multilateral programs seem to approach their political 
limits. The liabilities faced by the individual member states are not 
sufficient to justify increasing the size of the bail-out funds. It is necessary 
to pool or share liability across the member states by issuing Eurobonds, 
etc. (Münchau 2012c). Nevertheless, the ESM can be perceived as a 
specific form of transfer mechanism among member states. Some experts 
regard its establishment as a further step towards a transfer union. 
Nonetheless, the bail-out packages and the EFSF and ESM shift risks from 
banks to taxpayers rather than improving the competitiveness of the 
beneficiary countries.  
The provision of financial aid from the bail-out funds is tied to 
conditions designed to reduce general government spending by introducing, 
inter alia, austerity measures and structural reforms. Until recently, 
beneficiary member states attempted to meet stringent, self-imposed 
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austerity conditions. Nevertheless, a new situation may emerge if a 
beneficiary country fails to comply with austerity and structural reform 
conditions wilfully and permanently. This risk is quite plausible in Greece, 
where the stringent measures implemented in previous years combined 
with the subsequent recession fuelled political and social resistance to 
further austerity. The Greek public opposes the program designed by the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The situation is similar in the other heavily indebted 
member states. If wilfully and permanently non-compliant program 
beneficiaries are denied further funding, the exit of the respective member 
state cannot be avoided, entailing the risk of spill-over and contagion 
effects for other endangered countries. If further funding is not denied, the 
result may be “the creation of an open-ended, uncapped transfer union 
without the surrender of national sovereignty to the supranational 
European level” (Buiter 2012). 
6. The modification of the no bail-out clause:  
changes in the ECB’s tasks 
Faced with the financial and economic crisis, the European Central 
Bank also modified its views on bail-outs. First, the ECB began to buy the 
government bonds of EMU member states facing financial difficulties in 
2009 in the secondary market. The purchases were beyond the size 
required for conducting its monetary policy operations. In the framework 
of its Securities Market Program, the ECB purchased government 
securities valued at more than €200 billion. Moreover, the ECB sold high-
quality government bonds to neutralise the inflationary effects of these 
purchases. Although this type of operation stabilised the yields on 
sovereign debt, it drove banks to sell off the government bonds of weak 
EMU member states, which are hence being accumulated by the ECB. 
“Since the start of 2007, the ECB purchased financial assets totalling 1.7 
trillion euros, expanding its portfolio from 13% to over 30% of the euro 
zone’s GDP” (Mallaby 2012, 7). This figure represented more than eight 
years of Greek GDP.  
Second, the ECB offered unlimited liquidity loans to banks at an 
auction held in June 2009 with one-year maturities. The amount totalled 
€442 billion. Through these operations, the ECB reduced short term 
interest rates to US and UK levels (The Economist 2012a).  
Third, the threat of a new recession loomed, bank capitalisation 
reached critical levels and investors only purchased the safest government 
securities in December 2011. As a response, the ECB offered commercial 
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banks unlimited liquidity loans for three years against any collateral at a 
1% interest rate (Long-term Refinancing Operation – LTRO). The action 
was repeated in late February 2012. Commercial banks borrowed more 
than €1000 billion under this scheme, although the assets of the banking 
system grew by only €503 billion if expiring loans and deposits at the 
ECB are taken into account. These measures are similar to the quantitative 
easing practices of the US Fed and the Bank of England.  
In this scheme, the ECB formally observed the no bail-out clause of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
LTRO can be regarded as a disguised bail-out. In Germany the ECB was 
criticised for not fully respecting the provisions of the EU Treaty that 
prohibit monetary financing of government debts. The ECB circumvented 
the formal legal provisions of the EU Treaty because commercial banks 
were provided loans rather than the governments directly. As the ECB 
accepted government bonds deposited by banks as collateral, the LTRO is 
an indirect means of bailing out indebted governments. It should be noted 
that the ECB is legally allowed to accept government securities as 
collateral.  
Although the motivations for their introduction were more diverse, the 
loans provided by the ECB under the LTRO framework amended or 
extended the financial sources of the rescue funds. However, decision 
making in the ECB is more rapid than in the EFSF and ESM, and the ECB 
is more credible than the bail-out fund institutions. 
There is insufficient space in the present article to analyse the effects of 
the LTRO in detail. However, it should be mentioned briefly that the 
ECB’s primary objective with the LTRO was to reduce the yields of 
government securities and other risky assets and thereby fend off liquidity 
crises in some indebted EMU member states (particularly in Spain and 
Italy). The LTRO also contributed to the recapitalisation of banks, thereby 
preventing an eventual banking crisis. The LTRO undoubtedly helped to 
ease liquidity tensions in the EMU, but it was not appropriate to improve 
solvency and reduce general government debt, let alone improve 
competitiveness in indebted EMU member states and dampen current 
account imbalances in the EMU.8 The three-year maturity of the loans 
provided governments and banks with time to make adjustments and 
reforms.  
                                                          
8 EU policies “have failed to recognise the possibility of insolvency and have 
addressed all crises as if they were pure liquidity crises; they have failed to address 
systematically the interdependence between banking and sovereign crises and 
cross-country interdependence; and they have been reactive rather than proactive, 
squandering credibility because of inadequate responses” (Darvas et al. 2011, 1). 
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The risks of the LTRO are rather diverse. First, commercial banks may 
face difficulties in December 2014 and February 2015 in raising the 
amounts needed to repay the loans (Jenkins 2012). In addition, the three-
year maturity is rather short for many banks.  
Second, commercial banks may become too dependent on the ECB’s 
inexpensive loans. If they buy government securities using these loans 
(this is a carry trade, and governments are prone to encourage it), the 
relationships between banks and governments may intensify. The 
relationship between the sovereign debt of financially troubled countries 
and the actual state of the banking sector will be reinforced (The 
Economist 2012b). With government securities in their portfolios, banks 
may be more vulnerable during difficult periods of the sovereign debt 
crisis. Therefore, sovereign debt crises may easily lead to bank crises.  
Third, inexpensive loans may foster money and capital market bubbles 
similar to those that preceded the global financial and economic crisis, but 
with sovereign debt securities being purchased in this case. With the 
LTRO, the ECB may be unwillingly sowing the seeds of the next crisis 
(Milne and Watkins 2012). 
Fourth, the central banks in the US and UK purchased government 
securities. In other words, sovereign risk was transferred from the public 
sector to the central bank. In the EMU, sovereign risk is still being carried 
by the private sector, namely the ECB shifted it to the balance sheets of 
undercapitalised commercial banks. In the US, the Fed directly provides 
loans to banks with a wide range of control mechanisms. In the EMU, the 
ECB offers banks refinancing, therefore its monetary policy is less 
predictable than that of the Fed. To add insult to injury, ECB monetary 
policy remains tight; there is room for a further reduction in its reference 
rate, although it was reduced from 1% to 0.75% in July 2012. 
Fifth, there is no guarantee that the commercial banks that borrowed 
from the ECB are willing to buy the government securities of EMU 
member states with high yields and high risks or that increased liquidity 
can be channelled to the real economy.  
Sixth, it is difficult to assess how long the ECB’s last two liquidity 
injections through the LTRO will last. There are signs that their effects 
tend to fade away slowly.  
Finally, the inexpensive loans provided by the ECB have reduced the 
pressure on both governments and commercial banks to implement 
reforms. For governments, the unconditional and unlimited purchase of 
government securities also leads to moral hazard problems.  
By providing commercial banks with unlimited loans against 
government bonds (as collateral at specific LTRO auctions) the ECB 
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essentially assumed the de facto role of the banking system’s lender of last 
resort with some limitations (although the scheme cannot be considered a 
European Monetary Fund at present). However, this has yet to be declared 
officially, causing uncertainty among economic actors to remain. Germany 
opposes this mainly because of its inflationary impact in the long run. 
Nevertheless, in sharp crisis situations the benefits of crisis prevention 
outweigh the long-term costs in terms of inflation. 
7. Measures aiming at the overhaul  
of the institutional system 
The objective of softening the three prohibitions was to gain the time 
needed to take further measures at both the EU and the EMU levels to 
correct institutional deficiencies. They included the improvement of 
economic governance (the Stability and Growth Pact, Euro Pact, Six Pack, 
Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, etc.), prevention (Excessive Imbalance Procedure), etc. 
The common objective of these legal rules is to reinforce fiscal discipline 
and thus somehow compensate for the lack of a fiscal union. The analysis 
of these measures is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The most important proposals concerning the future of the EMU were 
submitted to the European Council in late June 2012. They contained, inter 
alia, an integrated financial framework including integrated supervision to 
ensure the effective application of prudential rules, risk control and crisis 
prevention throughout the EU; a European deposit insurance scheme to 
strengthen the credibility of the existing arrangements and secure eligible 
deposits at all credit institutions; and a European bank resolution scheme 
funded by contributions from financial institutions to provide assistance to 
banks (Rompuy 2012). This issue was also addressed previously by the 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group. 
The concept is referred to as a banking union and it should be 
elaborated in detail. Based on the available information, the banking union 
should comprise all 27 member states of the EU to avoid the fragmentation 
of the single market for financial services.  
Banking supervision would be delegated to the ECB. Bail-out funds 
could go directly to banks (the ESM will be allowed to recapitalise banks 
directly) rather than to governments, therefore they would not increase the 
government debts of the member states involved. This rule has already 
been applied to Spain. In addition, the ESM will be allowed to buy 
government bonds in secondary markets and thereby stabilise the market.  
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The common deposit insurance system could reduce the risk of bank 
runs in vulnerable member states. If a country is likely to leave the EMU 
and deposits are guaranteed in euros, people may borrow heavily in their 
local markets and deposit the money in their bank accounts. Their debts 
would be redenominated while their savings would be protected. This 
could be considered a direct transfer from the rest of the euro zone to the 
periphery (The Economist 2012d). 
According to calculations by Barclays, an insurance fund would have 
to cover €11 trillion in deposits. For the banking industry to raise an 
amount worth 1.4% of assets, EMU banks would have to be taxed a fifth 
of their annual earnings for five years. According to more conservative 
calculations, more than €100 billion would have to be raised (The 
Economist 2012d).  
The banking union could dismantle the link between governments and 
banks, creating a more stable financial environment in the EU. It can be 
considered a first step towards a fiscal union, although common 
responsibility and liability are rather limited. 
8. Summary and conclusions 
The sovereign debt crisis that evolved in the Economic and Monetary 
Union was fundamentally the result of economic policies in general and 
unsustainable fiscal policies in particular, pursued by member states, rather 
than the introduction of the common currency. The external and the 
internal stability of the euro have yet to be challenged. During the global 
financial and economic crisis, the euro provided EMU member states with 
protection against internal exchange rate shocks. After its introduction, 
conversion costs, exchange rate risks and uncertainties disappeared and, as 
a result, transaction costs decreased in intra-EMU trade, which also 
boosted GDP growth.  
Nevertheless, the basic legal rules governing the EMU combined with 
some specific features of member states have long mitigated or even 
hidden economic disequilibria and tensions that developed both within and 
among member states for a long time. They were primarily the 
consequences of the fact that, first, the EMU was not an optimum currency 
area; second, EU legal rules were not efficient enough to enforce fiscal 
discipline and inhibit the accumulation of private sector debts in member 
states. The absence of the first two preconditions for an optimum currency 
area (flexible factor markets and internal homogeneity) was of minor 
importance in contrast to critiques written prior to the establishment of the 
EMU; whereas the third criterion (the availability of budgetary transfers) 
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was not compatible with the notion of a monetary union in the absence of 
a fiscal one. Under the given circumstances, exchange rate and liquidity 
crises were avoided.  
However, the economic disequilibria and tensions that had accumulated 
as a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis, the lack of an 
optimum currency area and the inadequate policies pursued by member 
states since the launch of the EMU in 1999 led to a sovereign debt crisis to 
which the institutional and regulatory framework of the Economic and 
Monetary Union also contributed. In addition, with the establishment of 
the EMU, its member states lost the majority of the traditional, national 
crisis management tools, which were replaced by very weak tools and 
mechanisms and funds that were endowed with limited financial resources 
at the level of economic integration.  
The sovereign debt crisis challenged the three pillars of the Economic 
and Monetary Union. The three prohibitions (no exits, no defaults and no 
bail-outs) were originally incorporated in the Treaty of Maastricht and 
secondary EU legislation to ensure the credibility of monetary integration. 
They did not constrain economic development and economic policy in the 
period of excessive global liquidity, but they did restrain the EMU member 
states’ manoeuvrability during the sovereign debt crisis. With the softening 
of two of the three prohibitions (no government defaults and no bail-outs), 
the economic policy tools and crisis management mechanisms in the EMU 
became more similar but far from identical to those prevailing in countries 
outside the EMU.  
As far as the first pillar is concerned, the Treaty on the European 
Union (the first part of the Treaty of Lisbon) allows any member state to 
exit the EMU if it simultaneously leaves the EU. This is independent of 
the sovereign debt crisis. The exit of a member state, be it a strong or weak 
one, from the EMU would pose insurmountable legal difficulties and 
would constitute economic suicide due to the costs, despite the arguments 
of economists stressing the presumed advantages of such a move. The 
major guarantees for the EMU are the enormous cost of its dissolution, the 
fear of the collapse of the EU and the loss of the tremendous amount of 
political capital invested in it over the past 10–15 years. Therefore, 
assuming rational behaviour on the part of governments, no member state 
is likely to make use of the legal possibility of exiting the EU. Despite the 
great uncertainty and enormous costs, the partial or complete dissolution 
of the EMU cannot be excluded, but its probability is relatively low under 
more or less “normal” circumstances. Nevertheless, contingency scenarios 
for the break-up of the EMU may be justified.  
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In the EMU, where their debts are issued in a currency over which they 
do not have full control, member states cannot rely on devaluation as a 
means of managing the crisis and restoring international competitiveness. 
Therefore, the likelihood of default is rather high. Devaluation could only 
be an option if member states leave the EMU. Therefore, the means of 
making adjustments and restoring international competitiveness include 
the consolidation of the general government through fiscal austerity, 
structural reforms and internal devaluation, in terms of reducing prices 
and unit labour costs, which are rather painful and may have adverse 
effects on GDP growth.  
The prohibition on government default was only partially softened 
because, regarding economic actors on the one hand, it was limited to the 
write-off of government debts held by private investors (the weak form of 
government default) and, on the other, in geographical terms to Greece, 
establishing a precedent. Because of its limited scope and size (in terms of 
the exclusion of public debt), its impact on easing debt’s drag on Greek 
economic growth is likely to remain modest.  
The softening of the no bail-out clause included establishing rescue 
funds, the ECB’s purchases of government bonds in secondary markets 
and the indirect involvement of the ECB in the purchase of government 
bonds through the provision of loans to commercial banks against 
government bond collateral, based on an innovative interpretation of 
existing basic EU legal rules. The legal basis for the softening of the no 
bail-out clause is rather uncertain. In addition, the rescue funds and ECB 
loans assist in the creation of conditions necessary for the member states to 
make adjustments rather than substituting for policy measures to be taken 
by the EU and the individual member states.  
It is also theoretically possible for the ECB to assume the role of lender 
of last resort should the necessity arise, although this is not included in its 
statute and opposition to this remains rather strong, mainly because of the 
inflationary risks perceived by some member states, particularly Germany. 
Nevertheless, it seems most likely that in serious crisis situations, the 
European Central Bank would provide member states with unlimited 
liquidity.  
The softening of the prohibitions on government defaults and bail-outs 
was a necessary but insufficient precondition for the management of the 
crisis. It was sufficient to prevent financial and economic disaster (bank 
crises and sovereign defaults) in the short-term, but it did not properly 
address the core issues related to the limited compliances of the EMU with 
respect to the criteria for an optimum currency area.  
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In addition, it involved undesired negative side-effects. First, the EMU 
has faced solvency problems rather than liquidity problems, while the 
rescue funds were designed to ease the liquidity problems of indebted 
member states. Second, the softening of the non-default assumption and 
the no bail-out clause had nothing to do with long-term issues, such as the 
core problems of the Economic and Monetary Union including the 
restoration of competitiveness in the peripheral member states, the reduction 
of external imbalances (huge current account surpluses in the core 
economies and equally large deficits in the periphery) and the stimulation 
of economic growth. The changes to the pillars of the EMU provided EU 
institutions, member states and economic actors with the time to 
implement structural reforms, undertake measures to transition towards a 
genuine optimum currency area (not discussed in this report) and promote 
economic growth. However, the increased flexibility created by the 
softening of the prohibitions on government defaults and bail-outs may 
mitigate the pressure weighing on national governments and EU institutions 
to introduce reforms. Given the specific features of the monetary union, 
including the impossibility of devaluation, crisis management is more 
difficult, and the requirements for implementing structural reforms and 
improving competitiveness are more difficult in the EMU than outside it. 
Concerning future prospects, the possibility of moving towards an 
optimum currency area is limited. Such a move would only be feasible 
with the exclusion of the southern European member states (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy) from the EMU, which is neither a realistic 
assumption nor feasible. In addition, transitioning the EMU towards an 
optimum currency area would not be sufficient to solve the underlying 
institutional and governance problems.  
The most desirable development in the EMU would be progress 
towards a genuine monetary union combined with some forms of a fiscal 
union based on the mutualisation of debts with more common 
responsibilities. A first step in this direction could be a banking union. This 
scenario would be most appropriate for overcoming the institutional 
weaknesses of the present Economic and Monetary Union. The probability 
of this development is rather low because of the diverging interests of the 
member states. Germany has opposed proposals aimed at a shift towards 
fiscal union because of fears of free riding and moral hazard. The 
probability of a painful scenario based on internal devaluation is also low. 
Considering the political constraints, the most probable scenario is that as 
a result of the softening of the no bail-out clause, government debts will be 
inflated with the help of the ECB’s indirect quantitative (hopefully with 
strict conditionality) easing in the long run (there is no imminent 
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inflationary danger in the EMU), particularly if no solutions are found to 
the structural weaknesses of the EMU. 
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THE CRISIS AS A TURNING POINT 







The impact of the economic crisis was dramatic in certain European 
Union member states; as early as 2008, Hungary and Latvia received 
combined rescue packages from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank and the European Union. Romania turned to the IMF in 
2009 and again in 2011. In 2010, Greece, as a member of the euro-area, 
received loans from the EU and the IMF. In the same year, a financial aid 
package was approved for Ireland, followed by one for Portugal in 2011. 
Spain requested financial assistance for the recapitalisation of its financial 
institutions in 2012. 
This trend begs the question of whether it was really an accident that 
the most vulnerable countries were all old and new, so-called cohesion 
countries of the EU that received support from the Cohesion Fund.1 In the 
media, as well as among experts, discussing the EU member states in 
terms of core and peripheral countries rapidly became commonplace and 
generally accepted. Should the crisis end one day, will this period have 
consequences, and will the countries return to the promising track they 
followed during their 5–25 year EU memberships? These questions are 
fundamentally important because one of the fundamental goals of 
European integration is to provide an opportunity to less-developed 
member states for convergence and to strengthen economic and social 
cohesion. The significance of convergence is also expressed in a European 
cohesion policy. The grave problems of old cohesion countries represent a 
particularly unexpected shock to integration, as their adaptation is usually 
considered a closed and completed process. Accordingly, all EU analyses 
                                                          
1 The old cohesion countries are Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, the new ones 
are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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and studies examine old cohesion countries as a part of the EU-15, i.e., the 
old member states, and only separately consider the new member states. 
In the fourth year of the crisis, it seems increasingly obvious that the 
cohesion countries cannot follow the same development trajectory as they 
did prior to the crisis. Our study will review how the crisis has affected the 
convergence results and how future perspectives can be appraised based 
on the evolution of the crisis to date. An investigation of the European 
convergence model reveals that it has vulnerabilities and limits that have 
not been revealed in the analyses of EU or World Bank experts. After 
studying these interpretations of convergence, we outline some necessary 
changes to the concept of European integration. 
2. Threatened results of convergence 
The convergence in terms of GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity was impressive before the crisis. In 1995, the contraction resulting 
from the economic transition came to an end in the post-socialist countries. 
Choosing this year as a basis for comparison, all of the cohesion countries 
were catching up with the EU-27 average, although to different degrees. 
Ireland, the poorest Baltic states, Slovakia and Poland made the greatest 
progress (Figure 7-1).2 
GDP per capita does not express the growth in a population’s welfare 
that is central to the meaning of convergence. Another indicator, actual 
individual final consumption (including expenditures on the consumption 
of goods and services by households and non-profit institutions serving 
households and in-kind social transfers) is more appropriate for this 
purpose. The general picture is similar, but the positioning of the countries 
is different; in the case of Ireland, the difference between the two 
indicators is striking (Figure 7-2). 
Summarising figures 7-1 and 7-2, we highlight that the crisis has 
injured the cohesion countries’ convergence towards the EU-27 average 
(with the exception of Poland and Slovakia); however, these countries 
were able to preserve the bulk of their convergence results to date 
(Table 7-1). In most cases, the loss in the final consumption values is 
greater than in GDP per capita. This means that in the countries that were 
severely hit by the crisis, there were changes in consumption in response 
to the recession and austerity measures. 
                                                          
2 To present the data in a clear and comprehensible manner, we omit the statistical 
data on the new member states Cyprus and Malta, as they are island states that do 
not share the common past and history of the Eastern and Central European region. 





Fig. 7-1 The development of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in the old 





Fig. 7-2 The development of per capita actual individual final consumption at 
purchasing power parity in the old and new cohesion countries compared to the 
EU-27 average 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database 
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Table 7-1 Catching-up in the actual individual final consumption of 
households and in GDP per capita with the EU-27 average compared 





GDP per capita 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Slovakia 30 32 26 27
Lithuania 29 24 26 22
Estonia 28 21 33 28
Poland 14 19 13 20
Latvia 24 18 21 16
Romania 14 10 14 13
Greece 14 8 8 6
Hungary 11 8 13 14
Bulgaria 11 7 12 12
Spain 10 6 13 9
Portugal 4 6 1 3
Slovenia 8 6 17 11
Czech 
Republic 3 3 4 3
Ireland 8 0 30 25
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat and AMECO database 
 
The economic and financial crises in the cohesion countries have been 
thoroughly analysed (e.g., Becker et al. 2010, European Commission 
2009c, European Commission 2010b, Gardó and Martin 2010, Gligorov et 
al. 2012). These studies came to similar conclusions with respect to the 
“anatomy” of the crisis. Here, we do not provide a reconstruction of the 
crisis; rather, we focus only on the processes that severely affected the 
European convergence model. 
The crisis highlighted that the European Union has a unique growth 
model that makes it possible for relatively low-income countries to catch 
up rapidly with their richer neighbours. This model is based on foreign 
capital inflows. Europe is the only region where the different forms of 
private capital – both foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio funds – 
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flow downhill from richer to poorer countries and from low-growth to 
high-growth countries (Becker et al. 2010, Gill and Raiser 2012).  
At its outset, the crisis affected the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) and Mediterranean countries differently. In 2009, the 
rate of decline exceeded the EU average – with the exception of Poland – 
in every new member state, with the Baltic states suffering extremely large 
losses. In contrast, of the old cohesion countries, only Ireland experienced 
an immediate, strong recession; the others faced smaller scale, but 
prolonged, downturns. However, it has subsequently become increasingly 
clear that there is a common element in their situations: the previously 
advantageous growth model made them particularly vulnerable during the 
crisis when capital inflows fell. Despite the differences between the 
countries, the foreign capital-based convergence combined with low 
saving rates is a distinctive feature of catching-up in both the old and new 
cohesion countries. 
Scrutinising these countries, the severity of the recession unambiguously 
depended on the degree of pre-crisis economic imbalances. This is not 
surprising, but it seems to determine their development paths at least in the 
medium-term. The differences among the countries are instructive from 
the perspective of the convergence model. 
Three Central European countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia, did not accumulate notable disequilibria prior to the crisis. In the 
CEEC (including Hungary and Slovenia), growth was accompanied by 
small and improving trade imbalances, as a reflection of reindustrialisation 
after the economic transition that followed the fall of the socialist system. 
These five countries had little or no problems with respect to their 
competitiveness in their tradable sectors. Despite the favourable conditions 
in manufacturing, in Hungary, the initial levels of both private and public 
debt were high at the beginning of the crisis; the Slovenian economy was 
overheated (characterised by full capacity utilisation and inflation 
pressure) when the crisis broke out, and the private sector (mainly 
corporate) debt position increased (Farkas 2012, Tajnikar et al. 2011). Of 
the old cohesion countries, Ireland also coped with debt- rather than 
competitiveness-related problems. 
In the Mediterranean cohesion countries, the three Baltic states, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, growth in the period preceding the crisis was 
driven by domestic demand, whereas the contribution of net exports to 
growth was negative (European Commission 2009b, 2009c). In this 
second group, the current account balance deteriorated sharply, and these 
countries were on an unsustainable development path, even before the 
crisis. The underlying issue is that these economies suffer from 
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competitiveness issues in their tradable sectors, although Spain shows 
better results. The percentage of medium- and high-technology product 
exports as a percentage of total product exports demonstrates these 
differences (Figure 7-3). 
The division between Central European countries, Ireland and the 
others concerning competitive tradable sectors may be surprising because 
the forms of capital inflows differ between the old and new cohesion 
countries. In the new cohesion countries, the main form of foreign capital 
was FDI, while the old Mediterranean cohesion countries attracted 
portfolio and other capital inflows (Figure 7-4). However, the Central 
European countries were the primary beneficiaries of rapid technology 
transfer, where the FDI flowed into manufacturing, which is a tradable 
sector. (Slovenia is a special case where FDI stock remained low.) In the 
Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania, the FDI was biased in favour of 
banking, real estate and other non-tradable sectors. Unfortunately, the FDI 
thereby fuelled an unsustainable boom and contributed to the development 




Fig. 7-3 Medium- and high-technology product exports as a percentage of total 
product exports in the cohesion countries, 2007–2010 
Source: Author’s compilation from European Commission (2011a, 2012) and 
UNU-MERIT (2009, 2010) data 
 





Fig. 7-4 Capital flows in emerging countries, 2001–2004; 2005–2008 
Source: Gill and Raiser (2012, 134) 
Note: “EU coh.” refers to the EU old cohesion countries, “EU cand.” refers to EU 
candidate countries, “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries and 
“LAC” refers to the Latin America and the Caribbean region. CA stands for current 
account and FX is foreign exchange. 
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The different compositions of foreign capital can also be observed in 
the banking sector. In the new cohesion countries, banking instruments 
were 60–90% foreign-owned, whereas the same ratio for the EU-15 was 
between 10–50% (European Central Bank 2010). Despite this difference, 
due to financial integration, external vulnerability reached critical levels in 
both groups. In the Mediterranean countries, net foreign liabilities were 
approximately 80–100% of GDP at the start of the crisis (European 
Commission 2010b). The average for the new member states was over 
60%, and in the case of Bulgaria and Hungary, exceeded 100% (Jevčák 
et al. 2010). Of the old cohesion countries, Ireland and Spain were 
engaged in disciplined fiscal policy before the crisis, but real estate 
bubbles developed in both countries, and the bursting of these bubbles led 
to a crisis in the banking system that was transformed into a public debt 
crisis. This was particularly tragic for Ireland because, relative to its GDP, 
its banking sector was the largest in Europe (Kinsella 2011, Kovács and 
Halmosi 2012, OECD 2009, Udvari 2012). 
In Greece and Portugal, in addition to external disequilibrium, the 
fiscal policies followed by these countries also exhibited certain 
disciplinary problems after the introduction of the euro. Twin deficits 
developed, and Portugal stepped off the convergence path at the beginning 
of the 2000s. All three Mediterranean countries were characterised by 
stagnating productivity starting in the beginning of the 2000s. Greece, in 
particular, was characterised by a distinct drop in productivity 
(Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011, Royo 2010). 
Apart from Hungary, in the new cohesion countries, public debt 
remained under the 60% rate stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty, but with 
the exception of Estonia and Bulgaria, public debt rates began to increase 
significantly during the crisis.  
In the non-euro-zone countries, the exchange-rate regimes had a clear 
influence on the composition of capital inflows and the accumulation of a 
vulnerable external debt position. The Central European countries where 
the FDI went to the manufacturing sector, opted for more or less flexible 
exchange rates (Slovakia until mid-2008). Slovenia, with its peg or 
crawling peg system connected to the euro, was also an exception in this 
field. In fixed exchange-rate regimes (in the Baltic states and Bulgaria), it 
was the use of capital in the form of foreign loans rather than FDI that was 
preferable, especially in the banking and real-estate sectors. Taking 
domestic inflation into account, fixed currencies meant significant 
negative real interest rates for domestic borrowers. Credit supplying 
foreign banks did not need to rely on local markets for raising funds, and 
nominal interest rates were attractive. The fixed exchange-rate policy was 
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not changed during the crisis, and these countries could adjust their 
imbalances via internal devaluation, that is, domestic price and wage cuts 
(Becker et al. 2010). 
Although the growth rates in the majority of the new cohesion 
countries were again higher than the EU-15 or EU-27 average after the 
first wave of the crisis, these rates are high enough to ensure the 
mathematical convergence, but not sufficient enough to provide 
convergences that are perceptible for households in these countries, with 
the exemption of Poland and Slovakia (Table 7-2). (In the Baltic states and 
Romania, the higher rates compensate for the large GDP loss in 2009.) 
There is a danger that this situation is not temporary but the beginning of a 
medium-term or even longer trend. 
 
Table 7-2 Real GDP growth rates in the cohesion countries, 2011–2013 
 
 2011 2012* 2013*
EU-27  1.5 0 1.3
EU-15 1.4 -0.2 1.2
Bulgaria 1.7 0.5 1.9
Czech Republic 1.7 0 1.5
Estonia 7.6 1.6 3.8
Ireland 0.7 0.5 1.9
Greece -6.9 -4.7 0
Spain 0.7 -1.8 -0.3
Latvia 5.5 2.2 3.6
Lithuania 5.9 2.4 3.5
Hungary 1.6 -0.3 1
Poland 4.3 2.7 2.6
Portugal -1.6 -3.3 0.3
Romania 2.5 1.4 2.9
Slovenia -0.2 -1.4 0.7
Slovakia 3.3 1.8 2.9
Source: Eurostat 
Note: * = forecast. 
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The external conditions have been changing unfavourably for a longer 
time. The contracted markets of the economies in the European Union do 
not promote export-led growth in the cohesion countries, and the 
management of European debt crisis and stricter financial regulation 
decrease the capital available to the cohesion countries. FDI and cross-
border production networks cannot play as dynamic a role in the 
convergence as they did before the crisis. Financial markets’ risk 
evaluations may remain higher, even for those cohesion countries that are 
not affected by more severe financial difficulties. Due to the indebtedness 
of households and governments in the majority of the cohesion countries, 
the diminishing external resources and markets cannot substitute for 
domestic ones. 
Demographic processes are another factor that seemed to endanger 
convergence even before the crisis. By the mandate of the ECFIN Council, 
a group of experts investigates the age-related expenditures in the EU 
member states to 2060 regularly. This “Ageing Report 2009” had already 
indicated in 2009 that more rapid population declines in the new member 
states will slow the convergence process (European Commission 2009a). 
In the “Ageing Report 2012”, the population loss combined with the effect 
of the crisis resulted in diminishing productivity presented even gloomier 
prospects for the majority of the cohesion countries (European 
Commission 2011b). The population census that was conducted in most of 
the European countries in 2011 and 2012 indicates that the average 
population decline in the ten new member states almost doubled over the 
past decade, according to preliminary data. Approximately half of the 
reduction from 2000 to 2011 is due to net migration and the other half to a 
natural decrease. A more striking figure is that the population aged 0 to 14 
shrank by almost 25% (whereas the corresponding figure for the EU-15 is 
approximately 1%) (Gligorov et al. 2012). 
3. Interpretation of the European convergence 
The slowdown of convergence in European integration is a substantial 
challenge because the achievement of the European Union in this field is 
one of the main bases for legitimating the existence of integration, and, for 
the populations of the cohesion countries, it is the most convincing and 
attractive element of the EU membership. The Treaty on the European 
Union declares the EU’s aims, one of which is that the EU “shall promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among member 
states” (Art. 3(3) TEU). 
The Crisis as a Turning Point in the European Convergence Model 
 
144
The crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of the European 
convergence model with respect to its dependence on foreign capital. 
However, if we study the assessments of European convergence carefully, 
we find other problems that are not explicitly revealed. We select two very 
thorough and influential analyses to show how these issues can affect the 
future of integration. One of the analyses is the report on the “Five years 
of an enlarged EU” that resulted from the collaboration of several 
Commission services of the EU and it only investigates the new member 
states (European Commission 2009b). The other work is a book by the 
World Bank’s experts on “Golden Growth. Restoring the Lustre of the 
European Economic Model” (Gill and Raiser 2012), which scrutinises the 
entire European Union. It is remarkable that both follow the same logic in 
assessing the European convergence model. Gill and Raiser (2012) 
contrast the economic achievements of the new and old cohesion 
countries; they interpret the convergence of the former group of countries 
as a success story and the old Mediterranean cohesion countries’ 
performances by and large as a failure.  
In both analyses, the main arguments of the advantages of the 
European convergence model are the growth performances of the lagging 
countries and their capital-intensive export structures. They regard trade 
openness, FDI inflows and institutional improvements resulting from EU 
accession as the key drivers of growth. The EU report estimates that “each 
year during the period 2000–2008 accession gave the new member states 
an extra growth boost of approximately 1¾% on average… Model 
simulations suggest that…the new member states enjoy 50–100 basis 
points advantage relative to other emerging countries with comparable 
fundamentals” (European Commission 2009b, 17). 
Both analyses agree that foreign capital inflows made it possible to 
overcome the lack of savings in the cohesion countries. Gill and Raiser 
(2012) emphasise that Europe is the only region where capital flows in the 
“right” direction, that is, towards poorer, high-growth countries. The EU 
report highlights that this catching-up model prompted current account 
deficits and the appreciation of real exchange rates. It supposes that, as a 
result of the global crisis, the slowdown of capital inflows will lead to 
significant contractions in economic activity, and in some of the new 
member states the income gap with richer EU countries will widen, at least 
temporarily. Gill and Raiser (2012) also call for prudence when financing 
is plentiful. 
According to both investigations, FDI played a prominent role in the 
productivity growth in emerging Europe directly (investment) and 
indirectly (spill-over effects). The EU report provides a detailed overview 
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on the knowledge spill-over effects of FDI in the empirical literature, 
which has contradictory results but the EU report regards the positive 
effects as decisive.  
FDI is also closely connected with the other advantage of the European 
convergence model, the increased technological content and quality of the 
export basket. Both analyses underline, based on statistical data, that new 
member states’ trade is becoming sophisticated and they have become 
even more specialised in capital-intensive goods.  
This picture on the European convergence model would be convincing 
and unambiguous. However, both documents contain further elements that 
make their interpretation inconsistent. They also highlight the convergence 
model from the perspective of the non-cohesion countries. The EU report 
refutes the danger of the relocation of production and jobs. This occurs 
rather in the case of the efficiency-seeking manufacturing sector, but 70% 
of outward direct investment from the old to the new member states is in 
the services sector and of a market-seeking type, thus limiting the job 
losses. In some sectors where changes in competitive position lead to 
relocation, it helps to maintain competitiveness for corporations that 
maintain their more skilled-based units of production, technology 
development and ownership in mature economies (that is in the non-
cohesion countries). Labour-intensive elements of production and routine 
tasks are located in the new member states. 
Gill and Raiser (2012) also explain the success of convergence through 
reconfiguration of the value chain in Continental and Northern European 
based companies after the collapse of communism. They located their 
assembly activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and due to lower wages 
they could strengthen their competitiveness through their flexibility in 
offshoring. Central and Eastern Europe could integrate not only within the 
EU but also within the world economy through increased productivity. 
According to the authors, the reason for the difficult situation in Southern 
Europe is that these countries did not participate in these processes and 
they have few global companies. The EU can be described as a three-
speed union with the Continental and Northern leaders, the Central and 
Eastern chasers and Southern laggards. 
Gill and Raiser (2012) address innovation in a separate chapter. They 
define innovation as a source of long-term growth differentials. They note 
that “Europe’s east is catching up in productivity, but remains far behind in 
innovation. For these countries, sustaining productivity growth is what 
matters, but the innovation gap so far has not been a binding constraint” 
(Gill and Raiser 2012, 256). Therefore, their policy recommendation is 
that countries in Central and Eastern Europe need not invest much more in 
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R&D and knowledge production. They should adopt existing technologies 
via FDI and trade links. 
Neither assessment raises the questions that resulted from their 
analyses. Both accept convergence as a fundamental goal, but they do not 
address the issue of whether this model is appropriate to reach this goal or 
it has limits.  
The above-mentioned expert group of “Ageing Report 2012” has 
already confronted the catching-up problem. They had to decide whether 
they assume convergence in either GDP level or GDP growth rate over the 
long-term projection exercise. Some exercises were run in the expert 
group that showed some convergence in GDP levels in past periods, but 
the growth rate needed to allow for this convergence in the projections (to 
2060!) would not be plausible in the short- and medium-term. Thus, the 
expert group decided to assume that there would be convergence in growth 
rates in the long run (European Commission 2011b). 
The limits of convergence can be derived not only from econometric 
projections but also from the EU report (European Commission 2009b) 
and Gill and Raiser (2012). Their analyses outline a division of labour and 
production between the north-western countries and the new member 
states. Although there are possibilities of upgrading along the value chain, 
there is no reason to assume that foreign companies will abandon their key 
positions in innovation, technology development and strategic decision-
making. It seems to be much more likely that the current labour and 
production division will essentially be reproduced. Another possibility 
could be that spill-over effects help the domestic companies to foster 
internationally competitive economies that are able to accelerate and to 
complete the catching-up process. The literature on FDI spill-overs shows 
unambiguous positive productivity effects in the case of vertical, backward 
linkages. Domestic firms occupy the dependent position in these 
relationships. The horizontal spill-over effects seem to be weak in the 
overwhelming majority of empirical investigations (Gorodnichenko et al. 
2007, Hanousek et al. 2010).3 The third means of economic development 
would be to strengthen domestic capital accumulation. As we have seen, 
the cohesion countries have high levels of FDI inflows coupled with low 
savings rates. Therefore, domestic investment was not a decisive factor in 
this model, in contrast to some Asian countries. 
Due to the low initial GDP levels in the cohesion countries, the above-
outlined contradictions and the limits of the European convergence model 
could be disregarded; it provided sufficient space for the cohesion 
                                                          
3 Both studies provide a comprehensive overview of the literature concerning spill-
over effects in emerging Europe. 
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countries to develop. However, it is remarkable that the Czech Republic, 
which had one of the highest initial GDP levels in Central and Eastern 
Europe and is one of the “best pupils” in following the European 
convergence model, has made very moderate progress in catching-up 
(Table 7-1). Slovenia, with its higher initial GDP level, has achieved 
greater convergence but has always chosen different means, focusing on 
domestic economy and had already accumulated imbalances prior to the 
crisis.  
In sum, it is questionable whether the European convergence model is 
appropriate for the long run catching-up of those countries that are already 
close to the efficiency/technical frontier. If the crisis had not occurred, the 
poorer countries could have further developed within the framework of the 
European convergence model, even if the development would have been 
concentrated in the areas that had attracted foreign capital (typically the 
capitals and their agglomerations) accompanied by increasing regional 
inequalities. 
4. Conclusions 
Assuming that the foreign capital inflows would return to the cohesion 
countries to their status prior to the crisis, the European convergence 
model could be restored despite its limits. The actors would be aware of 
the larger vulnerability of cohesion countries’ economies, and European 
economic governance, e.g. in the form of the excessive imbalances 
procedure could help to avoid similar difficulties. 
However, the only certainty in the current crisis is that things will not 
get back on track. The above-mentioned EU report (European Commission 
2009b) did not address this problem at the beginning of the crisis; it 
simply referred to growth slowdowns and the new member states having a 
long way to go to full convergence. Gill and Raiser (2012) raise a question 
regarding the future of the European convergence model. They are very 
optimistic: “Restarting the convergence machine will not be difficult” (Gill 
and Raiser 2012, 10). The task is very simple; a single market for services 
should be completed. Although market liberalisation in services would be 
advantageous for the cohesion countries, it is difficult to imagine that it 
could compensate for the diminishing external and internal sources that we 
have already outlined. 
In their common studies, experts at Bruegel, a European think tank, 
and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, an 
independent research institute, made more sophisticated policy suggestions 
to reorient the European convergence model. Their starting point is that 
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the reduction in the private sector savings-investment gap is unavoidable. 
In the medium-term this leads to the problem of dampened domestic 
demand. A sustained re-launch of growth requires a more efficient use of 
savings than in the past. They list a range of policies (human capital, 
technology, industrial and regional) that should be employed to improve 
the competitiveness of tradable sectors (Becker et al. 2010). 
We can draw two conclusions independently from the ultimate 
outcome of the global crisis: 
 
• Even if the economic actors in a country, including the government, 
adjust their behaviour and economic policies successfully, we 
cannot assume a return to the speed of convergence prior to the 
crisis. 
• The reorientation of the growth model requires very professional 
government activities to promote the competitiveness of the 
tradable sector. It is difficult to believe that all of the governments 
in the cohesion countries will be able to exhibit high levels of 
administrative performance. 
 
These consequences of the global crisis make some changes in the 
concept of integration necessary. As we have seen, the degree and speed of 
convergence between countries has played a central role in assessments 
regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of European integration in 
recent decades. If the necessary adjustments to the post-crisis reality are 
not carried out at the conceptual level of European integration, the 
legitimacy of integration will be jeopardised. The Union’s raison d’être in 
the next decade will be tied to the fact that without integration, European 
countries would not be considered global economic players. If, however, 
the speed of convergence remains a measure of the success of integration, 
the EU will doom itself. 
One of the most important lessons from the last two decades is that the 
positive FDI spill-over effects are limited in market transactions. If foreign 
capital becomes scarcer, it will be even more important to promote the 
positive spill-over effects through economic policy. Even if there are 
numerous studies on the channels of spill-over effects and other measures 
of local economic development, the problems of a dual economy and the 
development of an internationally competitive domestic economy are 
missing from EU policies (e.g., cohesion, innovation). Failing to bridge 
the productivity gap between foreign and domestic companies makes 
catching-up impossible. However, the policy measures to develop a 
competitive domestic economy are essentially in the hands of national 
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governments. The EU’s cohesion policy only has a significant impact if 
the national economic policy creates the appropriate environment. In 
addition, the success of economic policy depends on not only the 
government but also on the state of social capital and other social and 
institutional conditions. 
Despite these difficulties, efforts must be taken to maintain cohesion at 
the level of relevant policies because a certain degree of inequality leads to 
disintegration. Cohesion policy must remain an important tool to this end, 
a tool that reinforces a common European identity and a palpable 
manifestation of solidarity for the populations of cohesion countries that 
are already experiencing difficult times. Cohesion assistance should not be 
expected to be able to do anything more than dampen the effects of the 
unfavourable tendencies described above; it would be unrealistic to expect 
such assistance to bring about a reversal of these effects. 
The content of cohesion policy should be revised. At present, it focuses 
on the support of SMEs, although the real problem in the cohesion 
countries is the productivity gap between foreign and domestic companies 
that cannot be addressed with the division of companies into large firms 
and SMEs.4 
Considering all of these aspects, we cannot count on an economically 
and socially homogeneous area in the foreseeable future as the current 
integration concept does. To maintain a multi-speed integration will be the 
most important challenge for European integration. 
Acknowledgement 
The study was created within the framework of project No. TÁMOP-
4.2.1/B-09/1/KONV-2010-0005 “Establishment of a Research University 
Centre of Excellence at the University of Szeged” supported by the 
European Union and co-financed by the European Social Fund. 
                                                          
4 Gill and Raiser (2012) demonstrate how damaging it is for the Mediterranean 
economies that the business environment discourages their SMEs to grow. 
Mihályi’s study in this volume analyses the reasons why the Hungarian micro- and 
small enterprises are not able and/or are uninterested in becoming middle-size or 
large firms, which is one of the most important reasons for the deteriorating 
Hungarian economic performance over the last decade. 




Becker, T. and Daianu, D. and Darvas, Zs. and Gligorov, V. and 
Landesmann, M. and Petrovic, P. and Pisani-Ferry, J. and Rosati, D. 
and Sapir, A. and Weder Di Mauro, B. 2010. “Whither growth in 
central and eastern Europe? Policy lessons for an integrated Europe.” 
Bruegel Blueprint Series 11. Brussels: Bruegel. 
European Central Bank. 2010. “EU Banking Structures”. Frankfurt 
am Main: European Central Bank. 
European Commission. 2009a. “Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary. 
projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060).” European 
Economy 2009, 2. 
—. 2009b. “Five years of enlarged Europe.” European Economy 2009, 1.  
—. 2009c. “Economic Crisis in Europe.” European Economy 2009, 7.  
—. 2010a. “Cross-country study. Economic policy challenges in the 
Baltics.” European Economy. Occasional Papers 58. 
—. 2010b. “Surveillance of Intra-Euro-Area Competitiveness and 
Imbalances.” European Economy 2010, 1. 
—. 2011a. “Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010.” Research and Innovation 
Union scoreboard. 
—. 2011b. “The 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and 
Projection Methodologies.” European Economy 2011, 4. 
—. 2012. “Innovation Union Scoreboard 2012.” The Innovation Union's 
performance scoreboard. 
Gardó, S. and Martin, R. 2010. “The Impact of the Global Economic and 
Financial Crisis on Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. A 
Stock-taking Excercise.” European Central Bank, Occasional Paper 
Series 114. 
Farkas, B. 2012. “The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis in the Old 
and New Cohesion Member States of the European Union.” Public 
Finance Quarterly 57, 1: 53–70. 
Gligorov, V. and Holzner, M. and Landesmann, M. and Leitner, S. and 
Pindyuk, O. and Vidovic, H. et al. 2012. New Divide(s) in Europe? 
Wein: Wiener Institute für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche. 
Gill, I. and Raiser, M. 2012. Golden Growth. Restoring the Lustre of the 
European Economic Model. Washington: The World Bank. 
Gorodnichenko, Y. and Svejnar, J. and Terrell, K. 2007. “When Does FDI 
Have Positive Spillovers? Evidence from 17 Emerging Market 
Economies.” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, IZA DP no. 
3079, September. 
Beáta Farkas 151 
Hanousek, J. and Kočenda, E. and Maurek, M. 2010. “Direct and Indirect 
Effects of FDI in Emerging European Markets: A Survey and Meta-
analysis.” The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, WP 
no. 976, March.  
Jevčák, A. and Setzer, R. and Suardi, M. 2010. “Determinants of Capital 
Flows to the New EU Member States Before and During the Financial 
Crisis.” European Economy. Economic Papers 425.  
Kinsella, S. 2011. “Is Ireland really the role model for austerity?” 
University College Dublin, Geary WP2011/22.  
Kovács, Á. and Halmosi, P. 2012. “Similarities and Differences in 
European Crisis Management.” Public Finance Quarterly, 57, 1: 9–27. 
Mitsopoulos, M. and Pelagidis, T. 2011. Understanding the Crisis in 
Greece. From Boom to Bust. Hampshire-New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
OECD. 2009. OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland. Paris: OECD. 
Royo, S. 2010. “Portugal and Spain in the EU: paths of economic 
divergence (2000–2007).” Análise Social 45: 209–254. 
UNU-MERIT (United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and 
Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology). 
2009. European Innovation Scoreboard 2008.  
http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/european-innovation-scoreboard-2
008 
—. 2010. European Innovation Scoreboard 2009.  http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/page /european-innovation-scoreboard-2009 
Tajnikar, M. and Došenovič Bonča, P. and Ponikvar, N. and Pušnik, K. 
2011. Economic Crisis Exit by a Small EU Country. Challenges of 
Europe: Growth and Competitiveness – Reversing the Trends. 
University of Split, Split-Bol, 26–28th May, Conference Proceedings. 
Udvari, B. 2012. “A kelta tigris bukása: okok és következmények” [Fall of 
the Celtic Tiger – reasons and consequences]. In Válság és 
válságkezelés az Európai Unió kohéziós országaiban [Crisis and crisis 
management in the EU Cohesion Countries] edited by Farkas, B. and 
Voszka, É. and Mező, J., 9–24. Szeged: University of Szeged, Faculty 
of Economics and Business Administration, Discussion Papers MT-
PNGKI – 2012/1. 
 
 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT SIMILARITIES  
AND DIFFERENCES IN THE NEWLY ACCESSED 








One of the cornerstones of the analysis of the economic crisis that 
began in 2008 is the analysis and evaluation of the different crisis 
management methods employed by the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Several researchers have been addressing the problems of the 
crisis.1 However, most of these analyses are focusing on the antecedents 
and symptoms of the crisis, on the ways out via individual economic 
policies.2 Focusing on budgets and public finances, the present monograph 
examines the similarities and differences of the crisis management 
practices employed by those Central and Eastern European countries that 
accessed the European Union between 2004 and 2007 and that were 
formerly “socialist” with a so-called planned economy (the EU-10) in 
comparison to each other and to the European “core-countries.” We are 
                                                          
1 This monograph is focusing on these countries because the historical and 
economic positions of the two Mediterranean countries that accessed the EU at the 
same time belong to different geopolitical groups – according to the categorisation 
used in the EU – when compared to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia that, after World War II, 
belonged to the same political and economic block and shared a similar fate; 
despite a number of similarities, Slovenia can be put into the category of the 
“socialist block”, with certain distinctions regarding its development course and 
inherited traditions. 
2 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. announced the greatest bankruptcy of economic 
history on September 15, 2008. Usually, this date is considered as the eruption of 
the crisis of the financial mediator systems. 
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presenting the fiscal policy steps that governments took by sorting them 
into so-called “action matrices.”3 
The “matrices” that sum up the characteristics of measures introduced 
at the eruption of the 2008 crisis and in 2010 and 2011 make the life cycles 
of the various measures traceable, whereas the analysis of the 
“condensation” of identities and differences helps to identify the 
characteristics of the different socio-economic traditions, public finance 
policies and governance models.  
Our attempt is not merely to present the trends of the identities and 
differences of the crisis management by using the methods referred to in 
the literature review and sorted according to EU categorisations; we also 
attempt to analyse to what extent the crisis management of the Central and 
Eastern European countries that accessed the EU later, 
 
• had a solid, theoretical grounding; 
• proved to be pro-active and preventive; 
• assisted in the re-structuring of social and economic services and 
the efficient operation of the large entitlement systems; and 
• provided a solid, harmonised regulatory and governance framework. 
 
In our conclusions, we are seeking to answer how, to what extent, and 
how separately, the crisis management by the Central and Eastern 
European countries has contributed to the stability of public finances, and 
whether the chosen solutions will be able to offer a sustainable, new 
development perspective by vitalising the economy or whether they will 
merely offer short-term relief. We tried to answer the question whether the 
crisis-related problems, by causing serious instability in certain countries, 
will deepen to the extent that they might endanger the sustainability of the 
European integration. 
2. The trend in public debt in the EU countries  
and in the EU-10 
The literature review on the topic shows that researchers agree that the 
financial crisis and the contraction of the economic performance have 
created a difficult situation regarding the sustainability of fiscal policies in 
every country of the European Union. Additionally, to a different extent in 
the different countries, new problems have emerged that can be traced 
                                                          
3 We are only summarising literature from the second half of 2011, ignoring the 
tabular, comparative summary of the measures taken (European Institute 2011). 
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back to the persistent imbalance of performance and consumption, the 
issues that have not been addressed for a long time, and structural 
deficiencies. With the crisis, these issues have become more exposed, and 
they show the constraints of public financing.4 
The performance of the economy and the extent of public financing, 
namely its functioning and the efficiency of the allocation of coherent 
expenditures and their structure will, always and in every country, 
mutually determine each other. Figures 8-1/a/b/c and 8-2 show the 




Fig. 8-1/a The amount and internal distribution of public expenditures in 2000 by 
country and EU-15 and EU-10 average, gross sum, in % of the GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
                                                          
4 Naturally, the articulation of the individual measures required simplifications and 
contractions that are based on focal points from the literature review. We are also 
aware that even a classification that considers most factors can only be accidental 
and that assigning other limits or categorisation would also be possible; it is also 
possible to believe that certain measures (“packages”) are “independent” from the 
crisis and “merely” reflect the “general” modernisation intention prevailing within 
public finance. 
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Fig. 8-1/b The amount and internal distribution of public expenditures in 2007 by 





Fig. 8-1/c The amount and internal distribution of public expenditures in 2011 by 
country and EU-15 and EU-10 average, expenditure gross sum in % of the GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
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Fig. 8-2 Public revenues, expenditures, and deficit trends in the EU-15 and EU-10 
countries, in % of the GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As shown in Figure 8-2, the countries most affected by the crisis, the 
outdated structure of public expenditures and, most importantly, their 
unsustainable growth, played significant roles in the escalation of financial 
problems and the debt crisis (OECD 2010 and Inotai 2011). The 
transformation endeavours (modernisation, efficiency improvements) and 
the structural reforms that occurred in various short or long-term national 
government programmes have not resulted in radical changes. The ensuing 
and mostly campaign-like steps led to only a few and very different results 
in the different countries. However, it is worth analysing the reasons for 
the lack of significant results in more detail.  
When comparing the average financing ratios of Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia 
and Slovakia (EU-10) with those of the EU-15 group consisting of the 
former EU, it is notable that there are no significant differences in the 
various public finance structures that would determine the sustainability of 
the financing. Additionally, we should note that the sustainability of the 
more developed, yet similarly outdated social entitlement systems of the 
Baltic states, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, i.e., the majority of 
the later accessing European countries, requires less sacrifices than in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. The public finance structure in the 
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examined EU-10 group, partly due to the entitlements from the 
“socialistic” heritage, is rather rigid, and changing it significantly would 
require an emergency situation or the support of the society. The public 
finance structure has advanced, or rather inched forward, by changes 
affecting the total functioning of the state. In turn, social demand tends to 
result in over-consumption, inefficient but “familiar” social services, and 
qualitative improvements, not paying attention to the fact that the outdated 
financing system is leading to a path of deficits (Fig. 8-2); prior to the 
crisis, the individual countries have followed this path that they were 




Fig. 8-3 Trend of indebtedness in proportion to the GDP in the EU-10 and 
Northern, Western and Southern European countries (2000–2011) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Due to the earlier evolving and deepening “financing gap,” the crisis 
affected the Central and Eastern European countries at the peripheries 
much more than the countries of Northern and Western Europe. In the first 
phase of the crisis, the situations of the EU-10 countries were in many 
aspects similar, as shown in Figure 8-3, before a relative improvement of 
the positions started. However, there were stability problems in the EU-10 
as well as in the Southern European countries, where governments have 
been financing social services that lagged far behind the performance of 
the real economy in respect to their structure, scope and quality 
(Csaba 2010). According to different authors, the present Euro crisis is 
first of all a budgetary and public debt crisis or, in other words, a sovereign 
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debt crisis, but one that affects only certain (southern) countries of the 
euro zone (Carmoy and Combes 2011 and Palánkai 2011). 
From the above, it can be concluded that, as a consequence of the 
convergence5 of basic social rights and demands, the welfare systems and 
institutional and entitlement models of the European Union countries are 
showing a number of similarities. At the same time, regarding the 
financing of these similar solutions, the differences were significant even 
prior to the crisis. Now, in light of the crisis – as we will show when 
discussing the crisis management measures – the different approaches that 
were directly related to the size of public finance, the structure of services 
financed by the public finance, the technical implementation of the 
entitlements and their sustainable financing and, thus, a given country’s 
inclination for crisis6 are called into question (Kovács 2011a and 
Muraközi 2012). 
When comparing the GDP proportionate budget deficit of the EU-27 in 
2009 to the pre-crisis years, it has nearly tripled to 6.8%, and the same 
development occurred in the Euro zone: the GDP proportionate budget 
deficit reached 6.3%. Budget surpluses disappeared in all countries, and 
only Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg and Sweden 
performed below the 3% deficit threshold. The deficit level was 
approximately average in countries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
                                                          
5 In the second decade of the 21st century there are four interlinked and 
consequential challenges seeking answers (Muraközy 2012). Namely: 
1. the lack of optimal-sized and affordable public services may result in 
losses that could 
2. make it difficult to keep up in the competition of social models and the 
global economy. This challenge, in the coming decades, will be coupled with 
3. changing demographic situations and, in a number of European 
countries, including Hungary, borrowing as a result of the postponement of 
reforms; social consumption that could not be financed from domestic resources 
and that was in no relation to the economic performance of the country resulted in 
the ensuing, differentiated 
4. debt crisis that caused serious burdens making recovery difficult not only 
among those countries directly affected, but also within the risk-sharing 
community of the European Union (Cipriani 2010). 
Among those challenges, in the coming decades, the management of the crisis and 
the challenges caused by demographic trends will receive most attention. Thus, it 
is not possible to employ action scenarios reflecting the traditional economic 
literature that emphasises economic development while maintaining social 
cohesion. 
6 Here we can refer to various norms, guidelines, and charters, but also to the fact 
that the Union identifies itself as a market economy, which is reflected, in different 
forms or wording, in the fundamental laws of the individual countries. 
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Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. With a 4.4% deficit, Hungary’s situation 
can be considered better than average.7 By 2009, the budget deficit of 
several countries was near to or even higher than 10%, which can be 
considered a crisis level. Among the Euro zone countries, Greece, with a 
deficit of 15.4%, Ireland (14.4%), Spain (11.1%) and Portugal (9.2%) 
were in such a crisis situation. Similarly, high deficits were observed in the 
United Kingdom (11.4%) and, among the examined Central and Eastern 





Fig. 8-4 Debt map of the European Union 
Source: MNB data 
 
The budget crisis continued in 2010–2011, and the average deficit of 
the EU-27 kept rising to 7.2%. In 2011, it was solely Sweden that 
produced a budget surplus (0.9%). The success of public finance 
stabilisation in seven countries, including three of the group of examined 
countries (Bulgaria, Germany and Hungary), that were able to reduce or 
stabilise their respective deficits in 2011 is conspicuous. Portugal (5.9%) 
as well as France, Poland and Slovenia (all 5.8%) had significant deficits. 
                                                          
7 Obviously, maintaining welfare and education systems with identical efficiency, 
scope, quality and availability essentially requires identical expenditures, whether 
they are financed by taxes, centralised redistribution or citizen’s income. Real 
differences are extorted by the differences of the economic performance. 
Crisis Management in the Newly Accessed European Countries  160
Ireland (10.5%), Greece (9.5%), the United Kingdom (8.6%) and Spain 
(6.3%) were facing a grave situation.  
According to forecasts, the majority of the EU countries will be 
successful in significantly decreasing their budget deficits. Among the 
Central and Eastern European countries, a deficit surpassing the 3% limit 
can be expected in Poland and Slovakia. Their trends, however, indicate 
that the stabilisation results will approach those of the so-called core 
countries of the euro zone. None of the EU-10 countries belongs to the 
lagging Mediterranean group, although, concerning the sustainability of 
stability, as can be seen in the trend prognosis of economic growth and 
investments in Figure 8-5/a-b, they are in different positions. The level of 
their respective deficits can be attributed to one-time effects (e.g., 
in Hungary), to the curtailment of services without structural 
transformation (e.g., in Romania), or to the invariability of the inherited 
low level (e.g., Slovakia, the Baltic states, Romania). 
When searching for the causes of the growing national debt in the 
period of 2007–2011 (Fig. 8-6), concerning the EU-10, we can find several 
reasons. In the case of Romania and Poland, the 14.8% growth of national 
debt compared to the GDP can be explained entirely by the deterioration 
of the primary balance of the central budget, whereas, in the case of the 
Czech Republic, 13.7% of the 14.6% growth can be explained via that 
same reason. In the case of Lithuania, approximately half of the national 
debt deterioration can be explained by the deterioration of the primary 
balance. At the same time, in Hungary, the significant deterioration of the 
interest rate conditions for financing, the drop in the economic 
performance and the lagging speed of cost cuts8 were also responsible for 
the growing national debt. In the remaining countries, a variety of other 
causes for debt deterioration were found. All these causes show that 
without a transformation of public finance structures, it would be difficult 
to achieve sustainable financing. However, as shown in Figures 8-1/a-c, 
only moderate results were achieved in this field. 
 
                                                          
8 Most scholars accepted the favourable Hungarian deficit indicators because they 
were realised by using the share of the private pension fund above HUF 500 billion 
and by using other, non-recurring measures. At present, there are no rules concerning 
the structural balance. The Maastricht criteria merely state that the deficit cannot be 
higher than 3% of the GDP. There is a significant difference between the Maastricht 
deficit and a “structural deficit.” Namely, the latter has to be adjusted by the so-called 
cyclical and non-recurring items; in our case, this would mean a 6–7% deficit. 
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Fig. 8-5/a Expected trend of GDP growth, investments and budget deficits in 2012 
Source: European Commission (2011) 
 
 
Fig. 8-5/b Forecast of the GDP growth, investments and budget deficits in 2013, in 
% of the GDP 
Source: European Commission (2011) 
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Fig. 8-6 Public finance deficit and public debt in the EU in 20129, in % of the GDP 
Source: European Commission (2011) and GKI Economic Research Co.  
Note: The lines within the diagram show the so-called Maastricht criteria. 
 
Declining investments observed in indebted countries lead to a lasting 
decline in growth, which also cannot be compensated by the low level of 
domestic demand. The chances of recovery from the crisis look 
particularly gloomy in countries where the debt service for the previously 
accumulated deficit, despite some successful corrections and even with a 
positive budget, is so high that following the implementation of current 
financing restrictions, there is not enough money, and investments in 
infrastructure developments keep being postponed (see, for example, 
Hungary). This development, in turn, will reduce the chances for growth, 
even in the short run. 
                                                          
9 “Reflexivity” is a concept promoted by George Soros. In his opinion, the balance 
of the market is the result of the continuous interaction of the subjective decisions 
by the actors of the market and the fundamentals of the market; thus, he rejects the 
theoretical principle that had been tacitly accepted in the course of the governance 
of the international financial system, according to which money markets are 
always aiming at a balanced position. During the crisis, investors and market 
analysers have exposed themselves as commentators serving their own interests 
and striving for influence in the processes. The world economy has been drifting 
and cannot provide an answer to the emerging social issues yet. At the same time, 
the whole European economy governing system is quietly moving towards 
centralisation and protection under the slogan of “let’s save what can be saved.” 
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Financing is influenced by the bankruptcy risk rating of the given 
country and by the costs of the external borrowing operations, the so-
called credit default swap (CDS) premiums.10 CDS premiums prevail via 
the strong fluctuation of securities market yields, and deviations are a sign 
of the fluctuating level of trust in the government policy of the given 
country. Figure 8-7 shows the aggregated, mutual effects of the securities 
market yields and political events11 (European Commission 2011 and 




Fig. 8-7 Security markets yields of the EU-10 countries and decisive political 
events and economic initiatives 
Source: Eurostat, OTP, own compilation 
                                                          
10 Naturally, even the possibilities of decreasing expenditures cannot be final, and 
the transformation of the public finance structure, in the beginning, tends to show 
growing expenditures. An analysis of these social connections (action brakes in 
governance), and budgetary policy is beyond the scope of this article. 
11 At the beginning of January 2012, the Hungarian Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
rate was 670 basis points, compared to 255 at the beginning of summer in 2011. In 
March 2009, at the time of the expansion of the global financial crisis following 
the collapse of the large American bank Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008, and 
when Hungary was near bankruptcy, the CDS rate was 630 basis points. 
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3. Matrices of fiscal interventions and the ensuing 
consequences 
Shortly after the eruption of the Greek crisis, a number of leading 
economists called attention to the lack of economic policy harmonisation 
and the “softness” of the Stability and Growth Pact (Boefinger and 
Ried 2010). This situation implied that the member states would manage 
the effects of the economic crisis individually, which is what actually 
happened. Obviously, this led to a “mix of action scenarios” marked by 
significant randomness, instead of a scenario built on economic, social and 
political research. However, this approach also included some decisive 
elements that are prevailing in the long run. 
The employed solutions included a mixture of taxations, cost reductions, 
service cuts, restrictions, consumption reductions and economic stimulus. 
However, the proportions, timing or dosage were different, depending on 
the size of the given country, its economic strength, indebtedness, social 
traditions, feasibility or the preferences of the respective government. 
Obviously, the results were also different. The same solutions, for example 
the introduction of a modest income tax, in some countries led to an 
increase in domestic savings, whereas in other countries those were 
depleted or transferred abroad (Haan et al. 2002). 
The time that has passed since the eruption of the crisis can be divided 
into two phases: From 2008-2010, the first economic and political 
reactions indicated fundamentally similar situations in the individual 
countries. Regarding crisis management, maintaining the viability of the 
financial intermediary system was considered most important, followed by 
preventing economic decline. To this end, governments, if there was 
money for such measures, also tried to use appropriated stimulus funds. 
The EU-10 countries, however, did not have resources for the broad 
implementation of such solutions. 
The deepening of the crisis from 2010 onward led to the renewal of 
crisis management strategies, including the employed solutions. Trying to 
identify the fundamental, stable characteristics of the EU-27 crisis 
management and the differences of the two crisis phases, we can find them 
in the following 7 areas: 
 
• the prevailing reduction of public finance expenditures 
(restrictions) in both phases (in 2008–2010 and in 2011); 
• the general growth of taxes, duties and levies of contributions that 
can be found in both phases (2008–2010 and 2011); 
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• the interventions into the economy, primarily into the labour 
market, that prevailed in both phases (2008–2010 and 2011); 
• the selective reduction of taxes, duties and levies of contributions 
targeted at specific fields, characteristic primarily in the first phase 
(2008–2010); 
• individual bank rescue operations in the first phase (2008–2010); 
• changes to the operational rules, institutional systems and structures 
of public finance that generally prevailed in the first phase12 
(2008–2010), and 
• special taxes targeted at the financial sector, characteristic in the 
second phase of crisis management (2011). 
 
                                                          
12 A survey conducted by the European Committee in 2009 and encompassing 21 
member states emphasised the following (European Commission 2010b): 
• Among the countries that responded to the questionnaire, 19 often 
resorted to employing budgetary procedures as fiscal means that included the 
general curtailment of expenditures, building up bigger reserves and 
differentiated structural transformations.  
• 13 countries introduced new, numeric fiscal rules; 13 countries reported 
new fiscal frameworks.  
• In the given period, increasing transparency and the employment of the 
programs and the transformation of the budget process were characteristic. 
• Strengthening fiscal discipline (e.g., budget centralisation, top-down 
budget) scarcely emerged.  
• From among the 21 countries that responded, 19 introduced new fiscal 
rules, whereas 2 transformed the existing rules.  
• 8 new regulations were dealing with restricting the growth of 
expenditures, 6 were dealing with balanced budgets, and 5 focused on the debt 
level.  
• In the field of medium-term financial planning, ten countries witnessed 
both the transformation of the existing rules and the introduction of new 
regulations.  
• 3 countries introduced as a first step medium-term financial planning 
systems as means of emerging from the crisis; therefore, 25 EU member states 
have such systems. 
• Although several countries introduced new fiscal rules, the Council’s 
recommendations have not been largely reflected yet; progress has been 
reported only in 7 cases.  
Regarding this issue, the opinion of the European Committee is that 
additional/complementary fiscal incentives and initiatives are necessary. Fiscal 
regulations appeared strong enough only in 5 countries, which could lead to the 
conclusion that as long as the old structure can be financed, countries keep 
postponing the structural reform of public finance. 
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Additional measures are showing a rather mixed picture. The concerned 
countries regarded strengthening the monitoring of financial and economic 
processes, establishing supranational controlling and coordinating 
institutions, and the operation of these institutions as part of an early 
warning system as the best tools to prevent unexpected situations. The 
establishment of such a system, however, has been proceeding slowly and 
accompanied by debates (Moser 2011). At the same time, new advisory 
institutions with a specific control function have been formed, such as 
fiscal councils. By 2008, no such institution had been established among 
the EU-10 countries, but Hungary and Slovenia in 2009, Romania in 2010, 
and Slovakia in 2012 set up independent fiscal councils. 
With the exception of Hungary, the intensive phase of crisis 
management in the EU-10 countries, not unlike in the Northern and 
Western parts of the EU, occurred in the years 2008–2009. In the 
Mediterranean countries, the indecisiveness concerning interventions 
resulted in the escalation of the crisis.  
Considering the reasons and the feasibility of the intermediary 
“solutions” included in the “action scenario matrices,” they are related to 
the public finance balance, the production and welfare systems and the 
size of the challenge. Obviously, governmental action is more “activist”, 
both in terms of measure and expansion, in situations where the structural 
transformation of the welfare system made the decrease of public finance 
expenditures and their structural transformation more urgent. 
Naturally, the conditionalities (e.g., social, stability, political, economic, 
public administration) of similar mixes of action scenarios differ; thus, the 
mechanisms are also different from country to country. In other words, 
identical or very similar prescriptions and “dosages” of solutions or 
techniques might lead to different results.13 As such, it is difficult to draw 
generalised conclusions. However, even within the outlined limits, we can 
note that regarding the depth of the problems and crisis management 
activities it would be impossible to state that there is a significant 
relationship between a country’s size of public finance, its financing, and 
the inclination for a crisis. Considering the successful crisis management, 
                                                          
13 Answering these questions, namely why similar public finance governing and 
crisis solutions lead to different results in different EU countries, is beyond the 
limits of the present study; identifying the limits of creating a model in this respect 
would require additional research, involving many aspects of social studies such as 
the history of law, traditions, analysis of political, governance and management 
traditions as well as national characters. 
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or rather the absence of a crisis, in Slovenia,14 the Northern European 
countries and the examined Central and Eastern European block of 
countries and considering the significant expansion of these countries’ 
social services, we can conclude that the question is not in what model 
(type of state participation) entitlement systems can function, but whether 
they are functioning efficiently and whether their financing is in harmony 
with the performance of the economy. 
Comparing the matrices, it was clear that tax reductions were 
implemented as a stimulus for certain productive industries. Also, special 
taxes were introduced as part of a general increase in tax burdens. The 
introduction of special taxes (solidarity taxes) and tax exemptions in 
Hungary has not been a unique phenomenon in the course of crisis 
management. The extent (e.g., the significant reduction of personal income 
taxes and corporate taxes), the broad variety of implementation tools, and 
the fragmented nature of the tax system itself, were significantly different 
and more complicated.15 Regarding bank taxes, it is important to note that 
the concept itself has been used not only in countries belonging to the euro 
zone (Austria, France, Germany), but also in Hungary, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. At the same time, regarding the performance of the 
banking system, size indicators and the gross sum of revenues of the public 
finances of the countries that reported a resource surplus (and partial 
correction of the division of burdens) to ensure a balanced budget, the 
solution employed in Hungary was incomparably more radical then the 
measures introduced in other countries and of a magnitude that might 
endanger the financing activity of the banking system and, also, economic 
growth.16 
                                                          
14 Contradictory information has been published about Slovenia recently, stating 
that it had accumulated many problems, that the economy was overheated prior to 
the crisis and that the current correction is belated; this information might imply 
the revaluation of the country’s role as a “star pupil.” 
15 Now, by making the conditionality of collection even harder, the trend of 
budgetary revenues is becoming disadvantageous, whereas leaving more income 
with the targeted section of the population – the so-called middle-class – did not 
result in significant saving surpluses, partly due to the decreasing of heavy 
indebtedness, partly due to lack of trust. 
16In the period of 2008-2011 – with the exception of bank consolidating actions – 
Hungary tried almost every step of fiscal policy, which, in some cases, represented 
the opposite of existing policies, administering major changes that resulted in 
shocks to the system. It was also obvious that, especially in an unstable 
environment, repeatedly opting for creative, non-orthodox solutions that had not 
been tried before and that were scarcely paying attention to the harmonisation of 
different interests had a higher risk of achieving the desired results. First, because 
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4. First phase of crisis management in the EU-10 
countries: 2008–2010 
Looking at the reaction to activities during the first phase, we can see 
that government rhetoric was emphasising the decreasing of the burdens of 
the real economy as well as the launching of economic development in the 
EU-10 countries (Table 8-1). However, the actions themselves were not 
consistent, partly due to a lack of resources and due to political 
fluctuations. Revenue concentration generally became more moderate. The 
dynamics of the welfare expenses of public finance have generally 
dwindled; occasionally, countries spent less on such expenses, also in 
absolute numbers. The general assumption was that even with an increase 
– in contrast to a selective reduction – of corporate taxes, more would 
remain for development and to support innovations indispensable for 
growth. However, this assumption applied only to the Baltic States and 
Poland, who are closest to the group of the Northern countries.17 
It is understandable that in every crisis where jobs are eliminated, the 
state tries actively to boost employment and offers support and training; 
thus, various labour-market programmes could be observed. One of the 
significant steps of the crisis management was a major decrease in, or even 
the elimination of, such “benefits” due to their welfare character, which 
lowered the labour-market participation of individuals. However, in 2009  
                                                                                                                         
the institutional system was bearing the burden and the responsibility of the 
international crisis management fearing the possible spreading of such 
“innovations” that might tear up cooperation, it was distrustful and ready to 
implement sanctions. Second, the rapidly changing conditions themselves pose a 
risk to feasibility. Creative ideas, if not tested for feasibility, sooner or later might 
become counter-productive and (might) lead to a diversion from the chosen 
scenario or make the goal unachievable, together with all the social and economic 
consequences. 
17 When experiencing the first signs of the crisis, the government of Lithuania 
made several, impressive promises, which included a whole range of measures: 
decreasing the salaries of senior officials and public servants, with the exception of 
teachers, increasing the value added tax, launching of employment protection 
programmes, and more (Hawkesworth et al. 2010). The government used the 
majority of the saved money for innovations and education because it considered 
these fields to be one of the most important engines of growth. As a 
counterexample, we can mention the case of the Czech Republic where, despite the 
increase of certain tax revenues (VAT, consumption taxes), the government did not 
pay much attention to supporting innovations and education; on the contrary, the 
amount of money spent on such purposes has decreased significantly (Hrdlicka et 
al. 2010). 
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and 2010, the incentive programmes started to get “exhausted” as a 
consequence of the restrictions of the fiscal leeway (European Commission 
2010a). The ineffective labour-market interventions, however, have not 
adequately recognised the dynamics of the deepening crisis and its effects 
on the structural transformation of the labour market. However, short-term 
governmental interests in maintaining social peace have also contributed 
to the contradictory character of the activities.18 
 
5. Characteristics of the second phase of crisis 
management 
 
The analysis showed that in the gripping global crisis, due to a lack of 
balance in world markets, earlier stimulus activities were not able to 
generate substantive growth. Thus, the effects of implemented measures 
have usually “lagged” behind the events, and stimulating the economy 
with public finance resources has also resulted in a transfer of market risks 
to the public sector. Therefore, after a certain period, when governments 
kept balancing public finances with new restrictions, the lessening of the 
burdens of the real sector was not able to boost growth in the real 
economy. Most countries that implemented economic stimulus measures 
saw their GDP deficit grow by 0.1-0.5%, which explains the complete 
disappearance of this solution from the crisis management toolbox 
(European Commission 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011). 
                                                          
18 Decreasing the various burdens of employees and employers represents an 
important measure to protect jobs. We find frequent examples illustrating this 
statement in the crisis management strategies of the countries addressed earlier: the 
wide-range measures taken in Slovakia included the partial or full overtaking of 
health insurance and pension contributions, the support of flexible working hours, 
the supervision of laws governing employment, and the saving of building 
construction jobs by government orders (Bucek 2010). In a similar way, Slovenia 
also spent a significant amount on protecting work places, on mitigating the effects 
of the crisis on businesses, as well as on increasing innovation and education 
expenses, similar to the above-mentioned case of the Baltic states (Beynet and 
Leibfritz 2009). In this respect, Poland has not been an exception either; as in the 
years prior to the crisis, it worked toward sustaining the domestic market and 
supporting the significant entrepreneurial layer of the society. This effort was 
manifested in the support of flexible working hours or the partial or full taking 
over of various contributions (Reichardt 2011). Drawing EU support in euros 
offered partial coverage to facilitate these actions; the favourably low exchange 
rate of the national currency as well as revenues from an increasing VAT have also 
served these purposes (Csomós 2011). 
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Within the EU member states, with the exception of Romania, Hungary 
and the Mediterranean countries that had been unable to solve the crisis, 
the crisis management in the period of 2010–2011 moved away from 
wide-range activities and indirect interventions targeted at public finance 
towards more reserved governmental activities. 
The EU-10 countries were also able to consolidate their situations; 
contrary to earlier steps, they employed mostly 2–3 crisis management 
measures that typically have been restricted to the field of energy or 
general consumption taxes. At the same time, budgetary austerity 
measures and the protection of the labour market invariably prevailed. 
Estonia introduced exemplary restrictions as a result of its rapid growth 
after 2010. 
The characteristic feature of the EU-10 crisis management was that, 
although with a delay compared to the Northern and Western countries of 
the EU, it also resorted to deficit reduction. Among the latter group of 
countries, this approach was more characteristic in the first period of the 
crisis, and both the efficiency and magnitude have been more favourable. 
However, while savings and restrictive measures contribute to the 
reduction of national debt, without additional, balancing steps such 
measures involved the risk of entering a downward spiral of increasing 
recession. 
Budgetary measures impact fiscal sustainability through several 
channels: primarily, they affect the balance, followed by growth effects 
and long-term growth effects resulting from the increased trust of 
investors. In this respect, the ability to reach a consensus to introduce 
measures, and the consistency and predictability of these measures are 
important. In this respect, the Central and Eastern European countries 
followed a course that reflected a rather mixed picture, and the 
governments considered a lack of trust mostly as their heritage (Table 8-2). 
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6. Conclusions 
The present crisis is a mix of problems with global, regional and 
national origins, reflecting that all three components can be attributed to 
the fact that institutional systems were not able to keep up with the 
changes in the economy. The multifaceted character of the European 
Union, mostly as a result of the expansion of the organisation to the South 
and the East, has become more pronounced. This fact is expressed in 
differences such as level of development, economic and social structures, 
traditions and values, which are all connected to the present European 
crisis by intricate links; therefore, the solution to the crisis does not depend 
solely on new institutions and policies (Kiss 2011). 
Regarding the question of whether identities or differences were more 
dominant, we can state that with respect to the employed solutions, 
identities were more dominant than differences, also in the case of the 
later accessed Central and Eastern European countries. Differences have 
been present mostly around measures of interventions, the number of 
intervention areas, methods resorting to more “activist” interventions, 
individual solutions or more normative, careful approaches. 
At the eruption of the crisis in 2008 and in 2009, EU countries with 
reserves and resources opted for Keynesian, demand-oriented, anti-
cyclical economic policies that contributed to the growth of indebtedness, 
made debt financing more expensive, and resulted in growing budget 
shortfalls. 
One consensus on the issue is that inadequate management was one of 
the major reasons for the deepening of the crisis. These days, it seems that 
decision-making based on socio-economic research is absent at the level of 
governmental, global and regional institutions. The conceptual and 
strategic handling of the problems is missing in the “Mediterranean” and 
“Continental” group of EU member states.19 Mutually exclusive steps can 
often be observed, but such solutions reinforce rather than solve the crisis 
in the long run. Sustainable growth and monetary stability is not possible 
without the coherent implementation of reforms concerning the structure 
of public finance (Kovács 2011b). The definition of public tasks is a 
fundamental and conceptual issue, which is necessary on both national and 
EU levels. Budgetary savings should also be “sustainable” and have long-
term effects. 
                                                          
19 “Public finance expenditure overruns” is a relative concept: it shows to what 
extent governance is able to continuously maintain harmony between the available 
sources and the financed services to ensure the prevailing of social cohesion, either 
by meeting the growing social demand or not. 
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EU membership offered a certain (limited) protection against the 
direct, short-term consequences of the crisis. The imperfection of the 
integration framework has negatively influenced crisis management, 
which was not institutionalised (Carmoy and Combes 2011). The EU-27 
countries and the EU itself, as observed, have not been able to employ a 
preventive, proactive and theoretically well-founded crisis management. 
However, by 2012, the EU was mostly able to stabilise its position and, for 
the time being, show solidarity with countries that are in trouble and 
unable to renew their social and economic models or that are still 
struggling with the debt trap.20 The measures taken served the 
sustainability of the social and economic functioning on the EU level, and 
the chance remained that efficiency improvements and new growth would 
become reality, not only for certain groups of EU members but also for the 
whole union. 
Instead of welfare redistribution, sharing of risks and burdens were the 
characteristic features. Today, regarding the EU countries – with 
significant simplifications – two groups can be observed: one group 
consists of those countries that had been able to stabilise their respective 
positions with the help of strict restrictions, whereas the other group 
contains those countries that are either bankrupt or on the brink of 
bankruptcy due to the late introduction of correction measures or the lack 
of social-political conditions for the implementation of restrictions. 
The examined EU-10 countries belong more to the former group of 
countries that were able to stabilise their situations by resorting to strict 
fiscal restrictions, even though to a different degree and with different 
chances; they showed specific reactions related to government changes, 
followed occasional detours and used action scenario mixes that, in some 
cases, contained counterproductive elements. The chances of the EU-10 
regarding catching up have improved. The crisis had painted a gloomy 
picture, based on earlier experiences, in respect to the “outer circle” or a 
                                                          
20 The countries that received assistance were, in turn, former members of the EU. 
Unfortunately, there is little literature on what roles the dictate of political and 
economic interests have played in the enforcement of the common risks or to what 
extent considerations that focused on the development of the EU have influenced 
the decisions. Under these circumstances, it is a significant result that – for the 
time being – none of the new member states received assistance; although, this 
could also be explained by the relative low level of social services. In the case of 
Latvia and Romania, a financial safety net worth €1.7, respectively €12 billion was 
set up in 2009. Besides Hungary, Romania is currently also negotiating with 
international financial institutions and organisations on setting up a similar safety 
net worth €15 billion. In exchange, it will likely commit to the establishment of a 
system of responsible and sustainable budgetary processes (IMF 2009a, 2009b). 
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two-speed development (Farkas 2009). This group of countries has 
integrated more into the “core Europe” and the internal markets of the EU. 
The work force in those countries is well trained, and the legal 
environment for investments is mostly adequate. Poland, the Baltic States, 
Slovenia and, partly, due to geo-political reasons, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia are closer to the core; Hungary, due to the market integration and, 
lately, the reduction and maintenance of a lower budget shortfall, belongs 
also to the circle of the “Northern and Western Group” of the EU. 
Hungary, however, has not yet entered the road to consolidation regarding 
the predictability and functioning of its institutional systems or the steady 
financing of the public finance system. Regarding investments with a 
significant effect on growth, Hungary is lagging behind. As a 
consequence, the chance of Hungary catching up is closer to Romania and 
Bulgaria, which are two countries with very favourable indebtedness 
indicators.  
The conditions of the crisis made it obvious that maintaining public 
finance stability, boosting the economy and achieving sustainable 
development do not depend on the “appropriate mix or dosage” of 
economic rationalisations, which includes not only the taxation of 
restrictive and “relaxing” measures but also external and internal social 
adaptabilities, so-called quality adaptabilities, that cannot be quantified. 
Great self-discipline, restraint, patience and consensus seeking are 
required to ensure that endeavours to adjust to the changes are not 
distracted by the reflex to intervene immediately, resulting in improvised 
solutions. It is impossible to realise sound objectives if the tools are 
inappropriate, contradict each other, are unacceptable in the given socio-
economic environment, or do not reflect economic realities. At the same 
time, the decision on what is unfeasible, futile and destabilising, and what 
is right, will improve safety, and create sustainable value, is impacted by 
constant changes and balance-related problems, which, in today’s Europe, 
represent the greatest challenge. 
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THE ADEQUACY OF INFLATION-TARGETING 
MONETARY POLICY AND EURO ZONE 
PARTICIPATION  
FOR THE CENTRAL-EAST EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
GÁBOR DÁVID KISS  






Currently, the central banks of European nations with market 
economies have the primary statutory objective of achieving and 
maintaining price stability. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish national 
banks have already introduced inflation targeting, because these countries 
are European Union membership candidates, but they did not introduce the 
euro after their EU accession in 2004, despite it being a future obligation 
for them. These Central-East European countries have a unique style of 
capitalism, characterised by underdeveloped capital markets, poor savings 
accumulation and over-concentrated banking systems (Farkas 2011), 
resulting in substantial capital imports that accelerated the domestic credit 
booms in the pre-crisis era (Kovács 2009, Árvai et al. 2009).  
This paper aims to analyse the liquidity sensible environment that has 
defined the range of monetary policy decisions in the selected Central-East 
European member states over the last decade, using bond and currency 
markets as indicators and stock markets as control variables. First, it is 
necessary to define the monetary policy frameworks of these states and 
describe the expected potential impacts of these policies on, and 
assumptions regarding, capital markets. Second, it is necessary to analyse 
how these expectations measured against the experiences of the countries 
over the last decade. This study applies a method for examining the 
efficiency of capital markets and identifies different forms of collective 
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behaviours, such as contagion, divergence or interdependence; these 
phenomena influence the range of available monetary policy decisions.  
Following these results, it is necessary to evaluate how inflation 
targeting supports future euro adoption by answering these questions: 
 
1. Is there any convergence between the capital markets of the euro 
zone and the selected countries, as required by the Maastricht 
criteria1? 
2. Are the national banks in the selected countries able to address 
financial market crises alone? 
2. Theoretical background 
This chapter summarises the frameworks, expectations and 
assumptions regarding capital markets and their interactions with inflation-
targeting monetary policies, before defining the different forms of 
collective behaviours in capital markets. 
2.1. Capital markets and inflation-targeting frameworks 
Inflation-targeting monetary policy could be defined as a monetary 
framework that comprises the following four properties: (1) the goal of 
price stability, (2) an announced numerical or sequential inflation target 
within a given time period, (3) inflation-forecast targeting (Svenson 1997), 
and (4) high levels of transparency and accountability (Hamori and 
Hamori 2010). O’Sullivan and Tomljankovich (2012) summarise the 
primary benefits attributed to this approach in the literature as follows: 
substantial declines in inflation and output growth volatility in emerging 
economies reduces the probability of banking crises and noise in bond 
markets. The expected noise reduction became significant in light of an 
article by Bean et al. (2010), which summarises the presumptions of the 
pre-crisis monetary policy for both the US Federal Reserve System (FED) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) – where the assumption of market 
efficiency as a working approximation for equity and credit markets and 
where price and financial stability are assumed to be mutually dependent. 
The assumption of market efficiency and the expected reduction of 
noise in bond markets are connected to the first question of this study. The 
                                                          
1 Focusing on the 4th and 5th criteria, which call for long-term interest rates of no 
more than two percentage points above the rate in the three EU countries with the 
lowest inflation over the previous year, and that a national currency's exchange rate 
remain within certain pre-set margins for two years. 
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Maastricht-type convergence of capital markets could be temporary or at 
least biased when they can be described by a complex capital market 
model, involving the phenomenon of collective behaviour on extreme 
days. To test these phenomena, this study focuses on the 3-month and 
10-year maturities of bond and currency market developments and on the 
stock market as a control variable between January 1 2002 and August 31 
2011 using daily closing values. Our objective is to explore the spill-over 
effects generated by the FED and ECB on the new EU member states that 
aspire to adopt the euro. 
Bonanno et al. (2001) defined three statistical consequences of 
complexity in financial markets: first, time series have short and long 
range memories and only asymptotic stationarity; second, their sectoral 
intraday cross-correlations are high; and third, they demonstrate collective 
market behaviours during extreme market events. The contagion, 
divergence and interdependence terms are consistent with the latter two 
consequences, with interdependence ruling out any significant changes in 
the common movement between markets, contagion being important under 
a significant increase in cross market correlation and divergence being 
important under a decrease in cross market correlation. 
Contagions can be broadly defined as the cross-country transmission of 
shocks or general cross-country spill-over effects, which do not need to be 
related to crises. This paper uses the World Bank’s very restrictive 
definition2 of contagions, as cross-country correlations that increase during 
“crisis periods” relative to correlations during “tranquil periods”. 
Interdependence can be described as a situation where the difference 
between correlations under extreme and normal conditions is insignificant. 
Definition: Contagion (1) occurs between jk mm  markets when the 
jmkmρ  cross-market correlation becomes significantly higher due to a 
shock derived from one market ( m xnr / ) spreading to others or as a result of 
other external factors (Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Campbell et al. 2002; 







xnr ρρ <→≠ 0/ ,  (1) 
                                                          
2 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) used the World Bank’s (2012) definition as well. 
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Definition: Interdependence (2) occurs between jk mm  markets when 
the jmkmρ  cross-market correlation is not significantly different, but the 







xnr ρρ ≈→≠ 0/  (2) 
 
Definition: Divergence (3) occurs between jk mm  markets when the 
jmkmρ  cross-market correlation becomes significantly lower due to a 
shock derived from one market ( m xnr / ) spreading to others or as a result of 







xnr ρρ >→≠ 0/  (3) 
 
There could be a number of reasons behind the collective behaviour 
phenomenon, for example changes in market mood, herding, trade 
relations3, credit channels or political connections. However, according to 
Jentsch et al. (2006), there is a more general reason for collective 
behaviour that derives from the dynamic properties of extreme events, as 
extreme events are nested functions of scale-free complex networks. The 
efficient market hypothesis is consistent with an Erdős and Rényi (1960) 
random graph or a competitive market model, but there is a more 
oligopolistic model of a scale-free network that has been developed by 
Barabási and Albert (1999). Networks among economic actors and 
financial markets or ordinary enterprises follow this model, according to 
Berlinger et al. (2011), Benedek et al. (2007), Lublóy (2005) and Vitali et 
al. (2011). Financial systems are primarily interconnected through the 
interbank lending market, as the results of Kovács (2009) and Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 2011) suggest. Therefore, the vulnerability of 
a country will not depend on macroeconomic fundamentals or the general 
soundness of the individual banking systems alone, but will be affected by 
the maturity structure of foreign claims and the financial relationships 
between home and host institutions, as Árvai et al. (2009) suggests. 
                                                          
3 The euro zone accounted for 52% of Hungarian exports and 55% of its imports in 
2011 (KSH 2012); the euro zone accounted for 47% and 60% of Polish imports 
and exports in 2010 (GUS 2011, 112), while the corresponding figures for the 
Czech Republic were 53% and 67% (CZSO 2011). 
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2.2 The difference between the autonomy  
and independence of monetary policy 
 
The possibility of barriers between capital markets raises a second 
question and obviously suggests a more intensive collaboration between 
the ECB and non-euro-area member states to support official liquidity and 
maintain the transmission mechanism. In optimal circumstances, a credible 
and independent central bank would be able to establish a path for short-
term interest rates to anchor expectations about future policy rates to 
influence longer term interest rates (BoE 2000). For example, between 
September 2008 and February 2010, the reduction in the ECB’s short term 
interest rates generally affected the three month Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate (EURIBOR) and, in parallel, most bank interest rates on loans for 
housing and consumption also declined (ECB 2010). Based on the deep 
economic relationships between the countries in this analysis and the euro 
zone, the monetary policy environments are already interconnected, with 
the potential consequence of narrowing the range of decisions available. 
The autonomy of monetary policy was defined by Plümper and Troeger 
(2008) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) as the ability of central banks to set 
prime rates according to macroeconomic conditions, or as the independence 
from the monetary policies in the key currency areas. This ability is 
reduced by the degree of monetary interdependence, which is based on 
trade relationships and cross-border production chains. Therefore, a 
floating exchange rate regime and free movement of capital does not 
necessary imply full monetary autonomy as the classic notion of the 
impossible trilemma would suggest. Global liquidity is able to limit this 
autonomy by increasing the vulnerabilities of a financial system through 
substantial mismatches across currencies, maturities and countries, while 
the supply of global liquidity stems from one or more “core countries” 
(BIS 2011). Therefore, the BIS recommends wider and more targeted 
interventions on the national (monetary liquidity) and international (IMF 
and other regional stabilisation funds) levels (referred to as “official 
liquidity”) in domestic and foreign currencies when private funding or 
market liquidity contracts suddenly. 
Uneven monetary autonomy and central bank independence are not 
contradictory because this “independence” only refers to its domestic 
institutional meaning under current law4, where only the frameworks for 
                                                          
4 ECB: article 130 of the Treaty on European Union; Act No. 6/1993 Coll. on the 
Czech National Bank, Article 1 and 6; Act CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank – Hungarian National Bank, Article 1; The Act on the National Bank of 
Poland of 29 August 1997, Article 56 
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central bank activities are defined by the law, instead of its operations. The 
turbulence in private liquidity and the cross-border lending and ownership 
in the banking sector suggest more intensive collaborations between 
EU-27 central banks and financial authorities5 within and outside the euro 
zone. The next chapter briefly summarises the primary interactions among 
the ECB, the FED and the selected central banks with a focus on the 
patterns of pre-crisis and crisis collaborations. 
3. Monetary policy decisions by the ECB and the FED 
This paper defines two periods according to the ECB’s and FED’s 
interest rate decisions: “period A” covers the era of increasing and 
consistently high interest rates, while “period B” is a period of 
expansionary monetary policy with decreased interest rates on the short 
end of the yield curve and increasing yields on the long end. This chapter 
briefly summarises the main events of these periods, focusing mainly on 
the relationships between the ECB and the central banks (Czech National 
Bank – CNB, Hungarian National Bank – MNB, Polish National Bank – 
NPB) of the selected countries, especially in the year 2008. 
3.1 Period “A” 
A cautious monetary tightening characterised both ECB and FED 
monetary policy during the reconstruction phase after the dot-com bubble 
– the FED began to cautiously increase its primary credit interest rate from 
2% to 6.25% between June 30, 2004 and August 17, 2007. This 42 month 
period was longer than the corresponding 18 month period when the ECB 
increased its main refinancing rate from 2% to 4% between December 6 
2005 and June 13 2007. This tightening was triggered by the general 
increase of raw material, food and energy prices (MNB 2008), despite the 
emerging concerns regarding the sustainability of the housing sector. The 
FED kept interest rates high until August 17 2007, while the ECB waited 
until July 9 2008 and increased its interest rates to 4.25% until October 14 
2008. This stable period was characterised by emerging risk management 
and securitisation issues.  
                                                          
5 Despite the different institutional environments, for example there have been 
supreme financial supervision authorities in Hungary and Poland since 1999 and 
2006, while in the Czech Republic it has been part of the central bank since 1993. 
(Act No. 6/1993 Coll., on the Czech National Bank; Hungary: law 124 in 1999; 
Poland: Act on Financial Market Supervision of 2006, No. 157, item 1119). 
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The ECB’s measures to manage money market turbulence during the 
period from January to September 2008 can be grouped under three 
headings (ECB 2009): 
 
1. The liquidity provision used earlier in the maintenance period to 
fulfil counterparties’ reserve requirements.  
2. Supplementary longer-term (3 and 6 month) refinancing 
operations occurring since July 2007. 
3. Operations in conjunction with the US dollar Term Auction 
Facility: in 2007, the ECB established a reciprocal currency 
arrangement (swap line) with the Federal Reserve System – the 
Eurosystem provided funding in US dollars received via this 
28-day and, later, 3-month swap line to its counterparts against 
collateral eligible for Eurosystem credit operations. 
 
The intensification of the global financial crisis brought challenges for 
monetary policy in the selected countries, which experienced liquidity 
constraints in their interbank markets and tensions in their foreign 
exchange markets. Central bank responses varied depending on the 
economic conditions and monetary policy framework in place, for 
example ERM II participants adopted monetary policy measures that 
frequently mirrored moves by the ECB. However, central banks with 
inflation targets that did not participate in ERM II tightened their monetary 
policy stances at the beginning of 2008, with the aim of containing 
inflationary pressures stemming in large part from food and energy price 
increases and wage growth. In the first three quarters of 2008, the MNB 
and PNB each increased their main policy rates by a total of 100 basis 
points in several steps, while the CNB increased its main policy rate only 
once, by 25 basis points in February, a move that was reversed in August. 
The selected non-euro-area member states did not participate in ERM II in 
2008, and their currencies appreciated and reached record levels against 
the euro in the first half of the year. In February 2008, Hungary replaced 
its exchange rate band for the euro with a free-floating exchange ratio 
reach its inflation target, thereby fulfilling the nominal Maastricht criteria 
(MNB 2008). However, after the deepening of the financial crisis in 
September, global deleveraging and severe problems in the functioning of 
interbank markets worldwide resulted in a rapid and pronounced 
depreciation of the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint (ECB 2009). 
As a result of the increasingly deepening crisis, a direct disinflationary 
effect emerged that affected demand and household consumption; this 
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trend was supported by the expansion of household foreign currency loans 
and redundancies in the labour market (MNB 2008). 
3.2 Period “B” 
Central banks had to operate under disrupted monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms: money market interest rates were largely 
affected by liquidity disturbances, caused by the lack of trust among 
market participants and significant declines in markets’ balances, due to 
price decreases and problems with asset valuation (NBP 2009). 
Period “B” is characterised by monetary easing; however, period “B” 
did not occur simultaneously at the ECB and FED (as shown by their 
policy rates): the FED reduced the prime rate between August 17 2007 and 
December 17 2008 until it reached 0.5%, while the ECB only reacted after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The late reaction on the part of the ECB 
seems reasonable due to its previous liquidity enhancement measures and 
the significant increase in inflation, resulting from a price surge in the 
global agricultural and energy commodity markets in 2007 and the first 
half of 2008. Global inflationary pressures only eased in the second half of 
2008; however, at the same time, the previously visible appreciation trend 
of the Central-East European (CEE) currencies was inverted due to 
growing risk aversion and the ensuing capital outflows from emerging 
markets (NBP 2009). 
In the second half of 2008, the ECB’s main refinancing rate declined 
from 4.25% to 1% until May 2009, and it tightened the interest rate 
channels from 200 basis points to 100 bps to reduce interbank market 
volatility. The financial system recovered quickly, but the crisis spread to 
the European bond market, causing heterogeneous risk premiums between 
euro-area member states.  
The ECB took the following steps to enhance liquidity management 
from October to December 2008, as the Annual Report of the ECB (2009) 
describes: 
 
1. Fixed rate tenders with full allotment (all bids were satisfied), 
signing to market participants that the ECB was willing to supply 
as much liquidity as needed to avoid a liquidity crisis. 
2. A reduction of the corridor formed by the standing facility rates, 
i.e., the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility, from 
200 to 100 basis points, aiming to further ease banks’ liquidity 
management by offering less expensive central bank intermediation.  
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3. Supplementary longer-term refinancing operations: one for the 
length of the maintenance period, two with a maturity of three 
months, and one with a maturity of six months.  
4. Additional US dollar and Swiss franc-providing operations. 
Market liquidity in the foreign exchange swap market was 
unusually low due to increased stress and market segmentation, 
causing US dollar financing to become extremely difficult for 
institutions outside the United States. The Eurosystem further 
reinforced its provision of US dollar liquidity to Eurosystem 
counterparts by adding collateralised repo operations, fulfilling all 
bids at a fixed rate with overnight, 7-day, 28-day and 3-month 
maturities, in parallel with EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps.  
On 15 October, the Swiss National Bank and the ECB jointly 
announced measures to improve liquidity in short-term Swiss 
franc money markets, whereby the Eurosystem would provide its 
counterparts with Swiss franc financing via a swap line at a fixed 
price and with a maximum allotment amount and a 7-day or 3-
month maturity. 
The ECB did not undertake any foreign exchange operations 
in the currencies that participate in ERM II.  
5. Expansion of the collateral list. 
 
In response to the tensions that developed in financial markets in late 
October and November 2008, there was a joint international financial 
support programme for Hungary to ease the downward pressure on the 
forint and other currencies in the region. However, the deteriorating 
economic outlook and external vulnerabilities, combined with credit rating 
downgrades for Hungary in October and November, resulted in a further 
sharp depreciation of the zloty, the forint and the koruna (ECB 2009). On 
21–22 October, the exchange rate of the forint was subject to significant 
devaluation pressure in excess of that justified by macroeconomic 
fundamentals, causing an increase in the base rate of 300 basis points to 
maintain the stability of the financial intermediary system, contain a 
further strengthening of capital outflows and devaluation expectations and 
make speculation against the forint more expensive (MNB 2008). In 
October and November 2008, the ECB signed agreements to provide euro 
liquidity to the Hungarian and Polish national banks to improve euro 
liquidity in their respective domestic financial markets via repurchase 
agreements worth up to 5 and 10 billion euro (ECB 2009).  
Hungary was able to meet its external obligations (97% of GDP at the 
end of 2007) under these extreme market circumstances due to the 
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17-month Stand-By Arrangement provided by the IMF (€12.3 billion), 
ECB (€6.5 billion) and World Bank (€1 billion) under the Fund's fast-track 
Emergency Financing Mechanism procedures (IMF 2008). This programme 
had two key objectives: to reduce the government's debt-financing needs 
and maintain the liquidity and capital adequacy in the banking system. 
This joint credit line caused a 57% increase in the balance sheet of the 
Hungarian National Bank (MNB). The MNB took several steps to improve 
the distribution of interbank forint and FX liquidity and maintain the 
functionality of domestic financial markets; FX liquidity was improved 
through two-way O/N FX swap quick tenders and an overnight FX swap 
standing facility from the €5 billion credit line provided by the ECB. 
Forint liquidity was enhanced through a reduced reserve ratio, two-week, 
fixed-rate, and weekly collateralised loan tenders, six-month, variable-rate 
collateralised loan tenders, as well as secondary market government 
securities purchases (MNB 2008). The range of eligible collateral was also 
expanded and made more similar to the set of instruments applied by the 
ECB. 
Polish commercial banks also suffered from limited access to financing 
currency positions due to the turmoil in international financial markets. 
Therefore, the Polish National Bank introduced the so-called Confidence 
Pact in October 2008 to (1) enable banks to obtain financing in the zloty 
with 7-day and 3-month maturity repo transactions, (2) enable banks to 
obtain foreign currency financing through FX swaps (USD/PLN, EUR/PLN 
and CHF/PLN after November) with 7-day and 3-month maturities, and 
(3) extend the list of securities that were acceptable in transactions with 
the NBP (NBP 2009). A $20.6 billion IMF Flexible Credit Line was 
provided for Poland in May 2009 for a one year period, but it was not used 
(IMF 2009, NBP 2010).  
The Czech National Bank also applied reverse 2-week repos and 
foreign exchange swaps (3-month CZK/EUR) as extraordinary operations 
to increase liquidity in the secondary government bond market and other 
channels for banks. However, Czech domestic short-term interest rates 
were lower than the corresponding rates in the euro-area for most of 2008, 
as was the case in the previous three years, until euro interest rates fell 
sharply below Czech rates in the second half of the year. The Czech 
Republic adopted the role of a “safe haven” in the first half of 2008, but a 
rapid outflow of short-term investments followed (CNB 2009). 
Inflationary pressure eased due to declines in commodity prices; 
therefore, most central banks with inflation targets (the Bank of England 
and The Swedish National Bank) decreased their policy interest rates in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 in response to the weakening economic outlook 
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and the intensification of the global financial crisis. However, the Czech, 
Hungarian and Polish national banks were only able to decrease their 
policy rates in November and December, after gaining liquidity through 
official channels in October. 
The experiences of the liquidity disruptions in 2008 are reflected in 
both the concepts of the new capital and liquidity adequacy regulations in 
Basel III (Ács 2011) and the Global liquidity – concept, measurement and 
policy implications report of the BIS (2011). The latter clearly states that 
the role of official liquidity is inevitable when private (market and 
funding) liquidity declines to an extreme level: central banks are able to 
provide liquidity in domestic currency, however foreign currency can only 
be provided through foreign exchange reserves, swap lines between central 
banks, or dedicated facilities such as IMF programmes. 
In summary, this section indicates that foreign exchange markets and 
foreign currency liquidity play fundamental roles in the selected countries 
and indirectly and directly affect the government bond market. A 
Maastricht-type convergence seems to have disappeared between capital 
markets during the extreme days of 2008, underscoring the relevance of 
the first research question. The swap lines and collaboration between 
central banks proved to be essential (including on the level of FED-ECB 
relations, not only between ECB and CNB-MNB-PNB), but it is necessary 
to study the differences between ordinary and extraordinary periods in 
capital markets – focusing on the remarkable forms of collective 
behaviour. 
4. Methodology 
To demonstrate the existence of collective behaviours between markets 
on extreme trading days, it is first necessary to reject the efficiency of the 
selected markets. To meet the efficiency requirements put forth by 
Fama (1970), markets have to behave as a random walk describes them –
returns should be normally distributed (Jarque-Berra test), without 
autocorrelation (Ljung-Box test) or heteroscedasticity (ARCH LM test), 
and should be stationery (ADF test) (Wong and Li 2010, Tsay 2005, 
Lütkepohl 2004). The rejection of market efficiency allows us to estimate 
contagions through the use of dynamic conditional correlation after ruling 
out heteroscedasticity with GARCH-models, following Cappiello et al. 
(2006).  
Time series are generally biased by autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
because of the fat tails of the return distributions and volatility clustering. 
The different versions of Bollerslev’s (1986) Generalised Autoregression 
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and Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models are widely used methods to 
provide homoscedastic, standardised residuals. The Asymmetric Power 
GARCH (APARCH)6 model (4) developed by Ding et al. (1993) may be 
the most powerful tool to address the heteroscedasticity bias that results 












δδδ σβεγεωσ , (4) 
 
where ω  is a constant term, α denotes the impact of news, 11 <<− iγ  is 
responsible for the asymmetry function, β  is the level of volatility 
persistence, and 0>δ  provides nonlinearity. The parameters of APARCH 
have to be defined: “ p ” and “ q ” determine the lag numbers of the 
residuals and volatility, while “ o ” is a non-negative scalar integer 
representing the number of asymmetric innovations. A further advantage 
of the APARCH model is its flexibility – it is simple to convert it to the 
GJR GARCH and TARCH models and the basic GARCH form. The lag 
length was optimised on a 1-to-4 scale and selected according to the 
estimation’s Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest, ordinary cross-correlation is 
not a suitable tool for specifying the common movement of markets 
because of heteroscedasticity. Cointegration is also ruled out because it is 
better to analyse long-term processes; hence, BEKK-GARCH or 
DCC-GARCH could be adequate solutions following the APARCH step.  
This study applies DCC-GARCH7, following Engle (2002), to analyse 
the daily common movements of the selected markets. Cross-market 
correlation is compared using the Ansari-Bradley test because this 
variance test is not based on the assumption of a normal distribution – as is 
the case for the widely used t-test. After the identification of common 
market movements, it is necessary to separate them on the basis of the hub 
return’s extremity or normality. 
How can we separate the “extreme” and “ordinary”? Jentsch et al. 
(2006) defined extreme events8 by their impact and probability – hence, 
                                                          
6 The estimation based on the UCSD toolbox, developed by Kevin Sheppard: 
http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/UCSD_GARCH 
7 The estimation based on the Oxford MFE toolbox, developed by Kevin 
Sheppard: http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/MFE_Toolbox 
8 Definition: Extreme event (4) is a Wwx ∈  event for a W  stochastic variable 
with a nx ww >>  or nx ww <<  significantly higher impact than the expected in 
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we have to find a suitable threshold or milestone to form both groups. 
There are multiple solutions (see Campbell et al., 2002), but this study 
focus on the fatness of the tails; therefore, it is necessary to separate the 
empirical distribution by fitting a theoretical normal distribution to it. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to define extreme returns on the basis of the 
extreme event definition – that is, “shocks” were the product of the 
transition from the normal to the extreme return subset. 
Definition: Extreme return (5) is the extreme change of the jm  market 
on the fat tails of the jmr  return’s probability distribution. This event is 
related to the skewness of the distribution, while their probability and 
value differ starkly from the )(rE  expected. 
 
)(rErx >> or xrrE >>)(  where )(rExr pp <<  (5) 
 
Definition: Normal returns (6) fit well on the projected theoretical 
normal distribution – therefore, they are denoted in the study variable nr . 
Definition: Capital market shock (7) means the xnr /  transition of the 
return from the nr  normal subset to the xr  extreme subset. The 0/ ≠xnr  
existence of this transition defines both subsets (6), while the totally 
















xn rrr =→= 0/ . (7) 
 
The entire time series can be divided (8) into extreme and normal 
subsets according to the above definitions: 
 
                                                                                                                         
a limited time and space with a )()( nx wpwp <<  significantly lower probability 
than the expected, providing a uniqueness (Jentsch et al. 2006). 
































where iempiricalr ,  is the i th element of the empirical distribution and the 
inormalltheoreticar ,  denotes the projected normal distribution, lki << . 
Relying on the definition of QQ plots by Deutsch (2002, 690–691), the 













1 φφ  for all Ti < , therefore,  
in Xr 22 σμ +≈ ,   
ix Xr 22 σμ +>
+ ,  
ix Xr 22 σμ +<
− , (9) 
 
where iX  denotes the theoretical empirical standard normal distribution, 
which is represented in the QQ plot by a line with iX22 σμ +  slope. 
Contagions, divergences and interdependences initiated by one 
market’s extreme days have to be detected for 10 inter-market correlations 
(6 for currencies). First, it is necessary to decide between interdependence 
(nonsignificant changes in correlations) and significant correlation 
changes (such as divergence and contagion) – this could be expressed by 























s , N  denotes the 
number of involved market pairs. Contagions are characterised by 
significantly higher correlations and divergences are characterised by 
significantly lower correlations according to the definitions (11). To select 
between these two forms, the following algorithm was used: 
 








































































































Thus the contagion was expressed by weighting against the entire set 




Fig. 9-1 Mapping the difference between contagion and interdependence 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
This approach (Figure 9-1) regards market developments in terms of 
whether they would be signs of shock or contagion. Therefore, a 
contagiousness ranking could be defined between the three CEE, US and 
euro zone markets, where markets could be scored according to the 
number of correlations divided into significantly different parts, and the 
extreme correlation should be higher on average. The results can be easily 
visualised in the following way: the “x” axis depicts the rate of 
significantly different and non-different correlations, while the “y” axis 
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depicts the number of observable correlations, where extreme values are 
higher than normal. 
Although the need for monetary collaboration became obvious in light 
of the events of 2008, it was necessary to define the patterns that require 
monetary policy to be conducted with caution. The above methodology 
can be used not only to test for market efficiency (one of the presumptions 
of pre-crisis monetary policy), but we are also able to separate the days 
when this efficiency was most biased (e.g., trading days with extreme 
returns), as well as the dynamics of common market movements and 
collective behaviour patterns. 
5. Results 
Our results are structured in the following manner: after the rejection 
of the classic form of market efficiency, the patterns of extreme price 
developments and common movements will be analysed. The impacts of 
the FED and ECB’s monetary policies on the sample countries will be 
analysed using two event windows on the basis of the increasing and 
decreasing phases of these two important central banks’ main refinancing 
rates.  
According to the results in Table 9-1, the lack of a normal distribution 
and the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the time series ruled out 
the classical form of market efficiency. These properties suggest volatility 
clustering and more frequent extreme jumps in the first differentials of 
bond market yields, currency rates and stock market indices. 
High kurtosis (exceeding the level of 3) could be interpreted as a clear 
sign of fat tailness and extreme changes, which occurs with enormous 
magnitude in the bond markets – in contrast to the stock and currency 
markets with their moderate kurtoses. This result is remarkable, 
considering that changes in the 3-month yield are primarily affected by 
monetary policy and changes in international liquidity, while the 
unregulated stock markets and free-floating currencies seemed to be 
smoother. The observed heteroscedasticity underlines the appropriateness 
of employing various GARCH models before estimating the correlations. 
As the results in Table 9-2 suggest, heteroscedasticity was ruled out in 
all of the cases – consequently, bond markets required the highest lag 
number and the application of the developed GARCH model, while the 
stock and currency markets were less difficult. Volatility persistence 
seemed to be an important factor as the close-to-one level of the β  
coefficient suggests. Market participants and central banks were forced to 
operate in a market where volatility was self-enhancing.  
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Patterns of the common market movements differ between market 
types. Figures 9-2 to 9-5 illustrate the dynamic conditional correlation 
fluctuations. 
 






US 3M 0.23 70.0669 0.001 -55.462 * -1.9416 0 0
EURO 3M -0.02 42.0711 0.001 -51.2232 * -1.9416 0 0.2245 ***
HU 3M 1.3047 85.5834 0.001 -50.2077 * -1.9416 0 0.8346 ***
CZ 3M -3.9396 63.4792 0.001 -46.9896 * -1.9416 0.846 ** 0.0033
PL 3M -0.7997 37.5076 0.001 -44.1657 * -1.9416 0.0334 0
US 10Y -0.2763 8.4496 0.001 -52.3948 * -1.9416 0 0.0188
EURO 10Y 0.0321 4.96 0.001 -46.9331 * -1.9416 0 0.0016
HU 10Y 0.3541 14.6869 0.001 -47.6824 * -1.9416 0 0.0171
CZ 10Y -1.6999 63.9912 0.001 -49.1197 * -1.9416 0 0.3756 ***
PL 10Y 0.6234 16.2843 0.001 -42.2279 * -1.9416 0 0
DJI 0.1068 12.2829 0.001 -55.5017 * -1.9416 0 0
DAX 0.107 8.2694 0.001 -52.2590 * -1.9416 0 0.0276
BUX -0.093 9.9225 0.001 -47.6622 * -1.9416 0 0.0178
PX -0.5618 17.8663 0.001 -46.4961 * -1.9416 0 0.0003
WIG -0.2971 6.2382 0.001 -46.3625 * -1.9416 0 0.0002
EUR/USD -0.1148 5.2043 0.001 -49.7133 * -1.9416 0 0.8173 ***
HUF/USD -0.476 7.275 0.001 -50.6851 * -1.9416 0 0.464 ***
CZK/USD -0.2709 5,5867 0.001 -48.0621 * -1.9416 0 0.0573 ***
PLN/USD -0.1601 8.5734 0.001 -50.0457 * -1.9416 0 0.9433 ***
p p
*: stationary time series; **: homoscedasticity; ***: lack of autocorrelation
Analysed markets Skewness Kurtosis
Stationarity Heteroscedasticity Autocorrelation
(ADF-test) 1 lag (ARCH-LM ) 2 lag (Ljung-Box) 6 lag
t statistic
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Fig. 9-2 Dynamic conditional correlation between 3-month yields 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Three-month yields exhibit uncorrelated fluctuation, suggesting limited 
spill-over effects between these maturities in the sample countries. As this 
is the most liquid maturity and is targeted by monetary policy operations, 
it is difficult to find any evidence of interdependence or time-variance.  
The appearance of the crisis after 2007 had more serious impacts on 
the 10-year yields, as Figure 9-3 presents. The pre-crisis weak correlation 
was neutralised by the crisis, which is our first piece of evidence to prove 
Bearce’s (2002) divergence phenomenon. This result is considerable on 
the basis of the bond market convergence requirements in the Maastricht 
criteria – Central-East European countries’ euro adoption was weakly 
priced in the pre-crisis era and totally ruled out during the crisis. 
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Fig. 9-3 Dynamic conditional correlation between 10-year yields 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
There was a correlation between stock markets, as Figure 9-4 suggests. 
Stronger economic ties between German and emerging European countries 
implied high correlation compared to the weaker correlation between the 
US and the other markets in the sample. The strength of the common 
movement increased dramatically in the second half of the decade – thus, 
it was already high before the crisis appeared; which is similar to the 
results obtained by Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) and Goetzman et al. 
(2005). 
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Fig. 9-4 Dynamic conditional correlation between stock markets 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Contrary to the observed weak 10-year bond market convergence, the 
selected currencies exhibit strong correlation (see Figure 9-5), as shown by 
Stávárek (2009) and Babetskaia-Kukharchuk et al. (2008). This strong 
common movement is surrounded by several declines, suggesting there are 




Fig. 9-5 Dynamic conditional correlation between currency pairs 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to these results, we are able make the following statements: 
3-month yields and currency rates fluctuated around well-defined 
correlation levels, while the 10-year yields had a decreasing trend and 
stock markets had an increasing trend approaching the crisis era. 
After the identification of the correlation curves and outliers, it is 
necessary to define “normal” and “extreme” in the sample markets days. 
Trading days with extreme fluctuations were placed in the “extreme 
subset”, as they do not fit the theoretical normal distribution in both of the 
tails of the empirical distribution (Table 9-3). These extreme days met the 
definition of extreme events: their mass is insignificant in the entire 
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sample, but they occur in the tails with low probability and high values. 
The validity of this method was verified by comparing the kurtosis of the 
entire sample to the subset of “normal” or ordinary days – the observed 
convergence to 3 was quite impressive.  
Extreme jumps were distributed almost symmetrically in the case of 
the 3M market, while the first extreme return had the highest magnitude. 
Extreme yield increases characterised the 10Y market; this asymmetry is 
underlined not only by the number of days but also by the smaller first 
extreme return. Asymmetry characterised both the stock and currency 
markets on their negative side – the increased mass of extreme drops is 
clear in the case of the stock indices, but the currencies were characterised 
by extreme days primarily after the strength of the currencies had 
improved substantially. 
After the introduction of time-varying correlation patterns and extreme 
change properties, it is necessary to make a brief comparison between 
“subsample A” (increases in the main refinance rates of the ECB and FED) 
and “subsample B” (decreasing interest rate period) for all of the markets. 
Considering the shorter period of the ECB refinancing-rate changes – a 
34 month increase and 36 month decrease compared to the FED’s 42 and 
47 months – there are two common phenomena (Table 9-4). First, the 
3-month yields generally declined when the central banks reduced the 
main refinancing rates – implying some type of implicit spill-over effect 
between monetary policies. However the decline in 10-year yields was not 
a broad success, Central-East European national banks had to contend with 
increasing long term yields in contrast to the general decline in the euro 
zone and the US. The shapes of the yield curves became steeper in the 
entire sample, but they were the sharpest in the centre. A maturity 
transformation in a banking system requires this positive shape of the 10Y-
3M spread under constant price level expectations. All of the currencies 
appreciated against the USD with increased volatility in the interval “B”, 
while the stock indices were generally devalued according to ECB’s 
monetary decisions – the FED windows produced a different outcome. 
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Table 9-4 Market differences under increasing and decreasing 
interest rates 
 
US EUR HU CZ PL US EUR HU CZ PL
mean "A" 3.809897181 3.5003 7.5218 3.0487 4.8834 3.834701958 2.6703 7.6137 2.3492 4.9094
variance "A" 2.061284042 0.361 0.7361 0.5813 0.8121 1.521848281 0.519 2.2822 0.1307 0.9910
mean "B" 0.125510778 0.7093 6.9252 1.8194 4.2992 0.761449082 1.6498 7.2524 2.4266 4.7550
variance "B" 0.012027703 0.2983 3.5459 0.7010 0.5364 1.325980386 2.3883 2.8827 1.4100 0.9820
mean "A" 4.443556107 4.0302 7.2212 4.2229 5.5631 4.533348103 3.7753 7.0318 3.9982 5.5258
variance "A" 0.23584287 0.0954 0.3768 0.2221 0.1818 0.109197037 0.1401 0.4347 0.3113 0.4810
mean "B" 3.216767531 3.0693 8.0788 4.2510 6.0088 3.434390821 3.3910 7.9372 4.3725 5.9969
variance "B" 0.1834048 0.1264 1.6655 0.2821 0.0931 0.27888403 0.3550 1.3788 0.2493 0.0862
mean "A" 0.633658926 0.5298 -0.3007 1.1743 0.6798 0.698646144 1.1051 -0.5818 1.6490 0.6164
variance "A" 1.044591812 0.1770 0.4704 0.1673 0.3369 1.017479763 0.3019 1.1300 0.1617 0.4262
mean "B" 3.091256753 2.3600 1.1537 2.4316 1.7095 2.672941739 1.7412 0.6848 1.9459 1.2418
variance "B" 0.180085116 0.2867 0.9540 0.5249 0.5545 0.750074321 1.1571 1.2308 0.9578 0.9718
mean "A" 1.3660 0.0054 0.0506 0.3692 1.2641 0.0050 0.0430 0.3142
variance "A" 0.0138 0.0000 0.0001 0.0028 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007
mean "B" 1.3664 0.0050 0.0537 0.3352 1.4013 0.0053 0.0550 0.3609
variance "B" 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025
mean "A" 12164 6632 23516 1588 48793 11264 5473 20459 1366 38962





central bank ECB FED
markets
3M
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Dividing our samples according to the interest rate decisions of the 
ECB and FED was useful to separate the pre-crisis and crisis eras and to 
evaluate possible spill-overs to the emerging European sample, but it is 
difficult to identify any difference between the two approaches. 
The increasing and decreasing periods defined by the FED’s main 
refinancing rate seemed a more appropriate tool to divide the sample 
markets’ common movements into two significantly different components 
– at least 67% of the market pairs had significantly different correlations in 
this case (Table 9-5). This result is remarkable because 3M markets 
seemed to be uncorrelated before the crisis in addition to the consistently 
high common movements in the currency market. The results concerning 
the FED’s leadership role could be biased by the different length of the 
two intervals. 
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Table 9-5 Significant differences in the common movement of the sample 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
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Therefore, it is necessary to study how the common movements differ 
under the extreme days defined by US and euro-area benchmarks for the 
entire sample or the upper subsets. Figure 9-6 demonstrates that it is 
difficult to define collective behaviours during extreme events. The 
correlation of sample currencies during the strong appreciation of the euro 
indicated divergence, meaning a weaker correlation as opposed to the 
general strong one. However, contagions were identified using the shorter 
ECB subsets, while the broader FED subsets indicated only interdependence. 
3M markets generally exhibit interdependence, as do those of the 10Y, 
where only the entire sample-based EUR10Y indicated divergence, which 
means that weak correlations occur when the yield curve decreases 
substantially, e.g. during monetary expansion, ruling out the possibility of 
liquidity providing monetary spill-overs between central and emerging 
countries. During severe decline in the stock markets, only the entire-
sample based on the Dow Jones Industrial Average was able to identify 
contagions – DAX and various subsets indicated only interdependence. 
The widely accepted hypothesis of trade-relation-based common 
movements was rejected because of this result and because the stock 
markets are not consistently interconnected. 
Figure 9-7 presents divergences between currencies when the euro 
depreciated substantially against the USD according to the ECB subsets; 
sample currencies with weakened correlations are able to depreciate more 
extensively or remain stable. The 3M markets remained interdependent, 
but the US10Y market in the entire subset was able to indicate divergence 
when it increased substantially, meaning loosening common movements 
under monetary tightening and scarce liquidity. The entire sample based 
Dow Jones Industrial Average remained able to identify contagions only 
when the index increased substantially, and “A” periods present a nearly 
identical picture. 
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Fig. 9-6 Map of possible contagions, divergence and interdependence, comparing 
ordinary and negative extreme changes 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Fig. 9-7 Map of possible contagions, divergence and interdependence, comparing 
ordinary and positive extreme changes 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
These results suggest that thinking of collective behaviour is necessary: 
cross market-correlation is able to change on the days when one market 
undergoes extreme changes, but it is difficult to identify such differences 
in subsets, such as those representing the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
6. Conclusion 
The operational autonomy of monetary policy is narrow in the selected 
Central-East European countries – and the range of decisions is even 
narrower under turbulent market conditions. The experiences during the 
crisis in the fall of 2008 underlined that even the former “safe haven” of 
the Czech Republic required FX liquidity trough swap lines, and the 
European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank 
faced the same problem on a larger scale. 
This paper applied a diagnostic model to explore the phenomena that 
occur in and between markets on extreme trading days. After the rejection 
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of the efficient markets hypothesis, the dynamic, conditional correlations 
of the markets were analysed under extreme and ordinary trading days to 
identify the particular forms of collective market behaviours. 
Maastricht-type convergence between the selected bond markets was 
already missing or had disappeared during 2008 due to the crisis, while 
free-floating currency markets tended to move together without any 
explicit monetary policy goal. Stock markets, as a control variable, tended 
to move together in a different way – correlation increased shortly before 
and during the crisis. The selected markets moved together in a 
significantly different way than before the FED began to reduce its prime 
rate, in conjunction with the ECB’s decision to ease liquidity conditions 
without any change in the policy rate. Free-floating exchange rates 
exhibited that rates were strongly correlated with each other, but these 
trends were also significantly different under the tight and expansionary 
monetary policies of the ECB and FED. Contagions and divergence both 
characterised the currency markets; therefore, investors have to be 
cautious regarding exchange rate risk. Trade relations characterised stock 
market correlations well, but contagion between stock markets was only 
indicated by the Dow Jones Industrial index. 
Yield curves’ long maturities generally reflected long run risk 
premiums and inflation expectations. Individual national currencies make 
it difficult to adapt to downward changes in the principle currencies’ yields 
– even real economies are tied strongly together through trade, corporate 
ownership and the banking sector, and the primary goal of monetary 
policy is the same and institutions are harmonised. The Czech, Hungarian 
and Polish bond and currency markets generally had to contend with 
loosening connections during difficult times: shocks affected them to a 
greater extent, while monetary activism was poorly implemented. The 
monetary autonomy of these countries will not decline after they adopt the 
euro in the future because this autonomy is also narrow in the present, and 
its maintenance requires expensive programmes and collaborations. 
Inflation-targeting monetary policy in the CEE was able to reduce inflation 
in all of the sample countries, but it was far from effective in reducing the 
probability of a banking crisis or bond market noise – due to its inability to 
influence the common lending channels between the euro zone headquarters 
and CEE subsidiaries of the regional banks. Therefore, we can conclude that 
inflation-targeting monetary policies have to be maintained in the region, but 
the free movement of capital and financial innovations requires that central 
banks increase their institutional capacities both in terms of financial 
stabilisation and their regional cooperation. 
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ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN GREECE:  







The crisis in Greece has defined political and academic debates for 
more than two years. Following the deadlock-marred Greek Parliamentary 
elections of May 6, 2012, a new wave of political uncertainty spread over 
developments in the country, with the possibility of Greece exiting the 
euro zone becoming an ever more tangible reality that was discussed 
openly around the world. Although the June 17 elections reduced fears of 
an imminent “Grexit”, Greece remains present in mainstream media 
coverage worldwide, frequently perceived as a litmus test of the euro zone 
crisis (Visvizi 2012a). Clearly, the crisis in Greece is by no means a linear 
and simple process. The events concerning Greece that have shaped 
popular opinion and imagination since late 2009 form a sequence of 
different yet interrelated, and to some extent overlapping, crises that have 
beset Greece since 2008. In other words, it is possible to distinguish 
between the demand crisis and the liquidity crunch (2008–2009) caused by 
the global financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis (2010–present) related 
to a specific course of action taken by the Greek government in Autumn 
2009, and the progressing economic recession (2011–?) that resulted from 
an inappropriate policy-mix implemented by the socialist government 
under the aegis of the so-called Troika, i.e., representatives of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB), 
and the European Commission since 2010 (Visvizi 2012c). 
Although a rich body of literature has emerged in an attempt to offer 
insights into the correlated exogenous and endogenous causes of the crisis 
in Greece, a more focused discussion of the empirical pattern of the phases 
of the crisis in Greece is still largely absent. Specifically, more insight is 
required on the question of how particular policy instruments employed by 
the Greek authorities may have influenced/fuelled the subsequent stages of 
the crisis. Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to focus on the 
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relatively under-researched issue of the role and efficacy of fiscal policy 
and fiscal policy measures in addressing the crisis in Greece. The major 
thesis that this paper advances is that the front-loaded fiscal adjustment 
measures consistent with the introduction of excessive taxation and 
marginal expenditure reduction constricted economic activity in the 
country, leading to an exponential rise in unemployment, a dramatic fall in 
general government revenue, and increased expenditures on social 
transfers. Moreover, the paper argues with the very popular – yet 
inaccurate – view according to which tax evasion was and remains the 
main reason behind shrinking government revenue in Greece, and thus of 
the uncertain fate of the two loan facilities generously offered to Greece by 
its international partners. 
The argument is structured as follows: In the first section, the 
background of the €110 billion financial assistance package that Greece 
received in May 2010 is discussed briefly, and the major qualitative and 
quantitative performance criteria attached to the assistance programme are 
outlined. In the next section, the focus of the discussion is directed towards 
the scope of fiscal adjustment that was proposed and/or implemented in 
Greece over the period May 2010–June 2012. In what follows, the 
efficiency and appropriateness of the fiscal consolidation measures 
implemented in Greece as a means of addressing the crisis are examined. 
Subsequently, the thorny issue of tax compliance is raised. Conclusions 
follow. 
2. The background of the €110 billion financial 
assistance package for Greece 
A set of endogenous and exogenous variables led Greece to the brink 
of losing access to financial markets in early 2010. The state of Greece’s 
public finances was deteriorating, the economic forecasts for the country 
were alarming, the spreads for Greek treasury bills began rising in an 
uncontrolled manner, and Greece’s credit ratings fell to the “close to junk” 
category. As the outlook for Greece’s public finance was deteriorating (see 
Table 10-1 for more details), in early 2010 the then IMF managing-
director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, suggested an early debt restructuring 
for Greece, a proposal rejected by the then Prime Minister of Greece, 
George Papandreou. As time passed and Greece’s inability to service its 
debt became apparent, in March and April 2010, discussions were held at 
various levels in the EU regarding the means of addressing Greece’s 
insolvency problem. Although the ECB pushed the limits of its 
prerogatives by repurchasing Greek bonds, and a bailout was not an 
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option, the European Union (EU) did not have a mechanism to assist 
Greece. Therefore, two alternative methods to approach the crisis in 
Greece were discussed in the EU. Some EU leaders suggested a strictly 
European solution whereby the EU member states would offer bilateral 
loans to Greece. This approach was stymied by a view promoted by 
Angela Merkel, who argued that the IMF’s involvement was needed. The 
IMF’s engagement with a possible future rescue package for Greece 
offered the promise that conditions would be attached to the rescue loan 
granted to Greece. These loan conditions would in turn increase the 
probability that Greek authorities would comply with the terms of the loan 
and consequently not only repay it but also improve Greek public finances 
in line with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (Visvizi 
2012b). 
In May 2010, a financial assistance programme for Greece was agreed 
on by the Eurogroup and the IMF Board. This unprecedented loan, with a 
total value of €110 billion, was to be disbursed in twelve tranches over the 
period 2010–2013. The loan consisted of a €30 billion Stand-by 
Agreement (SBA) approved by the IMF and €80 billion in bilateral loans 
granted to Greece by euro zone member states, centrally pooled and 
managed by the European Commission. The implementation of the 
programme was to be overseen by the representatives of the Troika. The 
major objective of the joint EU-IMF €110 billion assistance package was 
to aid Greece in overcoming its debt crisis, revive growth, and modernise 
its economy. It was expected that by 2012, Greece would regain its ability 
to finance its debt. The major quantitative targets of the economic reform 
programme that the Greek government suggested, included a reduction in 
the gross government deficit, a gradual reduction in the debt to GDP ratio, 
and the restoration of economic growth. 
In principle, the economic reform programme approved by the Troika 
in May 2010 was based on fiscal consolidation and fiscal discipline that – 
coupled with structural reforms – were expected to yield positive 
outcomes in the form of growth and increased government revenue. The 
fiscal consolidation measures included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) of May 2010 included front-loaded revenue 
enhancing measures, i.e., increases in tax rates and a broadening of the tax 
base, as well as plans for reducing expenditures, including reductions in 
public investments, the public sector’s operating costs and the wage 
burden. These measures were to be complemented by structural fiscal 
reforms focusing on tax administration, the reform of the tax collection 
mechanism, enhanced auditing, simplifying the general tax framework, 
and combatting tax evasion. The structural reform measures listed in the 
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programme included public administration reform, labour market and 
wage-negotiation reform, pension reform, healthcare reform, business 
environment reform, reforms aimed at promoting foreign direct investment 
and exports, and reforms increasing the levels of absorption of structural 
and cohesion funds. 
 
Table 10-1 The Greek economy: major macroeconomic & fiscal 
indicators 2008–2012 
 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
(target/ 
forecast) 
Total revenue  
% GDP 40.7 38.2 39.7 40.9 42.4 
in m. of EUR  94,833.0 88,601.0 90,247.0 88,075.0 86,267.50 
Total expenditure 
% GDP 50.6 53.8 50.2 50.1 47.7 
in m. of EUR 117,963.0 124,646.0 114,106.0 107,769.0 97,050.9 
Primary deficit/balance 
% GDP -4.8 -10.4 -4.7 -2.2 -1 
in m. of EUR -11,193.0 -24,128.0 -10,666.0 -4,664.0 -2,034.6 
Overall balance/deficit 
% GDP -9.8 -15.6 -10.5 -9.2 -7.3 
in m. of EUR -23,130.0 -36,045.0 -23,859.00 -19,694.00 -14,852.6 
Gross government debt 
% GDP 113 129.4 145 165.3 162.1 
in m. of EUR 263,284.0 299,685.0 329,535.0 355,617.0 329,810.30 
GDP  
growth rate -0.5 -3.6 -3.7 -6.9 -6.0* 
in m. of EUR 232,920.3 231,642.0 227,317.9 215,088.2 202,182.9* 
Current account balance 
% GDP -17.9 -14.3 -12.3 -11.3 -7.8 
in m. of EUR -41,692.7 -33,124.8 -27,959.1 -24,304.9 -15,869.9 
Unemployment 
in %  7.7 9.5 12.6 17.7 19.7 
Inflation rate (HICP) 
in %  4.2 1.3 4.7 3.1 -0.5 
Source: Eurostat; forecasts for 2012 from: European Commission (2012b); * from 
Alpha Bank (2012) 
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Overall, the objectives set in the MoU followed the traditional recipe 
of fiscal consolidation that the IMF tends to offer as a lender of last resort. 
In this sense, these objectives delineated a routine means of assisting a 
country in the restoration of its shattered public finance. In the case of 
Greece, however, as insiders would have argued, the programme suffered 
from three significant drawbacks from the beginning. On the one hand, the 
programme was founded on incorrect assumptions regarding the nature of 
the crisis in Greece. That is, the crisis was initially approached by Greek 
authorities and Greece’s European and international partners as a liquidity 
problem. Thus, the structural causes of the crisis were downplayed in the 
MoU. On the other hand, the fiscal consolidation targets and especially the 
extremely short time-span within which fiscal consolidation was to be 
implemented, were overly ambitious and thus unfeasible. 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the MoU of May 2010 was 
largely identical to the provisions of the Updated Hellenic Stability and 
Growth Programme (SP 2010) approved by the Ecofin in February 2010. 
In addition, the MoU incorporated an excessively stringent Tax Law in 
April 2010 (applied retroactively as of January 2010) passed in haste by 
the PASOK parliamentary majority prior to the arrival of IMF officials in 
Athens. In this sense, the design of the fiscal consolidation programme of 
May 2010 created vast opportunities for the Greek socialist government 
(PASOK) to employ the programme in an instrumental way. Here it is 
worth considering the fact that the fiscal consolidation programme 
assumed the possibility of cyclical de facto readjustment of the 
programme’s quantitative objectives. That is, if a progress report produced 
by the Troika on a three-month basis were to reveal discrepancies in the 
quantitative performance criteria, to keep the programme on target, new 
fiscal policy measures would be introduced to guarantee the programme’s 
success. This mechanism allowed the socialist government to shift the 
burden of fiscal adjustment away from the public sector and thus away 
from expenditure reducing measures towards the private sector and 
revenue enhancing measures. Specifically, as presented in Table 10-2, 
several of the expenditure reducing measures were either not implemented 
or came into force with a significant delay or in an amended, “soft” 
version, thus having little impact on the strained state budget. 
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Table 10-2 Major consolidation measures in the authorities' programme 
of May 2010: commitments vs. implementation 
 
 Revenue-enhancing measures Implementation 
1 Increase in VAT rates & base 04/2010 
2 Increase in excise tax on fuel 01/2010 
3 Increase in excise tax on cigarettes 01/2010 
4 Increase in excise tax on alcohol 01/2010 
5 Luxury goods tax (yachts, cars, pools)* 01/2010 
6 Taxation on unauthorised establishments 01/2010 
7 Gaming royalties 01/2010 
8 Gaming licenses 01/2010 
9 Special/emergency levies on profitable firms 01/2010 
10 Levies on illegal buildings 01/2010 
11 Green tax 01/2010 
12 Presumptive taxation (“amnesty”) 01/2010 
13 Increase in administratively set prices of real 
estate 
01/2010 
14 Increase in taxation of real estate 04/2010 
15 Privatisation Practically none until 09/2012 
 Expenditure-reducing measures Implementation 
1 Wage bill (13th, 14th wage, allowances) Late 2011, several exceptions 
applied 
2 Intermediate consumption 11/11 & 07/12 
3 Pension cuts & freeze 2010 & 2011 & 2012 
4 Elimination of solidarity allowance 
(introduced 10/09) 
No 
5 Public investment reduction 2010, 2011, 2012 
6 Introduction of unified public sector wages 11/2011, several exceptions 
applied; the majority of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) did 
not conform with it; 
7 Local administration reform (“Kalikrates”) 
savings 
questionable 
8 Reduction in operational expenditure minimal 
9 Reduction in public employment illusory 
10 Unidentified measures   
Source: Adapted by the author from: European Commission (2010) 
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Simultaneously, all of the planned revenue enhancing measures were 
implemented on time with further policy instruments being added 
periodically, thus increasing the tax burden on the private sector. Increases 
in taxation, e.g., personal and corporate income taxes, and the imposition 
of new taxes, e.g., emergency contributions from vehicles, yachts, 
motorbikes and pools; levies on credit cards and cheques; and surcharges 
on mobile telephony, have been complemented by the introduction of the 
so-called income thresholds. These administratively established thresholds 
effectively increase the taxable income base, in that taxation – rather than 
being imposed on real income – is imposed on an estimated (and thus 
usually exaggerated) annual maintenance cost of a vehicle, a house, an 
apartment, etc. The thresholds are also imposed on tuition fees, healthcare 
expenses, etc. A focused study of these thresholds would reveal a direct 
correlation between their imposition and plummeting consumer demand 
for goods and services. As the discussion in this paper will depict, as a 
result of the overemphasis on revenue-enhancing measures, an expenditure 
drift occurred over the period 2010–2011. The socialist government sought 
to balance this situation with additional tax increases, a practice that the 
authorities legitimised by producing the myth of tax evasion in Greece. 
3. The scope of fiscal consolidation in Greece 2010–2012 
To obtain insights into the scope of the fiscal adjustment in Greece, in 
the following paragraphs, the milestones of the (planned) fiscal adjustment 
effort over the period 2010–2012 are described. By contrast, Table 10-3 
offers a summary picture of the scope of the fiscal consolidation process in 
Greece as recorded by IMF authorities. Six milestones in the fiscal 
adjustment effort in Greece can be distinguished. These include: 
1) provisions of the MoU of May 2010 for the period 2010–2012; 2) the 
Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment Strategy (MTFS) of June 2011 for the 
period 2012–2015; 3) additional, very specific tax laws introduced in 
September 2011 following a rather difficult negotiation round with the 
Troika; 4) the “voluntary bond exchange programme” of November 2011; 
5) the 2nd MoU of March 2012; and 6) measures discussed by the 
coalition government in summer 2012 to be implemented as of 2013. 
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Table 10-3 The scope of fiscal adjustment: measures executed 




(outcome or projection)  
Measures 
(implemented in or identified for 
a given year) 
 in m. of EUR % GDP  in m. of EUR % GDP 
2009 36,624.0 15.8 in 2010 19,074.0 8.4 
2010 24,125.0 10.6 in 2011 16,680.0 7.7 
2011 20,002.0 9.3 in 2012 13,0191.0 6.5 
2012 14,779.0 7.3 for 2013 1,584.0 0.8 
  in 2013 7,639.0 3.8 
2013 9,359.0 4.6 for 2014 3,065.0 1.5 
  in 2014 4,016.0 1.9 
2014 4,404.0 2.1  
Cumulative 51,969.0 30.6 
Source: Adapted by the author from European Commission (2012a) 
 
(1) The fiscal consolidation measures included in the MoU of May 
2010 aimed to increase tax revenue and cut expenditures. The measures 
designed to increase tax revenue were largely based on the provisions of 
the Tax Law adopted on April 23, 2010 (Law 3842/2010). This law 
provided for increases in VAT rates; increases in the excise taxes on fuel, 
cigarettes and alcohol; the introduction of a luxury goods tax (yachts, 
pools, and cars); special emergency levies on profitable firms; presumptive 
taxation (frequently inaccurately referred to as a “tax amnesty”); and steep 
increases in tax rates on property, followed by the introduction of new tax 
measures on property (European Commission 2010, 17). According to the 
government plans, revenues would be increased by the equivalent of 
approximately 4% of GDP through 2013 (MoU 2010, 8). The cuts in 
spending were to be achieved through nominal wage cuts in the public 
sector of approximately 7% of the basic salary (thus leaving other forms of 
compensation and benefits – notably constituting a lion’s share of 
remuneration in the public sector – intact); reductions in Easter, summer 
and Christmas bonuses and allowances; nominal pension cuts of 9% 
through a reduction in Easter, summer and Christmas bonuses; and a 
reduction in the largest pensions. Other measures included intermediate 
consumption cuts (e.g. managing ministry expenses) and a reduction in 
public investments (MoF 2010a). Overall, the government presented a 
rather ambitious programme of fiscal consolidation of a rare scale, i.e., 
7.8% of GDP in the first year of the process (MoF 2011a, 8). In line with 
the government’s plans, the reduction in the general government deficit of 
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5.0 percentage points (p.p.) in 2010 was to be followed by a 3 p.p. 
reduction in 2011, thus bringing the deficit from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to 
7.4% in 2011. The government declared that “fiscal measures will amount 
to more than 8 p.p. of GDP, but the nominal deficit drift in 2011 (the 
increase in interest payments, pension expenditures and other structural 
expenditures that would take place without the measures) is expected to 
reach 5 p. p. of GDP” (MoF 2011a, 8). 
(2) The Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy 2012–2015 (MTFS) approved 
by the Greek Parliament in June 2011 provided for additional fiscal 
consolidation measures valued at €28.3 billion (12% of GDP) for the 
period 2011–15. The MTFS’ objective was to reduce the general government 
deficit from 7.5% of GDP in 2011 to 2.6% of GDP in 2014. The MTFS 
included additional fiscal consolidation measures worth €6.5 billion or 
2.9% of GDP in 2011 (23.1% of the total fiscal effort), €6.8 billion or 
3.0% of GDP in 2012 (24.0% of the total), €5.2 billion or 2.2% of GDP in 
2013 (18.5% of the total), and €5.4 billion or 2.2% of GDP in 2014 (19.3% 
of the total fiscal effort). The government’s plan was to further reduce the 
general government deficit to approximately 1% of GDP in 2015, with 
measures worth €4.3 billion or 1.7% of GDP. Regarding reductions in 
public expenditures, the MTFS aimed to decrease such expenditures from 
51.4% of GDP in 2011 to approximately 44.4% of GDP in 2015 after the 
implementation of the measures. These reductions would include cuts in 
social transfers from 24% of GDP in 2011 to 20.0% in 2015; a reduction in 
the public sector wage bill from 9.6% of GDP in 2011 to 6.6% in 2015; 
and a reduction in intermediate consumption from 5.2% of GDP in 2011 to 
3.0% in 2015 (MoF 2011b, 2–3). Regarding revenue measures, the MTFS 
foresaw a decrease in public revenues from 40.9% of GDP in 2011 to 
37.6% of GDP in 2015 following the lapse of certain one-off measures 
taken in 2010 and 2011. However, public revenues were also expected to 
increase to 43.2% of GDP by 2015. “This rise in general government 
revenues [would] be driven mainly by increases in direct tax revenue 
(from 7.0% of GDP in 2011 to 8.2% in 2015); in indirect tax revenue 
(from 12.2% of GDP in 2011 to 13.2% in 2015); and a rise in social 
contributions from 9.5% of GDP in 2011 to 10.5% in 2015” (MoF 
2011b, 3). 
(3) In September 2011, on the occasion of a periodic review mission to 
Greece and in the face of a significant fiscal drift, dramatic negotiations 
took place in Athens with the Troika’s representatives leaving the 
negotiating room. As news reports suggested, the subject of the 
disagreement was the larger than expected budget deficit projected for 
2011. According to the Troika, the projected deficit was approximately 
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8.6%–8.7% of GDP due to omissions and gaps in the government’s policy. 
The government maintained that the deficit would be more than 1.1 p.p. 
smaller than the IMF’s estimates. On this basis, the government did not 
want to introduce any additional measures to balance out the expenditure 
drift. There was also a significant disagreement on the issue of privatisation, 
which in any case was delayed by the socialist government. As a result of 
the September talks with the Troika, the disbursement of the 6th tranche of 
the financial assistance to Greece was halted. In addition, the Troika called 
for additional measures valued at €1.7 billion on the grounds of a revenue-
lag of ca. €1.1 billion and increased spending of €600 million related to 
pension funds. To raise the required €1.7 billion and thus release the 
disbursement of the 6th tranche of the loan, the PASOK government 
introduced a new tax on property. This highly controversial tax will be 
discussed in the next section.  
(4) In February 2012, a “voluntary bond exchange programme” 
brokered by the Institute of International Finance (IIF) was enacted. The 
value of the bond exchange programme was set at a level of 53.5% 
(compared to the initially planned 50%). In other words, in line with the 
agreement, bonds in the hands of private creditors will be exchanged for 
new ones with nominal values corresponding to 46.5% of the “old” bonds. 
The actual loss that the creditors will incur amounts to, on average, 74%, 
largely due to the loss of future interest payments. The new bonds are 
issued by the Greek government (31% of the total) and the European 
Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) (15%) under English law (previously, the 
bulk of Greek bonds had a Greek law clause attached to them). As for the 
interest rates, depending on the maturity of the bonds, their holders will 
garner a 2% profit (for bonds maturing over the period February 2012 – 
February 2015), a 3% profit (for bonds maturing over the period 
February 2015 – February 2020), and a 4.3% profit for bonds maturing 
over the period February 2020 – February 2042. Moreover, as of 2015, the 
creditors participating in the bond exchange scheme will be entitled to a 
minor increase in interest rates should economic growth in Greece exceed 
the targets established in the agreement with the EU and the IMF. As a 
result of the programme, the share of Greek public debt that is held by 
private creditors will be reduced by 53.5%, which constitutes 
approximately 2/3 of Greek debt. Since in 2011 the value of Greek debt 
amounted to ca. €356 billion (ca. 165% of GDP), the bond exchange 
programme is expected to result in an effective debt reduction of ca. 
€109 billion. This reduction will allow Greece’s debt burden to be reduced 
by €3.2 billion annually, which – under specific circumstances – could 
allow the debt level to reach 120.5% of GDP by 2020 (Visvizi 2012d). 
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(5) On March 15, 2012, the IMF Executive Board approved a four-year 
€28 billion arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for 
Greece in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment programme. 
The details of the programme were laid out in the Second Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU II) supported by a financial assistance package of a 
total value of €130 billion co-financed by the IMF and the EU. The IMF’s 
decision to participate in the EU-IMF €130 billion four-year financial 
assistance programme for Greece completed the chain of events that was 
set in motion on October 26, 2011. In line with the agreement reached at 
that time, following a debt-restructuring arrangement, a new rescue 
package would be offered to Greece. The purpose of this package was to 
assist the country with meeting its payment obligations and to recapitalize 
Greek banks that would incur huge losses as a result of the bond exchange 
scheme. The support from the EU and IMF was conditional on Greece 
securing private creditors’ participation in the “voluntary bond exchange 
programme” and adopting a series of additional reform and fiscal 
consolidation measures. The MoU II primarily concerned structural 
spending reforms, which required additional measures beyond those 
already approved in the context of the 2011 MTFS and the 2012 budget. 
The programme required 1.5% of GDP worth of measures in 2012, 1.5% 
of GDP in tax administration improvements, and a further 5.5% of GDP 
worth of spending measures in 2013–14 to achieve the primary surplus 
target of 4.5% of GDP by 2014. As stated in MoU II, “[t]he bulk of 
adjustment will be achieved through expenditure cuts that aim at 
permanently reducing the size of the state and improving government 
efficiency, including by closing entities that no longer provide a cost-
effective public service and by targeted reductions in public employment. 
Many of these cuts will need to fall on social transfers, the category of 
spending which increased most explosively in the post euro accession 
period” (IMF 2012, 7). The first tranche (€1.65 billion) of the financial aid 
was disbursed on Friday, March 16, 2012. 
(6) Shortly after the Parliamentary Elections of June 17, 2012, which 
resulted in the formation of a coalition government (Visvizi 2012a), 
additional fiscal consolidation measures were discussed. To ensure that the 
2012 budget deficit remained manageable, the governing coalition agreed 
on additional measures generating €3 billion in expenditure savings. These 
measures would involve reductions in ministry operating costs, the 
cancellation of some benefits received by the cabinet, as well as further 
reductions in pension levels and social transfers, among other measures. 
Moreover, throughout the summer of 2012, discussions were held 
regarding additional measures worth a total of €11.5 billion to be 
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introduced over the period 2013–14. These measures (to be approved in 
September 2012) foresee a significant decrease in the general government 
expenditures to be achieved, among others, via reduction of employment 
in the public sector. 
4. Expenditure-reducing measures in Greece:  
their efficiency and appropriateness 
In discussing the efficiency and appropriateness of the fiscal consolidation 
measures implemented in Greece over the period 2010–2012, it is 
necessary to emphasise that contrary to the initial provisions of the MoU, 
the burden of fiscal adjustment was shifted towards the private sector. 
Table 10-2 attests to this shift. Moreover, although – as seen from the 
perspective of the last two years – Greece’s consolidation efforts have 
been considerable, neither the revenue enhancing measures nor the 
expenditure reducing efforts were as successful as the government and the 
Troika had expected. This raises some questions about the appropriateness 
of the design and of the assumptions underlying the fiscal consolidation 
programme agreed for Greece. For instance, one of the questions is, why 
regardless of the obvious signs of a deepening recession in the Greek 
economy, additional strain was imposed on the private sector via multiple 
increases in taxation. This issue is particularly relevant given the fact that 
one of the major weaknesses of the Greek economy is related to the 
excessive size of the public sector and the abusive role of the state in the 
economy. It is the private sector that – irrespective of the squeezed liberal 
space in Greece – used to keep the economy going and provided the means 
to finance the public sector. Paradoxically however, the fiscal 
consolidation programme implemented over the period 2009–2012, rather 
than supporting the “healthier lung” of the Greek economy, in a systematic 
way led to the exhaustion of the private sector. Clearly, several other 
questions regarding the empirical pattern of fiscal adjustment in Greece 
still need to be answered in future research. In the following paragraphs, 
the largely failed attempts at reducing expenditures will be discussed. In 
the next section some details explaining the revenue drift will be outlined.  
One of the flagship reforms advertised by the PASOK government 
throughout 2010 concerned the pension system. The objective of the 
reform was to simplify the fragmented pension system, enhance 
transparency and fairness, increase and equalise the retirement ages1 and 
                                                          
1 For instance, the statutory retirement age for women was to be extended by 5 
years to age 65 to match the retirement age for men. Successively, the statutory 
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decrease the unfounded generosity of retirement benefits available to the 
public sector employees,2 while preserving adequate pension levels for the 
low- and middle-income earners (MoU II, 8). Moreover, to generate 
further savings, state contributions (in the form of grants) to the 
supplementary (public) pension funds that exist in Greece were to be 
decreased by reducing the number of the funds (from 13 to 3 by the end of 
2018) and by diminishing the value of transfers to eligible pensioners.3 
None of the above plans was implemented until 2012. Instead, the socialist 
government introduced three successive cuts to pension levels over the 
period 2010 – May 2012. However, irrespective of the dramatic cuts in 
pension levels, the general government expenditures on pensions and 
grants to social security funds increased substantially over the period 
2010–2012 (see Table 10-4 for details). One of the reasons behind this 
“overshooting” is related to the government deliberately avoiding 
restructuring the public sector. 
                                                                                                                         
retirement age was to be extended to age 67 for both men and women. In addition, 
early retirement below the age of 60 was to be curtailed. In line with the provisions 
of the existing regulations, employees can draw a pension below that age if they 
have paid contributions for a certain number of years or had children under 18. 
2 In line with the existing regulations, upon their retirement the public sector 
employees would receive a generous one-off payment/bonus ranging from €30,000 
for the lowest-rank employees to ca. €160,000 for the medium-rank civil servants. 
The retirement bonuses granted to employees of the Bank of Greece would reach 
the value of €400,000. As the data revealed by the coalition government in August 
2012 suggest, these values are disproportionate to the total value of individual 
contributions and beyond what the retirement funds can afford. In August 2012, 
Antonis Samaras, head of the coalition government, ordered the bonuses disbursed 
in 2011 and 2012 to be paid back. 
3 It should be noted that several of the funds had very good financial positions, 
which was a reflection of prudent financial management by the individuals who 
established them. Consequently, the complementary pension transfers to fund 
members that these funds could afford did not constitute any burden whatsoever on 
the state budget. Of course, contrasting examples exist. The thrust of the reform 
was to treat all funds – unfairly so – as if all of them were in financial difficulty. 
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Table 10-4 Expenditures on pensions & contributions to social security 
funds in millions of EUR 
 
 2010 2011 2012
Pensions 6.25 6.572 6.511
Funds 10.376 11.78 13.119
Sum 16.626 18.352 19.63
% GDP 7.31 8.53 9.71*
*indicates GDP size with a recession estimated at 6%
Source: MoF (2010b, 2011c, 2012) 
 
The question of the size and efficiency of Greece’s public sector has 
been a recurrent topic in the official discourse on the crisis in Greece. Low 
productivity, a lack of transparency, a high degree of unionisation, 
corruption, and causing a burden on the state budget are the most accurate 
descriptors of the public sector in Greece. “Low and middle-rank civil 
servants have higher wages than similar private sector employees, 
although they work on average fewer hours and have greater job security” 
(OECD 2011a, 11). The public sector in Greece nourishes clientele’s 
connections and generates countless functional spill-overs for the entire 
economy. In this sense, the Greek public sector resembles bureaucratic 
communist public sectors. Regarding the size of the Greek public sector, it 
is not easy to reconcile the official data produced by relevant ministries or 
published by international institutions such as the OECD or IMF. 
Specifically, data provided by the Greek Ministry of Administrative 
Reform indicate that the general government employment was 715,882 in 
2009, 683,627 in 2010 and 664,223 in 2011 (European Commission 
2012a, 24). These numbers would suggest a rather small public sector, an 
observation also made by the OECD (2011b, 2). It is important to stress, 
however, that the official records do not include all of the employees of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs); the data do not include countless experts 
and committee members employed (and remunerated generously) by all of 
the ministries and other government bodies; the data do not include 
employees without tenure, referred to in Greece as “stagiaires.” Accordingly, 
the above numbers concerning the size of the Greek public sector should 
be increased by another 250,000, with the cost of its maintenance “hidden” 
in extra-budgetary accounts. To obtain a complete picture of the scale of 
the problem that the public sector generates in Greece, it is worth noting 
that in late 2009, ca. 100,000 public sector employees opted for early 
retirement, fearing the consequences of the planned pension reform and 
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taking advantage of the generous compensation and benefit schemes that 
the public sector pension regime used to offer.  
Overall, the question of the size of the public sector in Greece and the 
cost that it generates for the state budget has been beset by confusion and 
conflicting arguments during the last two years, with the socialist 
government being unwilling to downsize it and the Troika exerting no 
particular pressure on the government to change the status quo. In 2011, 
the plan was to place some 30,000 employees on reserve; an alternative 
solution was to move employees across the public sector according to 
demand. While the successes of the first measure were insignificant, the 
alternative solution produced anecdotal outcomes in the form of, for 
example, public railway company employees being moved to state 
museums and crowding the museum cafeterias rather than offering 
assistance to tourists. 
Considering the problem of the public sector from the fiscal 
consolidation perspective, as Table 10-5 demonstrates, the nominal value 
of expenditures on wages and salaries (however, including only the central 
government, hospitals and other government bodies and excluding the 
SOEs4) decreased slightly over the period 2010–2012. However, given the 
economic recession, the percentage change in expenditures relative to 
GDP has been negligible, thus indicating a sustained need of serious 
consolidation efforts in the public sector. Until now, as a means of 
avoiding the political cost related to possible public sector restructuring, 
the PASOK government deliberately channelled the burden of fiscal 
adjustment in Greece to the already squeezed private sector. In this way, 
the public sector, including the civil servants, SOEs and the powerful trade 
unions, were spared from the dramatic experience of fiscal adjustment that 
the rest of the Greek society endured over the period 2010–2012.5 One 
could argue that as a result of this politically driven selective approach to 
how to split the burden of fiscal consolidation, the PASOK government 
aggravated the cleavage that exists between the public and the private 
sectors in Greece and thus between the relevant groups of the population. 
It is worth noting that any media discussion of downsizing the public 
sector stumbles on the argument that public sector employees will be fired. 
                                                          
4 In August 2012 it was revealed that the majority of SOEs did not conform to the 
2011 law providing for the introduction of a uniform salary scheme for the civil 
servants and the SOEs, i.e., they maintained the excessively high levels of salaries, 
compensation and benefits intact. 
5 Note, that wages in the private sector have been substantially reduced in 2011 and 
2012, while the minimum salary level for employees under the age of 25 has been 
set at the level of €571. 
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In this context, the negative socio-economic consequences thereof are 
pointed to. At the same time, however, people seem to have reconciled 
with the 1 million-plus unemployed individuals who lost their jobs in the 
private sector.6 The paradox is that these individuals would not have lost 
their jobs had the socialist government restructured the public sector, 
hence had it reduced the general government expenditure, and – through 
liberalization and deregulation – limited the role of the state in the 
economy. In this way, there would be no need to move to excessive 
taxation aimed at balancing the expenditure drift. 
 
Table 10-5 Expenditures on wages & salaries 2010–2012, in 
millions of EUR 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
Central 
government 
wages & salaries 12,180 11,340 10,439 
other allowances 312 7 283 
productivity bonus 597 517 36 
ΕΟΠΥΥ 0 0 444 
Salaries for hospital personnel and other 
government bodies 3,318 3,102 2,765 
Sum  16,407 14,970 13,967 
% GDP  7.22 6.95 6.91* 
*based on the assumption of a recession of the size of 6% of GDP; 
ΕΟΠΥΥ: National Organisation for Healthcare Provision; 
Source: MoF (2010b, 2011c, 2012) 
 
Overall, as depicted in Table 10-6, some progress has been achieved 
with regard to controlling expenditures in Greece during 2010–2012. 
However, the failed pension system reform did not yield any outcomes in 
the form of reduced expenditures. Rather, the three consecutive cuts in 
pension levels forced many elderly citizens into poverty. Moreover, the 
local administration reform known as “Kalikrates”, which the PASOK 
government argued was a major achievement in terms of savings, led to 
organisational chaos in municipalities rather than decreasing public 
expenditures. Notably, although presented as a novelty, the local 
administration reform was scheduled and planned for years by the 
socialists, mainly to influence the distribution of political support in the 
                                                          
6 The tragedy of the situation is that the majority of these unemployed are not 
eligible for unemployment support/benefits, as is the case with self-employed 
owners of shops, taverns, small manufacturing entities, etc. 
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Greek countryside in view of future elections. Finally, the restructuring of 
the public sector, a reform that would have yielded multiple gains for the 
Greek economy, has been largely avoided by the PASOK government for 
reasons of political convenience. 
 
Table 10-6 General government expenditures: major categories of 
expenditure 2007–2011, excluding extra-budgetary funds 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Compensation of employees, payable 
% GDP 11.4 12 13.4 12.2 12.1 
in m. of EUR 25,464.0 27,986.0 31,002.0 27,770.0 26,066.0 
Social benefits (other than in kind social transfers) 
% GDP 17.9 19.6 21.1 20.8 21.9 
in m. of EUR 39,941.0 45,757.0 48,972.0 47,220.0 47,026.0 
Expenditures on local government 
% GDP 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.9 
in m. of EUR 6,013.0 6,675.0 7,651.0 6,465.0 6,306.0 
Total general government expenditures 
% GDP 47.6 50.6 53.8 50.2 50.1 
in m. of EUR 106,009.0 117,963.0 124,646.0 114,106.0 107,769.0 
Source: Eurostat 
5. Revenue-enhancing measures in Greece:  
their efficiency and appropriateness 
The government sought to increase revenues by broadening the tax 
base and introducing new temporary and permanent tax measures. Over 
the period 2010–2012, several tax increases (affecting both natural and 
legal persons) were introduced, while tax exemptions and discounts were 
largely abolished. However, as Table 10-A1 demonstrates, irrespective of 
increased excise duties, the steep increases in taxation, and regardless of a 
number of emergency levies imposed on companies, personal income, 
property, and the so-called luxury goods, a significant revenue-drift has 
occurred over the period 2010–2012. Rather than being offset by 
expenditure reducing measures, the revenue-drift was addressed with 
further increases in taxation. As the tax measures introduced over the 
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period January 2010 – March 2012 have been incommensurate with the 
companies’ and individuals’ ability to pay, the private economy contracted 
and unemployment exploded to 23.1% in May 2012, compared to 16.8% 
in May 2011 (ELSTAT 2012b). 
According to the results of a study conducted on a sample of 1,200 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Greece, 64.7% anticipate that the 
situation of their businesses will deteriorate in the second half of 2012. 
The commercial and services sectors will be the most affected by the 
worsening economic situation in the country. The same study reveals that 
almost 190,000 enterprises face a high risk of closing. The net loss of 
businesses during the next 12 months is estimated to be 67,000, which 
implies a risk of further job losses amounting to 260,000, including 
employers, the self-employed and employees (IME GSEVEE 2012). 
Currently, several of the companies that continue to exist either do not 
remunerate their employees in full or do not do so regularly and on time. 
Finally, it should be noted that the general government revenues from 
taxation decreased by ca. 8% in 2010 and by a further ca. 4% in 2011. 
Further decrease in revenue collection on account of taxation is expected 
to take place in 2012. In addition, companies’ contributions to the public 
insurance funds decreased dramatically over the period 2010–2012, thus 
creating an additional strain on the state budget. Specifically, data indicate 
that by July 2012 these funds consumed 74.2% of resources assigned to 
them in the 2012 state budget. Taking into account the estimates of an 
economic recession of at least 6% in 2012, the prospects for the execution 
of the state budget are grim. It is for this reason that the Troika demanded 
that the new coalition government imposed an additional €3 billion in 
expenditure-reducing measures for 2012 alone. As noted earlier, a package 
of additional measures of the value of €11.5 billion for the years 2013–
2014 was scheduled to be approved by the Greek Parliament in September 
2012. 
With regard to indirect taxation, over the period 2010–2011, VAT rates 
were raised three times, i.e., in March 2010 (from 4.5% to 5.0%, 9.0% to 
10.0%, and 19.0% to 21%), in July 2010 (from 5.0 to 5.5%, 10.0% to 
11.0%, and 21% to 23%), and in January 2011 (from 5.5% to 6.5% and 
11% to 13%). It should be noted that the range of goods and services 
covered by the highest VAT rates increased significantly, and the lowest 
rate is rarely applied. Faced with a demand crisis and negative consumer 
sentiments, Greek businesses were forced to absorb the successive 
increases in VAT rates, thus decreasing their already marginal gains, to 
maintain price levels. In this context, it is important to highlight one of the 
most contested changes in VAT policy, which concerns the gastronomy 
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sector, retail food and beverages. As of September 2011, VAT rates 
increased from 13% to 23%, thus causing an additional pressure on the 
owners of restaurants, bars, taverns, etc. Clearly, the majority of prices 
increased in such establishments, thus affecting the already damaged 
competitiveness of these sectors that are so important for the Greek 
tourism industry. 
Regarding excise duties and other taxes imposed on the petroleum 
products sector, over the period June 2010–June 2012, the cost of 
petroleum products increased, mainly due to taxes, by 80%, with the 
average price for 1 litre of unleaded petrol reaching €1,743 by the end of 
July 2012.7 Further increases in price levels are expected due to a rise in 
distillation costs (POPEK 2012). Considering the declining purchasing 
power of Greek consumers, in the first half of 2011, consumption levels 
plummeted to 35% compared to a comparable period in 2008. A 13% 
decrease in gasoline consumption was recorded in the first quarter of 2011 
(compared to the first quarter of 2010) in addition to a 19% decrease in 
diesel consumption. Accordingly, since 2010, more than 1,200 gasoline 
stations have been closed, and 1,000 more will close by the end of 2012, 
thus causing job losses of ca. 5,000. 
Another highly contested set of tax measures concerns property taxes. 
To understand these measures, it is necessary to outline some basic 
features of the Greek property market. That is, 8 out of 10 Greeks own 
some form of property, such as an apartment, a house, a plot of land, or a 
property designed for professional use. In Greece, it is common to inherit 
property. Thus, owning property is not the same as having income. 
Nevertheless, confusion and several myths beset the issue of property 
(taxation) in Greece, with the most common misconception being that 
property owners should be paying extra taxes simply because they own it. 
This incorrect view, expressed frequently in the public discourse in 
Greece, links – wrongly so – ownership of property to the ability to pay 
increased taxation. Clearly, and it should be emphasized, as long as 
property is not rented or subject to a sales contract, it generates no profits. 
Thus, the owners’ ability to pay taxes on account of owning either a plot of 
land, a house/apartment used for living, or an unrented apartment is nil, 
because no correlation between owning a property and the income level 
exists. 
                                                          
7 According to the 2012 Bloomberg Gas Price Ranking that sorts 60 countries by 
average price at the pump and by “pain at the pump”, locates Greece at the 9th 
position as regards the “most-expensive-gas”, and at the 26th position as regards 
the “pain at the pump”, i.e. well ahead of the UK, France or Germany. 
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The steep increases in property taxation in Greece have had severe 
ramifications, e.g., on the rental market, the construction sector and 130 
related industries and on general government revenue (see Table 10-A1 for 
details). With respect to the rental market, as the economy contracts, 
demand falls, and the tax burden increases, a 50% decrease in rents (for 
offices, stores, and apartments) has taken place across Greece, with 
countless stores and offices available for rent even in central locations of 
Athens. Despite the fact that a 20–30% decrease was observed in rental 
prices over the period 2010–2012, demand still does not match supply. 
Accordingly, the number of transactions in the real estate sector decreased 
from nearly 40,000 in the fourth quarter of 2007 to less than 10,000 in the 
fourth quarter of 2011, while the value of the transactions plummeted. 
Regarding the construction sector, it should be noted that following the 
liquidity crunch in 2009 and 2010, augmented by increases in taxation, the 
number of building permits decreased from 42,891 (over the period May-
April 2010–211) to 35,393 (over the period May-April 2011–2012), 
constituting a 17.5% decline. However, the decline in building area was 
even more spectacular, reaching a value of 30.5% over the same time-
frame (ELSTAT 2012a, 3). 
As a footnote in the discussion of property taxation in Greece, one 
should mention yet another direct tax levied on it. Imposed temporarily for 
a period of two years, i.e., 2011 and 2012, this special property tax 
imposes payments on real estate (€0.50 – €20.00 per square metre) to be 
collected via electricity bills. The planned revenue increase from this 
measure was estimated to be €1.7 billion annually. The enforcement of this 
measure was to be improved by eliminating access to electricity in cases of 
non-payment. Several problems, contingencies and controversies plague 
this tax measure. On the one hand, a very important constitutionality 
question was raised in that it is illegal for the Public Power Corporation 
(ΔΕΗ) to arbitrarily decide to shut off power for reasons other than 
electricity consumption. In fact, in March 2012, the Council of the State 
ruled against power being shut off if the property tax is not paid. On the 
other hand, several unintended exceptions in the imposition of this tax 
measure were revealed; similarly, several accounting mistakes were 
detected. Finally, the primary problem related to this tax measure is that it 
is detached from the income of the tax payer. Although in March 5, 2012, 
the Council of Ministers decided to replace the special property tax with a 
new tax as of 2013, to generate revenues €2.3 billion per year, the fate of 
this tax measure remains uncertain. The most probable scenario is that it 
will be incorporated in the ordinary property taxation. 
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In any discussion on fiscal consolidation and structural reform, the 
question of privatisation cannot be omitted. In the case of Greece, the 
privatisation process is particularly important in that rather than producing 
imminent privatisation receipts,8 it may trigger a path-dependent restoration 
of the Greek economic system and thus push Greece onto a growth path. 
In other words, it has to be noted that privatisation in Greece should not be 
conceived of as a fire-sale to generate one-off revenues. Rather, 
privatisation should be regarded as a process that will allow for the 
deregulation, liberalization and restructuring of the Greek economy, 
downsizing the public sector, and limiting general government 
expenditures (Visvizi 2012b). In addition, an added bonus of privatising 
the SOEs is that it may contribute to breaking the monopoly and the 
influence that the trade unions exert in Greece. Nevertheless, although 
privatisation holds a great deal of promise, it seems that Greece’s socialist 
government and the Troika itself adopted a misconceived approach to this 
process. Although over the period 2004–2009, the then centre-right 
government of Nea Democratia successfully accomplished privatisations 
valued at €11 billion, thus suggesting that privatisation in Greece is 
feasible, the MoU of 2010 contains only the following laconic statement 
on the matter: “Prepare a privatisation plan for the divestment of state 
assets and enterprises with the aim to raise at least €1 billion a year during 
the period 2011–2013” (MoU 2010, 45). 
In 2011, the Troika exerted significant pressure on the government to 
draft a privatisation plan valued at €50 billion; however, without any 
tangible results. In contrast, the MoU II includes several provisions on 
privatisation, the most specific of which is that “the government 
anticipates €50bn in proceeds over the lifetime of the asset sale program, 
including at least €19bn through 2015” (European Commission 2012a, 
108). Although in August 2012 the coalition government opened several 
tender procedures for the exploitation of property and for the acquisition 
of shares or licences, the fate of privatizations in Greece remains 
uncertain. Undeniably, the most difficult of all will be privatization of the 
SOEs. At this point several unresolved questions remain, for instance: 
which model of privatisation should be followed? Here, it seems that the 
experience of the successful privatisation process in Poland in the early 
1990s has been neglected by the Greek authorities and the Troika. 
                                                          
8 The interesting point here is that receipts from any potential future successful 
privatizations in Greece will not be directed to the state-budget, but to the treasury 
established especially for this purpose, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund S.A. Accordingly, any proceeds from privatizations will be reserved for 
servicing Greece’s debt. 
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Moreover, the legal framework for the privatisation process remains a 
sensitive issue. Therefore another question is whether those responsible for 
the process will be granted immunity, thereby shielding them from 
possible unfounded future accusations of political adversaries. As long as the 
above questions remain open, the odds for privatisation in Greece seem low. 
6. The (thorny issue of tax compliance and the) myth  
of tax evasion 
The notions of tax evasion, tax compliance and corruption have been 
making the headlines since late 2009, depicting Greece – at least at the 
popular level and undeservedly so – as a nation of corrupt, notorious tax 
dodgers. As will be argued in this section, to avoid politically costly 
restructuring of the public sector, the tax evasion argument was employed 
instrumentally by the Greek socialist government over the last couple of 
years to manipulate public opinion (at home and abroad) into believing 
that tax evasion and corruption were the causes of Greece’s downturn. 
Furthermore, as fiscal consolidation in Greece over the period May 2010 – 
June 2012 did not yield the expected results and an expenditure drift 
occurred, the same argument of tax evasion was employed by the PASOK 
government to legitimize additional tax increases. In other words, since 
late 2009, the socialist government embarked on a strategy of a ceaseless 
talk of tax evasion, of the necessity to enhance fiscal audit and to “catch” 
the tax dodgers. Unsurprisingly, in the public discourse tax dodgers were 
associated mostly with the rich and with the successful members of the 
society. It can be argued therefore that tax evasion and corruption were 
employed instrumentally by the socialist government for two correlated 
reasons. On the one hand, they served the purpose of diverting the 
society’s attention from the real causes of the crisis, i.e. the huge public 
sector and the abusive role of the state in the economy, in order to create 
an opportunity structure enabling the government to avoid the politically 
costly structural reforms. On the other hand, the same arguments were 
employed to create an image of a committed socialist government engaged 
with issues of social justice. This in turn was to improve the popularity of 
the government and the social support for it. Sadly so, the myth of tax 
evasion and corruption in Greece fell on a fertile ground of naivety, 
misconceptions and stereotypes about Greece and about the causes of the 
crisis. Accordingly, to a considerable extent the myth of tax evasion 
dwarfed the talk of reforms and economic growth in Greece. As the 
argument of tax evasion and corruption seems to be returning to the public 
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discourse regarding the crisis in Greece, it is necessary to make some 
points on it by means of clarification.  
According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2011, Greece occupies the daunting 80th position with a score of 3.4 
(on a scale up to 10.0) and is comparable to El Salvador, Colombia, Morocco, 
Peru and Thailand. Amongst its European peers, Greece is followed only 
by Bulgaria, which receives a score of 3.3. It would seem that the results 
of the Eurobarometer (2012) survey released in February 2012 confirm 
these results, in that 98% of Greek respondents perceive corruption to be a 
major problem in Greece, and 80% of Greek respondents believe that 
corruption within their country is more widespread than in other EU 
countries. As revealing as these findings may be, they are based on 
perceptions aggregated through opinion polls and surveys. Even if 
Transparency International seeks to have its surveys peer reviewed, the 
initial dataset remains subjective. It has long been demonstrated that 
scandals, crises, and allegations of corruption (frequently fuelled by the 
media and employed instrumentally for domestic politicking) affect 
people’s perceptions of the degree of corruption. 
The notions of tax evasion and corruption are frequently (and wrongly) 
blended into a single concept in the public discourse on Greece and seem 
to preoccupy some politicians and opinion-makers at home and abroad. 
Therefore, it is pertinent to elucidate some numbers that are readily 
available on the OECD portal. The provisional data for 2010 indicate that 
total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP was 30.9% in Greece, compared 
to 36.3% in Germany, 28% in Ireland and 48.2% in Denmark. The value of 
taxes on goods and services in 2009 as a percentage of GDP reached 
10.8% in Greece, 11.1% in Germany, 10.1% in Ireland, 11.7% in Poland 
and 15.4% in Denmark. The major difference in the shares of tax 
contributions to total GDP is identifiable for taxes on income and profits. 
In 2009, their share as a percentage of GDP reached a value of 7.6% in 
Greece, compared to 10.8% in Germany, 10.1% in Ireland and 29.4% in 
Denmark. 
In this context, an OECD report (OECD 2011a, 10) notes that 
“personal income tax revenues are more than 5% of GDP below the euro-
area average, although statutory rates are not especially low.” The OECD 
further suggests – rightly so – that the so-called self-employed, including 
plumbers, electricians, nurses etc., might be the culprits in this regard. The 
August 2011 OECD Economic Survey on Greece stated that “[i]f Greece 
collected its VAT, social security contributions and corporate income tax 
with the average efficiency of OECD countries, tax revenues could rise by 
nearly 5% of GDP.” Notably, the value of the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) 
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for Greece is 0.41 (OECD 2011c). This finding implies that 59% of 
potential revenues from VAT are not collected. This number would seem to 
confirm the argument of tax evasion in Greece, were it not for the 
observation that the VRR levels for the UK and Spain are the same as that 
of Greece. Moreover, the VRR value for Germany, 0.55, falls below the 
2008 OECD average (unweighted) of 0.58. 
Overall, the numbers presented here clearly suggest that, although tax 
evasion exists in Greece, it is not as severe a problem as the media and 
some politicians portray it to be. Until 2010, in some cases, Greece fared 
better than other countries, and in some cases the performance of Greece 
was comparable to countries that no-one would dare to call countries of 
tax dodgers. The paradox is that, like in a self-fulfilling prophecy, as a 
result of excessive taxation that caused an exponential contraction of the 
private economy, data for 2011 and 2012 may reveal heightened levels of 
tax evasion as well as growth of the grey sphere of the economy. Whereas 
neither of these two is a welcome development, both of these phenomena 
serve as a depiction of how the state has crowded out private agents from 
the economy to a clear detriment of fiscal consolidation and the reform 
process. Consequently, the insistence by some politicians in the West, 
including the Troika, regarding the argument of tax evasion in Greece is 
worrying in that it overshadows the necessary debate on transforming the 
Greek economic system. The danger here is that an overemphasis on tax 
evasion, and the resulting overemphasis on increasing taxation (a new tax 
law is to be submitted to the Greek Parliament in September 2012), rather 
than a focus on creating conditions for growth (via a sustained effort at 
restructuring the public sector, liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation), is counterproductive and thus is likely to capsize genuine 
efforts at rescuing Greece (Visvizi 2012e). 
7. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to discuss the background and the 
scope of the fiscal consolidation process implemented in Greece over the 
period May 2010 – June 2012. A particular focus of the discussion was 
placed on the efficiency and appropriateness of the fiscal policy measures 
introduced by the socialist PASOK government as a means of addressing 
the sovereign debt crisis in Greece. It was argued that contrary to the 
government’s assertions and provisions included in the MoU of May 2010, 
the government deliberately channelled the burden of fiscal adjustment 
towards the private sector of the economy to avoid the politically costly 
necessities of reducing expenditures and restructuring the public sector. 
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Consequently, as a result of tax-based fiscal adjustment, significant 
contractionary effects have occurred in the Greek economy, and general 
government revenues plummeted. Neither exports nor domestic demand 
could offset these contractionary effects. Therefore, in mid-2012, 
i.e., more than two years after the launch of the generous EU-IMF 
€110 billion financial assistance programme for Greece, despite the 
“voluntary bond exchange programme” followed by a second financial 
package worth €130 billion, the outcomes of fiscal adjustment in Greece 
remain at least uncertain. Clearly, the coalition government formed in 
Greece after the June 17 elections seems committed and able to navigate 
the stormy waters of fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, the domestic and 
external challenges that the coalition government faces are not conducive 
to success (Visvizi 2012a). Having said that, several practical and 
theoretical questions emerge that will be addressed in future research. 
Specifically, on the one hand, it is necessary to investigate the empirical 
pattern of the IMF intervention in Greece and its variability. On the other 
hand, it seems that a closer examination of the theoretical aspects of fiscal 
consolidation in Greece would be needed. 
In the rich body of literature on the variability of fiscal consolidation, a 
number of assumptions and hypotheses regarding the efficiency of fiscal 
consolidation have been tested. In this strand of research, the major 
question is which of the two alternative means of fiscal consolidation, i.e., 
expenditure reduction or revenue enhancement, produces better results. 
Moreover, additional questions include what can serve as a driver of 
growth in periods of fiscal consolidation, i.e., domestic demand or exports, 
and what the role of monetary policy vis-à-vis fiscal consolidation can be. 
Overall, research suggests that “spending-based adjustments are 
considerably less contractionary than tax-based adjustments” (Guajardo 
et al. 2011, 26). In this context, Konstantinou and Tagkalakis (2010, 3) 
conclude that “cuts in direct taxes generate a positive effect on consumer 
and business confidence (…). [At the same time], higher government wage 
bills and government investment reduce confidence, possibly because they 
entail a permanent increase in the size of the public sector, which would 
have to be financed by higher future taxes.” Addressing the question of the 
efficiency of fiscal adjustment in the face of a considerable debt-to-GDP 
ratio, Deák and Lenarčič (2011) observe that “a government spending 
shock has a positive and a tax receipt shock a negative effect on output 
over time. However, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is above [a certain] 
threshold, then fiscal policy has no significant effect on output.” Each of 
these contributions offers important insights likely to benefit the study of 
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the theoretical and empirical patterns of fiscal consolidation in Greece 
over the period 2010–2012. Treating these studies as a point of departure, 
it would be particularly interesting to examine the fiscal consolidation 
process in Greece from the perspective of the “expansionary fiscal 
consolidation” hypothesis (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990) in the absence of 
monetary policy. It should be noted of course that Perotti (2011) questions 
the hypothesis of expansionary fiscal consolidation and its applicability in 
the euro zone. He argues that limited policy options are available to euro-
zone members, i.e., “a depreciation is not available to EMU members, 
except possibly vis-à-vis non‐euro members. [And] an expansion based on 
exports is not available to the world as a whole.” Therefore, as Perotti 
suggests, the odds of expansionary fiscal consolidation in the euro zone 
are low. Yet, because several euro-zone members are currently undergoing 
fiscal consolidation, it could still be of benefit to test the Greek case 
against the expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis and to draw 
relevant lessons from it. The questions to be addressed therefore would 
include whether an alternative – to monetary policy measures – policy-mix 
exists to effectively address fiscal imbalances in countries that are 
members of a monetary union. In the specific case of the EMU, would it 
be consistent with domestic-level solutions, with euro-zone-wide 
approaches, or with a combination of both of them? The Greek case bears 
the promise of providing some insights on these questions. 
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In his 1966 Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge titled On the Causes of the 
Slow Rate of Economic Growth in the UK, the Hungarian-born British 
economist Nicholas Kaldor presented a series of “laws” to account for the 
growth rate differences between Britain and 12 more successful 
economies, such as the US, Germany and France. He called his method 
Circular Cumulative Causation, a multi-causal approach where the 
interdependencies between the explanatory factors were strong and the 
variables were interlinked in the determination of the outcome. In Kaldor’s 
interpretation, the UK’s main problem at that time was the slow growth of 
productivity, caused by slow growth in the manufacturing sector. Why did 
that matter? He found that industrial productivity was positively related to 
the growth of industry – i.e. the law of increasing returns to scale was 
strongly manifested. The objective, methodology and central analytical 
concepts of this paper are similar. We will examine the causes of slow 
growth in the Hungarian economy. As will be seen, the increasing returns 
to scale, which Kaldor took from Young’s (1928) seminal study, also 
occupy a central position in this paper. 
2. The Facts 
2.1 The Red Queen paradox 
For average Hungarians, the regime change of 1989/1990 did not 
produce the expected result: the country was unable to catch up with the 
Western market economies, even after two decades. While fundamental 
changes did occur on a broad front, our economic rivals also advanced as 
fast as Hungary. This is the so-called Red Queen Paradox, an often-used 
metaphor in everyday life, such as in economics, arms races, and 
evolutionary biology. 
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The Red Queen is a fictional character in Lewis Carroll's fantasy 
novella Through the Looking-Glass, the sequel to Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland. Speaking with Alice, the central heroine of both works, the 
Red Queen describes her empire as a system in which “it takes all the 
running you can do to keep in the same place.” In narrow, economic terms 
this is a perfect depiction of capitalist rivalry: if your competitors are 
moving ahead, you must move faster to not lose ground. In broader 
evolutionary terms (Van Valen 1973), the message is, “For an evolutionary 
system, continuing development is needed just to maintain its fitness 
relative to the systems it is co-evolving with.” 
 
2.1.1  Competition worldwide 
 
While the Red Queen Paradox is not well known in Hungarian 
economic parlance,1 its primary message did become frequently used in 
policy discussions: Hungary must grow twice as fast as the EU countries 
to catch up with them. 
Is it possible to catch up with the forerunners and leave them behind? 
The first intuitive answer is yes. Hungary has a mid-sized developed 
economy with a per capita GDP level 25% higher than the world average. 
Between certain selected years – such as 1997–2006 – the Hungarian 
economy did grow faster than the EU-15,2 and there were four calendar 
years (2002–2005) when the Hungarian growth rate was at least twice as 
high as the EU-15 average. Furthermore, if we disaggregate growth by 
regions, the numbers show that the Central Hungarian Region’s per capita 
GDP surpassed the EU-27 average in 2004. Why should there be any 
doubt that the performance of the most developed Hungarian region can be 
emulated by the country as a whole in the next 2 to 3 decades?3 
Yet there are good reasons to be wary of all this optimism. First, as 
shown elsewhere (Mihályi 2011a, b, c), during the last 140 years, Hungary 
had been unable to sustain above-average growth rates except for very 
short cyclical upswings. Kornai (1972) described this feature as the 
alteration of rush and harmonic growth periods. As illustrated in 
Figure 11-1, the exceptionally high and low growth rates should be 
interpreted in a comparative perspective, as the Red Queen Paradox 
                                                          
1 L. Carroll’s name is known thanks to his first book, which was translated into 
Hungarian in the 1930s. 
2 EU-15, as defined in EU statistics: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. 
3 Continued EU assistance can be also taken into account. 
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suggests. During this long time span, when Hungary was sometimes 
capable of producing a high average rate – such as the 3.8% in 1950–
1973 – the EU-12 countries4 displayed even higher growth rates. Between 
1990 and 2008, Hungary outperformed the EU-12, but its 2.2% growth 
was not particularly outstanding relative to the world average. In 
examining the entire period, there were several countries that produced 
2 to 3 times higher than average growth rates for a sustained period of time 
(e.g., Venezuela in 1870–1949; Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong in 1950–1989; 





Fig. 11-1 Long term growth rates of GDP/head in Hungary, in EU-12 and the 
world, 1870–2008 (Annual average changes in percentage) 
Source: Mihályi (2011a) based on Maddison (2010) 
 
Second, the example of the former German Democratic Republic is 
also compelling. In spite of the billions of Euros channelled from West 
Germany towards the Eastern Länder, the level gap hardly shrank after 
unification. Using a sophisticated econometric forecasting technique, 
Aumann and Scheufele (2010) concluded that it may require another 50 
years for the Eastern provinces of Germany to eliminate the gap with their 
                                                          
4 EU-12, as defined in Maddison (2010): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK. 
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Western peers. Third, there are important examples even among developed 
countries, where the distances actually grew between competitors. Using 
the US as a benchmark (= 100), Switzerland once achieved 93% and then 
fell back to 81%, Italy slid from 70% to 64%. The case of Japan is even 
more striking. Once widely admired, Japan climbed to 82% by 1996, but 
then by 2008 fell to 73% of the US income level. The list of failed 
catching-up stories is even longer if 5 to 6 Latin American countries and 
8 to 10 African countries are included, where growth was not simply 
slower than in the US but actually negative.5 
2.1.2  Competition among the transition economies 
Once Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, a new type of 
rivalry started; a competition between the former socialist countries in 
catching up with the core countries of the EU-15. Hungary was first 
compared with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland – the so-called 
Visegrád countries – but later the three Baltic countries were included in 
the standard analysis. During the first post-communist decade, Hungary 
always fared favourably in this comparison. However, in the next 10 years, 
this advantage was lost. As Figure 11-2 illustrates, Hungary hardly made 
any advancement between 1989 and 2010 relative to her new peers. 
Relative to the EU-15 average, Hungary advanced merely 1 percentage 
point in 20 years, from 54% to 55%. In the same period, Poland advanced 
from 38% of the EU-15 average to 55% (a total of 17 percentage points). 
While the raw data and the visual presentation suggest that Hungary’s 
performance in this kind of Red Queen Race was just about “normal,” this 
is not the public perception. In regard to comparison, people usually 
disregard the weaker competitors and envy the stronger ones. There are 
not many Hungarians who are impressed by a scholar or politician saying 
that Russia or Ukraine displayed an even worse performance than “we 
did”. Instead, they point to Poland and Slovakia, which were able to 
significantly reduce the gap separating them from the more advanced EU 
countries. For the average Hungarian, the case of Slovakia is even more 
relevant because this country was not only better in relative terms but also 
surpassed Hungary in absolute terms by 2007. 
 
                                                          
5 All figures cited in this paragraph were calculated from Maddison (2010). 
Péter Mihályi  245 
 
 
Fig. 11-2 Economic convergence of selected transition economies towards the 
average of EU-15 between 1989–2010 
(Percentage points, GDP/head at purchasing power parity, EU-15 = 100) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Darvas (2011) raw data and methodology 
2.2 Natural endowments and economic policies matter 
Since the previously mentioned Kaldor study (1966), analytical 
frameworks and tools have been significantly enriched. When countries at 
comparable levels of development are assessed today, the “laws” that 
might explain their differences are formulated at least in three separate 
dimensions: (i) natural endowments; (ii) economic policies; (iii) balance-
of-payments; and (iv) supply-side analysis. In the next few paragraphs, 
“laws” (i) – (iii) will be briefly discussed to leave space for the fourth 
explanatory dimension, the mechanisms determining the supply-side of the 
economy, and within this, the changes in productivity. 
2.2.1 Unfavourable geography 
The success of the Japanese economy during the 1960s was used to 
belittle the importance of natural endowments in many parts of the world, 
including Hungary. “Japan has no raw materials, yet she is producing 
miraculous growth rates” was the resounding verdict at that time. 
However, after the first oil shock in 1973 and the rapid enrichment of 
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some OPEC countries this alleged “law” went slowly out of fashion. 
Beyond the oil-rich Arab countries, the examples of Norway, the UK and – 
more recently – post-communist Russia have convinced everyone that the 
availability of raw materials is a major economic asset that can greatly 
contribute to the growth of a country. Similarly, the same holds true for 
monopoly positions (such as sea ports, maritime transit routes, summer 
beaches, and winter ski resorts). In this context, it is worth mentioning 
how in his latest book Jeffrey Sachs (2011) challenges the conventional 
view regarding European vs. USA comparisons. According to Sachs, 
America’s long-standing advantage in per capita GDP has been due to its 
geography rather than its economic system. America has vastly more land 
and natural resources per person than does Western Europe. This has been 
the source of its enduring advantage, rather than the allegedly better 
incentive mechanism, the lower taxes, the better institutions or the 
restrained activity of the state (Sachs 2011, 225–226).6 Without any further 
illustration and/or explanation, we submit that the weak economic 
performance of Hungary is partly due to her unfavourable resource 
endowments. 
2.2.2  Inept economic policies do harm 
The importance of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies in 
determining the growth trajectory of a given country has also become 
commonplace since the 1960s. This understanding has been forcefully 
supported by the recent worldwide calamities of the post-Lehman period. 
Partly due to her size and poor resource endowment, Hungary has been 
traditionally a very open economy. Currently, the combined value of her 
exports and imports is equal to 140% of annual GDP. In this context, it is 
important to refer back to those years – already mentioned above – when 
the Hungarian GDP growth figures were two times higher than in the EU. 
This is precisely when the country’s balance-of-payments displayed a 
deficit of 7–8% in four consecutive years. Moreover, during the last 10 
years, the central government, the local governments, the business sector 
and even the household sector pursued the same strategy of reaching for 
low-hanging fruit. Everybody was borrowing and – apart from the central 
bank – nobody was willing and/or capable to accumulate significant 
foreign (reserve) assets. As a result, Hungary has the worst position among 
the EU-27 countries concerning net international positions (Figure 11-3). 
The country’s total net debt was equal to 113% of its annual GDP, a figure 
                                                          
6 This is not a new idea in Sachs’ academic oeuvre. See also Gallup and Sachs and 
Mellinge (1998). 
Péter Mihályi  247 
far more worrisome than those of Romania or Poland (64%) or the Czech 
Republic (49%). Thus, considering the entire 1990–2010 period, the 





Fig. 11-3 Net international positions of the EU-27 in 2010 
Source: European Commission (2012a, 4) 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can apprehensively state that in terms 
of GDP growth the ballooning indebtedness of Hungary brought very 
disappointing results. As we will discuss, the borrowed money was 
primarily used to sustain consumption rather than to finance productive 
capital investments. With this strategy, the country reached a fiscal wall. 
Neither the markets nor the international financial institutions are likely to 
be willing to finance additional (net) borrowing. A long and painful period 
of deleveraging lies in wait for Hungary. 
                                                          
7 From the recent Hungarian assessments available in English language, see e.g. 
Antal (2004), Szapáry (2006), Győrffy (2009), Csillag and Mihályi (2006), Török 
(2010) and EEAG (2012). 
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2.3 A simple decomposition 
















GDP  = productivity  
ageworkinginPopulation
Workers  = employment rate 
populationTotal
ageworkinginPopulation  = dependency ratio, 
 















  (2) 
From the evidence presented in the previous sections, we can state 
without any additional investigation that Hungary suffers from two (not 
necessarily related) problems expressed in equations (1) and (2) – the low 
level of economic development and its slow annual increase. 
Analysing the three components in reverse, the assessment of the 
dependency ratio (as defined here for our purposes) is relatively 
straightforward. In 1980, 10 years before the regime change, the share of 
the working (15–64) age in the total population was 64.6%. This number 
rose to 66.2% by 1990 and 68.7% by 2011. This is a change in the right 
direction; the growth problem of Hungary did not originate from here! 
During the last 10 to 15 years, participants in Hungarian policy 
discussions have heavily focused on the employment rate, the second 
component of Equation (1). Even those economists who fundamentally 
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disagree on each and every detail of fiscal and monetary policies tend to 
accept without further analysis that this is the largest problem in Hungary. 
Indeed, the EU-wide international comparisons unequivocally show that 
Hungary “excels” with its lowest figure. According to the Eurostat 
methodology, the Hungarian rate was 55.4% in 2010, exactly 
10 percentage points lower than the EU-15 average (66.4%) and the 




Fig. 11-4 Changes in the Hungarian employment rate, 1996–2010 (In percentage of 
the 15–64 age group) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
However, what matters for the volume of production (GDP) is not the 
absolute number of workers but the amount of work these people perform 
in terms of working hours. The employment rate is low in Hungary 
because part-time employment is unpopular.9 For those who do work in 
Hungary, they do so for 1,961 hours a year on average, which is well 
above the OECD average of 1,749 hours. Perhaps it is surprising that 
Greece is the only country that has a higher figure. As Figure 11-5 on the 
next page shows, the Dutch, the Germans and the Norwegians are all 
below 1,500 hours. If Hungary’s GDP is low, the problem must be hidden 
elsewhere. 
 
                                                          
8 Malta used to be ranked lower than Hungary, but lately their figure rose from 
55.0% in 2009 to 56.1% in 2010. Among the OECD countries, however, Italy and 
Turkey have slightly worse numbers than Hungary (OECD 2012, 25). 
9 In 2010, the share of part-time workers was 5.5% in Hungary and 21.4% in the 
EU-15. 





Fig. 11-5 Average annual working time in selected OECD countries, 2010 (Hours 
per worker) 
Source: OECD (2011) 
 
As the numbers in Table 11-1 show, the variation of annual working 
hours around the calculated base for comparison (Hungary = 100) is in a 
rather narrow range (87–127%) and the absolute numbers in col. [1] are 
not correlated with the broadly varying GDP/head figures. Take, for 
example, Norway, Austria and Poland. The number of working hours per 
head of the total population is almost exactly the same in the three 
countries, while the GDP/head figure in Austria is twice as high as in 
Poland, and the Norwegian figure is three times higher than the Polish one. 
Thus, we can now safely state as a conclusion that the low level and the 
weak dynamics of labour productivity are responsible for the Hungary’s 
poor overall economic results. 
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Table 11-1 The relationship between total working time and economic 
development in 2008–2009 
 
Country Annual working hours per 
population 
GDP/Head 
Hours Percentage 1990. international dollars 
(PPP) 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Czech 
Republic 
946 127 12 868 
Portugal 900 121 14 436 
Slovakia 837 113 13 033 
Romania 832 112 4 895 
Norway 816 110 28 500 
Austria 816 110 24 131 
Poland 816 110 10 160 
Greece 811 109 16 362 
… …     
HUNGARY  744 100 9 500 
France 707 95 22 223 
Belgium 702 94 23 655 
Italy 692 93 19 909 
Turkey 650 87 8 066 
Source: [1] and [2] own calculations from Eurostat (2009), [3] Maddison (2010) 
Notes: Annual working hours are calculated in [1] for the entire population, 
including everyone. Data reflect the amount of work performed in the first quarter 
of 2009. Thus, the data show the state of the labour market before the international 
financial crisis. GDP/head data in [3] refer to the year 2008. 
3. The problem is labour productivity 
3.1 Education is not the answer 
Many policy makers and good-willed political commentators honestly 
believe that more higher education is the No. 1 recipe for growth. The 
opposite is true. 
In search for explanations and solutions to combat relative economic 
backwardness, most observers tend to overlook the positive legacy of 
socialist central planning. From the vantage point of the present paper, it is 
important to note that higher education was a top priority of the fallen 
system. As a result, 20 years after the fall of communism the population of 
the former socialist countries still has significantly more years of 
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schooling than capitalist countries of similar development levels. Russia is 
a perfect illustration. According to OECD (2009), 54% of the 25–64 age 
cohorts in Russia possess a higher education degree, in stark contrast with 
Japan and the US (40%) or the Swiss (30%). Because socialist planning 
systems looked at higher education as having merit, it was provided free of 
charge. From the perspective of Hungary, the comparison with neighbouring 
Austria is noteworthy. The share of adults with a university degree is about 
18% in both countries, while the difference in per capita GDP levels is 
more than 2:1. 
 
Table 11-2 The number of independent tertiary education institutions, 
1970–2008 
 










Source: Central Statistical Office. Statistical yearbooks, various years 
 
In this regard, the situation has only worsened since 1990. In the 
2010/2011 academic year, 1 out of 3 university students was enrolled in 
some kind of part-time, distance learning program rather than a regular, 
full-time program. In 1990/1991, this proportion was only 1:4 (Figure 
11-6).10 This tendency has led to a numerical overproduction of university 
graduates, which is a further fragmentation of the higher educational 
system and – as Polónyi and Timár (2001) warned long ago – to deteriorating 
quality throughout the entire network.11 Anecdotal examples suggest an 
                                                          
10 It is noteworthy that there are only few degrees that can be earned in full-time 
university programs only, such as medicine and architecture. 
11 It is more appropriate to state that Hungary, similar to many other former 
socialist countries, is suffering from a “quasi-development” problem (Jánossy 
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additional problem: part-time university students are usually not very 
effective workers because they must divide their attentions and energies 




Fig. 11-6 The composition of students in higher education, 1970–2011 (Number of 
students) 
Source: Central Statistical Office. Statistical Yearbook (1991, 254), Fazekas and 
Kézdi (2011, 203) 
 
Since the regime change, many Hungarian workers possessing only 8 
years of schooling are unable to find jobs because the jobs they would 
traditionally fill are now filled by others possessing a degree from middle-
schools (8 + 4 years). On the basis of this finding, many experts are 
convinced that the government must channel additional resources to 
expand the network of secondary schools. The argument is that without a 
good middle-school education the upcoming generation of young people 
will not meet the diverse skill requirements of the labour market. This 
paper is not the proper place to go into the details of this debate. However, 
perhaps it is enough to state that while in Hungary only one-third of this 
social stratum are employed, in other EU countries, such as Portugal, 
Greece and Denmark, two-thirds of the workers with 8 years of schooling 
find a job. 
We have a precise and detailed picture regarding the knowledge levels 
and the competencies of the future generation Hungarian workers, i.e., 
                                                                                                                         
1969). A lot of education has been obtained, but a poor economy has resulted 
because of the poor quality of teaching. 
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those who have just completed the 8-year long mandatory elementary 
schools. The results of the 2009 PISA-test Program12 show that the 
competencies of average Hungarian 15-year-old students in reading, 
mathematics and natural sciences are comparable with the OECD country 
averages. In most comparisons, the Hungarian students are on par with 
their peers studying in Sweden, Denmark and France. In 2009, the 





Fig. 11-7 PISA-test results and the OECD countries’ economic development levels 
(Results from science for 15-year-old students in 2006 and per capita GDP levels 
at purchasing parity rates) 
Source: OECD PISA 2006 database, Table F2.12a  
 
As the regression calculation in Figure 11-7 shows, there is a logic 
according to which some countries are significantly above the regression 
line (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland), while others are below it 
(Italy, Greece and Norway). The former group of countries are all 
transitional economies with a long tradition of socialist central planning. 
The second group proves that in striving for economic growth and 
development, countries with favourable natural endowments can 
compensate for the lower quality of their labour force. 
                                                          
12 The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a worldwide 
evaluation in 65 countries of 15-year-old school pupils’ scholastic performance, 
performed first in 2000 and repeated by the organizer (OECD) every three years. 
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3.2 In- and outward migration – an underutilised potential 
In many countries, outward migration is an important source of 
economic growth. In such cases, the economic rationale is that the 
migrating labourers can generate more added value in a more advanced 
economy than at home, and their home country benefits from this higher 
income through the repatriation of the higher earnings (remittances). It is a 
well-known example that, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, such 
migration greatly contributed to the overall development of Hungary. This 
was also the policy that was successfully applied by Italy during the late 
1950s and by Yugoslavia in the 1960s. After joining the EU in 2004, the 
legal conditions of outward migration have changed favourably, but 
Hungarians did not move in significant numbers unlike other post-
communist countries. In 2009, Romanian and Polish workers sent home 
€2.9 billion and €2.7 billion, respectively, while in Hungary the net 
balance of remittances was minus €50 million. 
Another way of enhancing a country’s growth potential is the import of 
labour. After World War II, Germany, Spain, the UK and Ireland used 
slightly different policies, but they all benefitted from the use of under-
qualified inexpensive workers from Southern Europe. Such a strategy is 
currently being pursued by Russia and to a smaller extent by the Ukraine, 
exploiting the labour reservoir of the ex-Soviet republics (Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, etc.). The United States is also a net importer, but her strategy 
is – not fully, but to a large extent – based on brain drain. Highly qualified 
intellectuals are imported from Europe, the Middle East, China and India. 
While some experts have already started to make forecasts about 
Hungary’s future immigration needs,13 the present situation is unfavourable 
both in the labour market and social-cultural dimensions. To become an 
attractive country for immigration, unskilled foreign workers should 
calculate net savings of €500–1,000 per month. However, Hungary’s tax 
and benefit policies (that compress wage distribution) are a major hurdle. 
Depending on the exchange rate, the average net wage is €460, and the 
official gross minimal wage is €320. In Hungary today, for a single worker 
without children earning the average wage, take home pay is only half of 
what it costs to employ him. From such a low net income, there is no way 
to save enough to provide for the family back home. Qualified foreign 
workers, in theory, could aspire to higher amounts of savings, but the 
barriers of the Hungarian language are almost insurmountable for them. In 
addition, the Hungarian public is notoriously intolerant vis-à-vis foreigners 
                                                          
13 Polónyi and Timár (2001) calculated that the Hungarian labour market would 
need 20,000 immigrants per year for the next 40 years. 
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and towards ethnically different people in particular. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that any political party would dare to start a political discussion 
on the benefits of immigration in the near future. 
While the politicians’ caution and fear from public sentiments are 
understandable, discarding the possibility of both types of migration 
(inward and outward) is a luxury that Hungary can hardy allow for itself in 
the future. 
3.3 Our answer: Far too many micro-firms 
As previously stated, the main problem in Hungary is the low average 
level of productivity. The next step is to analyse its variation. There are 
two dimensions where these variations are obtrusive. First, productivity 
differs drastically according to the size of firms. Second, but chiefly as a 
consequence of the first finding, there are huge territorial differences 
within the country. 
3.3.1 The missing increasing returns to scale 
During the last 20 years, many studies proved that there were large and 
growing productivity differences in Hungary between the large firms and 
small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs). As a static fact, this is not a 
specific Hungarian puzzle; the same was found in international 
comparisons (Lewis 2004, McKinsey Global Institute 2010, EC Enterprise 
and Industry 2010). However, it is important to note that, prior to 1990, 
large (state-owned) enterprises played a dominant role in the Hungarian 
economy and the regime change brought a reversal in this regard. Partly, 
this was unavoidable. Moreover, similar to nearly all industrialised 
nations, Hungary has also witnessed a shift in labour from the secondary 
sector, where firms were generally larger, to the tertiary sector (services), 
where they are smaller.14 
There are other factors. According to a Hungarian saying, policy 
makers fell from the other side of the horse, i.e., the country moved from 
                                                          
14 In Kaldor’s time, the share of the secondary sector (manufacturing + construction) 
was 31% in UK’s total employment, but it started to fall rapidly. By 2010, it was 
somewhere around 15% only. In Hungary, after the rapid restructuring of the entire 
economy, the contraction of the secondary sector did not start until 2002, and it 
was very slow even after that. In relative terms within total employment, the share 
was 29.6% in that year and the 2010 figure was only slightly lower (27.1%). In 
other words, it still matters what is happening in these two traditional sectors of the 
Hungarian economy. 
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one extreme position to the opposite. In 1989, there were approximately 
2,500 enterprises with more than 250 employees; the latest figure for 2009 
was 870. The number of sole proprietors in 1988 was 300,000; today the 
number is 1.4 million (2010). In other words, there is a continuing 
fragmentation of the nation’s entrepreneurial capital stock. In 2008, the 
annual value added of a Hungarian micro-enterprise was HUF 4.5 million 
per employee, while the same figure was HUF 8.2 million in large firms. 
The trend is negative. In 1998, the difference was only 150%; it was 182% 
in 2008 (Pitti 2010a). If we look at the 2009 data of the top 200 non-
financial Hungarian firms, the average per capita output in this elite group 
was HUF 67 million, while the corresponding figure was HUF 21 million, 
which is a three-fold difference, in the rest of the economy. It is alarming 
that since 2000 the absolute number of middle-size and large companies 
has been falling. The same holds for the changes in the structure of 
employment. This is the opposite of European trends. While elsewhere the 
process of concentration prevails, in Hungary the fragmentation of 
resources are to be observed almost everywhere.15 (The Hungarian 
categorisation of micro, small, medium-size and large firms is fully in line 
with the methodology of Eurostat. For detailed comparative data in all four 
enterprise categories used in the EU, see Appendix). 
The size problems also have a very important sectorial dimension. The 
productivity gap is not so worrisome in industry because many firms today 
are run as subsidiaries of western multinational companies. Foreign-owned 
manufacturing companies still operate, and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the productivity of the Hungarian employees in these subsidiaries is 
the same or even higher than in countries such as Germany and Austria 
where the mother companies have their own plants. However, the situation 
in the construction industry is alarming. Currently, there are 100,000 
domestic companies operating (at least on paper) within the sector; in 
1990, that number was slightly more than 5,000. Among the construction 
firms today, there are only 250 that are large enough to be qualified as a 
shareholding company – all of the other enterprises are limited liability 
companies owned by a single proprietor, a family or a very small number 
of connected entrepreneurs. The situation is even worse in agriculture, 
where 40% of the country’s agricultural land is cultivated by people who 
call themselves “farmers,” although only 3% of them have a specialised 
degree from a tertiary educational institution. This is a politically vocal 
                                                          
15 At the very top of the company pyramid – firms with more than 5,000 employees 
– there is a positive change, but not sufficiently strong. In 2004, the number of 
such privately owned firms was 11, while 14 such firms were registered in 2009. 
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and therefore important social group of 5–600,000 agrarians.16 Because 
these “farmers” are under-qualified, they continue to produce what they 
have seen from their fathers – grain. There are approximately 180,000 
farmer households currently registered as grain producers. In a country of 
the size of Hungary, 180 large farms would most likely be too many. 
Under such conditions, it is fully understandable why the total output of 
the Hungarian agricultural sector has been in free fall since 1990. In 2010, 
the level was the same as in the early 1970s, despite gigantic government 
and EU subsidies. The productivity gap is also substantial in certain parts 
of the service sector, where 63% of the jobs are to be found. In some 
areas, the multinationals have a strong and exclusive presence (e.g., 
banking, telecommunication), but in other areas (e.g., catering, retail trade) 
small Hungarian firms and public institutions dominate the job market. 
The problem in retail trade or catering is striking for any client with open 
eyes. In small Hungarian-owned shops and restaurants, one can often see 
assistants and waiters doing nothing because the premises are simply 
empty. By contrast, has anyone ever seen a McDonald’s or a Tesco 
hypermarket in which employees were not busy all the time? And these 
observations are not just anecdotal. According to the Central Statistical 
Office (KSH 2010), the number of retail trade outlets in 2009 was 2.5 
times more than in 1989, while the total turnover at constant prices grew 
by only 5%! The same source shows the same tendency in catering. In 
2009, there were almost twice as many functioning restaurants and cafes 
than in 1989, although the turnover in terms of volume actually fell by 
15%. The same holds for public sector employees, which is very high by 
international comparison.17 Two-thirds of these employees are working in 
very fragmented Hungarian local government institutions (e.g., general 
administration, education, health). 
The issues discussed above also have important territorial (regional) 
dimensions. Since 1996, the Hungarian Statistical Office has been 
regularly publishing a GDP/head time series for the country’s seven 
administrative regions. Figure 11-8 shows the disparity in these inter-
                                                          
16 Land ownership is even more fragmented than land cultivation. The number of 
registered farm land owners is 3.3 mn. According to the 2010 National Farm 
Survey, 60% of them are subsistence farmers, i.e. they do not even intend to 
market their own produce. From the total amount of labour used in Hungarian 
agriculture, only 25% is wage labour, 75% is provided by the land-owner and his 
family members. 
17 According to the 2008 OECD data, 20% of the Hungarian labour force is in the 
public sector, surpassed only by France and four Scandinavian countries. OECD 
(2012, 46). 
Péter Mihályi  259 
regional differences. Without going into a detailed demographic analysis, 
we note that the employment ratios and the dependency ratios do not 
display large variations among the regions. The variation is caused by the 




Fig. 11-8 Regional GDP/head differences 
Source: Fazekas and Kézdi (2011, 312) 
(In percentage. National average = 100) 
Note: For the sake of visibility only four of the seven regions are shown. The 
numbers in brackets show the population size. 
 
The advantage of Central Hungary, which includes the capital city of 
Budapest, is one of historical heritage. However, ethnically speaking, 
Hungary is a homogenous country; the differences cannot come from such 
differences among the seven regions. We strongly believe that the labour 
productivity gap is caused by the law of increasing returns to scale. Apart 
from Budapest, there is no other city in Hungary that is large enough to be 
successful in Europe-wide competition. Almost all big firms are located in 
Budapest or in Central Hungary. In other towns, everything is too small, 
narrow and disconnected: the labour market, the local demand, the logistic 
network, and the spectrum of amusements offered.18 For a long time, it 
                                                          
18 The country is too small to make a domestic airline network viable. Only 
Budapest has an international airport deserving its name. In 1990, the nation’s 
capital had more than 2 million inhabitants; it has only 1.7 million today. The other 
larger towns have been also shrinking in size. The second and the third largest 
cities are Debrecen and Szeged with populations of 208,000 and 170,000, 
respectively. Compared with the US, according to a recent McKinsey (2012) report 
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was a widely shared opinion that the construction of motorways from 
Budapest towards the seven most important border-crossing points would 
equalise the investment climate throughout the country. The motorways 
are now up and running, but the hopes did not materialise. Most of the 
time, many new highways are almost empty. 
3.3.2 The consequences 
The low level and the slow growth of productivity in the SMEs – and 
in micro-firms in particular – have at least three devastating dynamic 
corollaries at the macroeconomic level. Each of them is important, but 
only the third point will be discussed in this paper: 
 
(1) SMEs cannot play a serious role in vocational training; 
(2) SMEs cannot be properly taxed; therefore, the authorities have to 
rely on other taxable sources; 
(3) SMEs have weak incentives to invest and to grow. 
 
If production capacities are under-utilised (as in retail trade) and yields 
are low (as in agriculture), then unit cost – and therefore prices – are 
bound to be excessive, which then inhibits the growth of demand. If there 
is no demand, the firm or the farm cannot grow. As Gábor (1994) noticed 
early on, the Hungarian SMEs have been suffocating in this vertiginous 
vicious circle for two decades. There are very few successful SMEs 
capable of growth to reach the size and maturity of a publicly traded firm. 
Between 2000 and 2009, there were only 22 initial public offerings (IPOs) 
on the Budapest Stock Exchange, while Prague can take pride in 95 such 
transactions. 
In societal terms, the size distribution of firms has a strong influence 
on the distribution of the fruits of economic growth. Because SMEs are 
operating with narrow profit margins, they will not generate sufficient 
investable funding. This is the explanation for the downward sloping 
investment curve in Figure 11-9. At this point, we again invoke the 
concept of circular causation. If the level of investment is low for a 
prolonged period of time, the capital stock will be outdated and this will 
negatively impact labour productivity. This relationship holds strictly not 
only at the firm level but also at the macro level if externalities are taken 
into account. 
 
                                                                                                                         
using data for 2010, 84% of the American GDP was generated in the largest 259 
US cities, with a population of 150,000 or more. 
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Fig. 11-9 The share of gross accumulation within GDP, 1960–2011 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
In a European EU-27 comparison, the Hungarian SMEs have the 
weakest record in innovation. In the latest 2011 edition of the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard, four statistical measures are used to assess the SME 
sector’s contribution to innovation (Table 11-3). Of these four, Hungary 
occupies the very last position in two, and its scores and rankings are 
disappointingly weak in the other two categories as well.19 
                                                          
19 Those who know the Hungarian economy may object to the above presented 
causation by saying that there are many large publicly owned companies and 
institutions, particularly in such capital intensive industries such as transport, 
healthcare and education; thus, a lot of investments and R&D must be financed by 
these public actors. Unfortunately, this objection does not hold. These companies 
and institutions – precisely because they are publicly owned – have been forced by 
the government to operate with low profit margins to keep their prices and/or fees 
low. 
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Table 11-3 The relative position of Hungarian SMEs as enablers of 
innovation, around 2010 
 
Share of … 
(in percentage of the 




















… SME’s introducing 
product or process 
innovation  





39.09 53.02 (Luxembourg) 20.52 (24th) 
Source: European Commission (2012b, 62–63) (Annex A) 
3.3.3 How did we get here? 
If the consequences are so serious, it is imperative to understand how 
micro-firms became so weighty in the Hungarian economy so soon after 
the regime change and why they could preserve their positions up to 
present times. The problem is also known to other countries. As shown in 
the Appendix, Portugal and Greece also have many small firms, and this 
finding may explain their anaemic growth and low productivity to a great 
extent. Furthermore, the Portuguese story is similar to the Hungarian case 
to the extent that after the fall of the Salazar dictatorship, consecutive 
governments had pursued a deliberate policy of demonopolisation. 
However, the similarities most likely end there. It has been shown 
convincingly by Braguinsky et al. (2011) that in Portugal the survival of 
inefficient small firms is chiefly explained by the strong protection for 
regular workers in their labour code and other legislation, which was 
instituted as a reaction to the anti-democratic constraints of the overthrown 
dictatorship. 
The labour code does cause problems in Hungary too; however, in our 
view, it is not the main explanation of the distorted company structure. In 
Greece, rigid product market rules seem to be the culprit. As a recent 
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McKinsey & Company (2012) report shows, Greek licensing and 
operating processes are extremely cumbersome. In a direct, regression-
based comparison the Hungarian data look better (McKinsey 2012, 20). 
While these international comparisons are always informative, we must 
look for explanations elsewhere to understand the Hungarian case. In our 
view, there are at least four other causational mechanisms that mutually 
reinforce each other and thus fatally undermine productivity growth at the 
macro level.  
During the first period of the socialist planned economy, the state 
merged all the previously existing privately owned SMEs into newly 
created state-owned enterprises. Subsequently, the administrative prices 
guaranteed that profits were all taxed away from the society and then 
redistributed as investments for the benefit of state-owned enterprises. 
Under such circumstances, the service sector shrank, causing a 
deterioration of the quality of life for consumers. As SMEs disappeared, 
many consumer goods and services became either inaccessible or 
accessible in only a few places. As is well known, there were long queues 
in shops, and diners could not find a free table in restaurants. After 1973, 
the situation improved somewhat in this regard, particularly in Hungary as 
compared with other socialist countries. However, only the regime change 
in 1989 opened the gates in front of the owners of SMEs. The huge pent-
up demand quickly created its own supply.20 The mushrooming SMEs 
made a significant contribution to consumers’ welfare, although this was 
not – and for methodological reasons could not be – measured as a part of 
output. This kind of statistical distortion holds even today, when wage or 
consumption figures from the pre-1990 figures are compared with current 
data. 
After the initial boom, the continued hypertrophy of micro- and small 
firms was largely due to the new legal environment. As land ownership 
had been constrained since 1994 and lax tax and credit rules and 
subsidised investment moneys were continuously pumped into the system, 
the micro-ventures looked competitive from the consumers’ perspective. 
The explanation is that half to two-thirds of the activities of micro- and 
small enterprises are in the grey and black economy, and this allows them 
to offer bargain prices. Hence, the large firms operating in the “white” 
economy cannot translate their higher productivity levels into lower prices 
and thus compete with the small firms. In addition, the small firms use 
fixed capital sparingly, which is logical from their perspective. This is 
even more logical if the aging of the owners is also taken into account. As 
                                                          
20 By 1994, the first year when such figures were released in comparable form with 
later data, the number of registered business units was already above 1.0 million. 
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tax returns show, the small firms write off more fixed capital than they 
actually replace. These mechanisms, as already mentioned, do not cause 
much obstruction in the manufacturing sector, but they are strongly present 
in agriculture, retail trade, the construction industry and in the areas of 
health and culture. Because the manufacturing sector is relatively small 
today (15–17% of GDP), its high and growing productivity cannot 
sufficiently improve the economy-wide average. 
The third reason that explains the survival of so many SMEs is that the 
customary market-clearing mechanism (the big fish eat the small fish) 
does not work effectively. Due to the lax accounting rules, the owners of 
small firms are able to hide their families’ personal consumption costs as 
costs of their enterprises.21 This is possible because in small firms the 
bookkeeping and the access to a firm’s bank accounts are typically 
controlled by the owner-manager, which is inconceivable in middle-size 
firms with more than 50 employees. In this way, the true proceeds of the 
small firms can be 50 to 100% more than the reported profits. The flip side 
of this situation is that the more competitive, larger firms cannot buy these 
smaller firms because the owner of the small firm would like to receive 5–
10 times his true annual proceeds, while the potential buyer (a larger 
company) can offer only 5–10 times the reported annual profits. 
Moreover, these widely used cost-hiding practices prevent horizontal 
cooperation among farmers, shopkeepers and even professional service 
providers, such as physicians, nurses, translators and artists. Because 
everybody has something to hide from the eyes of the taxman, they are all 
afraid to show their contracts, invoices and bills to each other. Without 
openness and transparency in their administration, they cannot fully 
cooperate with each other in their actual daily work.22 
Finally, the honest but erroneous conviction of Hungarian policy 
makers needs to be mentioned in which their continued support of SMEs 
is necessary to create new jobs. As in many other countries, there is a 
widespread and repeated claim, both in the business community and in 
government, that most new jobs are created by small businesses. In static 
terms, this is true for Hungary as well. However, “young” firms should not 
be confused with “small” firms. As everyday Hungarian experience 
suggests – and rigorous econometric investigation for the US proves 
                                                          
21 A few typical examples: the office is operating in the apartment or the family 
house of the owner, the family car is legally owned by the firm, the phone costs of 
the entire family are assumed by the family company, eating-out costs of the 
family are billed as client-related expenses, etc. 
22 For a general discussion on the importance of cooperation, see also Győrffy 
(2009) and Szalavetz (2010). 
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(Haltiwanger et al. 2010) – most new jobs are created by young firms that 
happened to be small at the beginning and not by those small firms that 
remained small even 5–10 years after their establishment. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper argues that Hungary has no other growth reserves than a 
more efficient allocation of the existing human and capital stock. Overall 
labour resource utilisation is comparable to our peers because the low 
participation rates are fully compensated by the higher average hours 
worked. Inward and outward migrations are promising but untapped 
channels. As for capital, the country today lacks large enterprises, which 
can maximise workers’ output through economies of scale and scope. 
Thus, there is a need for ownership concentration of fixed capital and 
natural resources (e.g., agricultural land and forests). Such a strategy 
would require a fast consolidation of micro- and small enterprises into 
transparently functioning middle-size and large firms. Paraphrasing the 
famous Marxist slogan, the new slogan should be, “Small entrepreneurs of 
Hungary, unite!” 
Once this is achieved by means of legal and administrative changes, 
Hungary will be once again an attractive investment opportunity to foreign 
investors. If the Hungarian labour force in the service sector, agriculture 
and elsewhere can generate extra profits for the owners of capital, the 
necessary financial means will be amply supplied by international capital 
markets. In practice, this will mean green field investments and 
privatisation of existing assets as well. 
In other words, low productivity in certain – but not in all – parts of the 
Hungarian economy is the primary structural barrier to overall economic 
growth. The labour participation issue is merely a symptom and – to a 
considerable extent – the result of government induced administrative 
distortions. The country’s low employment rate cannot be addressed 
before a massive productivity and profitability boost. This boost can no 
longer come from debt- and consumption-driven output growth, but rather 
from private sector investments in machinery and infrastructure. No doubt, 
a shift from consumption to investments, from wages to profits is 
politically difficult. Thus, there is a price to be paid for the acceleration of 
economic growth, just as there is a price to pay for the failure of catching 
up with the EU-15. The society has to change its mind-set. The majority of 
Hungarians today do not understand that production per se, good 
intentions, and diligence do not represent true values. If they as consumers 
do not buy something that is being produced (e.g., expensive Hungarian 
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agricultural products) or do not buy tickets to half-empty passenger trains 
in the countryside or do not enrol into the small countryside universities – 
then the continuation of such production or service provisions is simply a 
waste. Eventually, the price we pay is that the country as a whole will 
remain unable to catch up with our envied neighbours, such as Austria or 
even Slovakia. Both the public and the political elite of Hungary should 
understand and accept that there is no societal objective for which it is 
worth sacrificing the growth of labour productivity. At present, we are 
very far from this. 
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